JUDGMENT 1. The main question involved in this Appeal is whether a paternal great-grandfather's son's daughter's son (i.e., a grand-uncle's daughter's son), or a mother's brother (i.e., a maternal uncle) is the preferable heir according to the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. The Plaintiff brought a suit for rent of certain properly which he claimed to have inherited from one Sarat Chandra, the last male owner, on the death of his mo her Kunjamoni, as his granduncle's daughter's son The Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (the tenants) raised the objection that he was not entitled to the rent on the ground that the Defendant No. 3 was the heir of Sarat Chandra. The Defendant No. 3 thereupon was added as a party to the suit and he pleaded that he as the maternal uncle of Sarat Chand a was his heir in preference to the Plaintiff. The Courts below have held that the Plaintiff is the preferential heir and have decreed the suit for rent in his favour. The Defendant No. 3 has appealed to this Court. According to the doctrine of spiritual benefit the Plaintiff is the preferential heir, being competent to offer funeral cakes to the paternal great grandfather of the last male owner in which he participates, whereas the Defendant is competent to offer such cakes to his maternal ancestors only, and the first kind of cakes are of superior religious efficacy in comparison to the second. The view that the principle of spiritual benefit governs the law of inheritance in the Dayabhaga was authoritatively laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Guru Gobind v. Ananda Lal 13 W. R. F. B. 49 (1870), and again by another Full Bench in the case of Digumbar Ray v. Moti Lal I. L. R. 9 Cal. 563 (1883). It has been contended on behalf of the Appellant that the principle of spiritual benefit is no test of heirship, at any rate, not the sole test, and that the doctrine has been misunderstood by Mitter, J., in the Full Bench case of Guru Gobind v. Ananda Lal 13 W. R. F. B. 49 (1870), and reliance has been placed on certain observations made by Shastri Golap Chandra Sarkar in his work on Hindu Law, 4th Ed., p. 323. An attempt was made in a recent case, Kedar Naih v. Amrita Lal 16 C. L. J. 342 : s. c. 17 C. W. N. 492 (1912), to induce the Court to have the matter reconsidered by the Full Court on the ground that the Full Bench took an erroneous view of the fundamental principles which underlie the Dayabhaga and consequently arrived at incorrect conclusions, but it was unsuccessful. The learned Judges (Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ.) expressed the opinion that had the matter been res integra the view put forward by the Appellant would deserve consideration, but that on well-established principles the matter should not be re-opened, the law on the subject having been authoritatively laid down by two successive Full Benches, once in 1870 and again in 1883, and previous attempts to re-open the matter having never been successful. We agree with the opinion expressed in that case, and must treat the law as settled by the Full Bench decisions. 2. It is contended, however, that the precise position of the paternal uncle's daughter's son in the category of heirs was not determined in the case of Guru Gobind v. Ananda Lal 13 W. R. F. B. 49 (1870) and that the fact that the mother's brother is expressly named as an heir in the Dayabhaga and the great-grandfather's son's daughter's son is not mentioned, goes to show that the former is entitled to succeed in preference to the the latter. It is further contended that the funeral cake offered by the grand-uncle's daughter's son although offered to a paternal ancestor of the deceased, coming as it does through a maternal line, is not preferable to that given by the Defendants. It is true the oblations offered by the Plaintiff to the great-grandfather of the deceased come through a maternal line, but oblations offered to a paternal ancestor of the deceased in which he participates, although coming through a maternal line, are of superior efficacy to those offered to maternal ancestors of the deceased. 3. The argument based upon the ground that the maternal uncle is expressly mentioned and the granduncls's daughter's son is not mentioned in the Dayabhaga has no force. 3. The argument based upon the ground that the maternal uncle is expressly mentioned and the granduncls's daughter's son is not mentioned in the Dayabhaga has no force. As pointed out by D. N. Mitter, J., in the Full Bench case "every one who has gone through the Dayabhaga must have perceived that the specific enumeration of each individual heir was not the object which the author had in view. It is perfectly true that a few of the heirs have been mentioned by name here and there : but the great majority of them have been left to be determined by the application of the principle of spiritual benefit. Thus, of the numerous relations who are entitled to come in as sapindas by virtue of their right to offer oblations to the maternal ancestors of the deceased proprietor, the maternal uncle is the only one who has been mentioned by name. Then, again, among the sakulyas or kinsmen connected by divided oblations, the grandson's grandson is the only person who has been specifically enumerated: and of the samanodakas, or kinsmen connected by libations of water, not one even has been so enumerated. In the face of all these facts, it is impossible to contend that the mere absence of specific enumeration is any ground whatever for excluding one single individual who is really competent to fulfil the conditions of heirship laid down in the Dayabhaga itself." 4. No doubt the precise position of the paternal uncle's daughter's son in the category of heirs was not laid down in that case but in the subsequent case of Braja Lal v. Jiban Krishna I. L. R. 26 Cal. 285 (1898), the precise position of the father's brother's daughter's son in the line of heirs was considered and it was held that there could be no doubt that he comes before the sapinda relations in the maternal line. The learned Judges in that case (Maclean, C. J., and Banerjee, J.) observed as follows :--"This will be seen from the Dayabhaga, Chap. XI, s. vi, paras. 13 and 20, in the former of which the author indicates the reason for the succession of maternal kinsmen and for the preference of sapindas in the paternal over those in the maternal line, according to the doctrine of spiritual benefit. That reason is shortly this. XI, s. vi, paras. 13 and 20, in the former of which the author indicates the reason for the succession of maternal kinsmen and for the preference of sapindas in the paternal over those in the maternal line, according to the doctrine of spiritual benefit. That reason is shortly this. The wealth of a deceased person, who can no longer have temporal enjoyment, should devolve on those who can confer spiritual benefit on him. Now the sabindas in the paternal line offer oblations to the paternal ancestors which the deceased was bound to offer, and in which he participates, and the sapindas in the maternal line offer oblations to the maternal ancestors, which the deceased was bound to offer, but in which he does not participate ; so that, while they both confer spiritual benefit on the deceased the former benefit him doubly by enabling him to participate in the oblations offered by them and by discharging a duty that was incumbent on him of offering libations to certain ancestors, and the latter benefit him only in one way, namely, by offering certain oblations which he was bound to offer ; and therefore while both are entitled to inherit his estate, the latter succeed only on failure of the former. After showing that his doctrine is in conformity with the texts of Manu, the author of the Dayabhaga states his conclusion in para. 20." 5. The granduncle's daughter's son would on the same principles succeed in preference to the maternal uncle. Dayabhaga, Ch. XI, sec. 6, verse 9, says :--"The succession of the grandfather and great grandfather's lineal descendants including the daughter's sons, must be understood in a similar manner according to the proximity of the funeral offering ;" and verse 12 says "on failure of any lineal descendants of the paternal great grandfather down to the daughter's son who might present oblations in which the deceased would participate," the property devolves on the maternal kindred. And in the Dayakrama Sangraha, Ch. I, sec. x, verse 13, it is stated "(In default of paternal great-grandfather's son) the succession devolves on the paternal grandfathers brother's daughter's son, who presents an oblation in which the deceased owner-participates, namely, to the owner's paternal great-grandfather [i.e., his maternal great-grandfather]." 6. We are accordingly of opinion that the Courts below are right in holding that the Plaintiff is the preferable heir. We are accordingly of opinion that the Courts below are right in holding that the Plaintiff is the preferable heir. It was next contended that the Court of Appeal below ought to have come to a finding whether the 1/3rd share of one Nilmony (Plaintiff's mother) constituted the stridhan of Kunjamoni, the mother of Sarat Chandra, because if it was her stridhan, it passed to her brother Defendant No. 3. But the question was not raised in the lower Appellate Court. It is said that it is a pure question of law, but the decision of it depends upon questions of fact. For instance, it will have to be found whether the possession of Kunjamoni was adverse to Nilmony, a co-sharer, and if so, whether Nilmony died within 12 years of the suit, in which case the Plaintiff being the reversioner, will not be bound by any adverse possession by Kunjamoni against Nilmony. The Defendant No. 3 cannot complain that no findings were arrived at on these points, as he did not raise the question at all in the lower Appellate Court, and we cannot allow him to raise the point now. The Appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.