JUDGMENT 1. The question for decision in the Rule is whether an appeal lies against an order resfuing a temporary injunction. Or. 43, r. I(a), provides for an appeal against an order under r. I of Or. 39. Or. 39, r. I, lays down that the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction. Now, sec. 588, cl. 24 of the old Code (Act XIV of 1882) gave an appeal against orders under sec. 492, and sec. 492 laid down that the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction or refuse such injunction. The words "or refuse such injunction " have been omitted from Or. 39, r. I of the present Code, and it is contended for the Opposite Party, that as Or, 43, r. I, provides for an appeal only against an order under Or. 39, r. I, and as the only order mentioned in Or. 39, r. I, is an order granting an injunction, an appeal lies only against an order granting an injunction and not against an order refusing it. But although the words "or refuse such injunction " have been omitted from Or. 39, r. I, there can be no doubt that the Court has the power to refuse an injunction. Or. 39, r. I, surely lays down under what circumstances the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction. It cannot be said that the only order which can be passed by the Court is an order granting an injunction. 2. The Court "may" grant, it is not bound to grant, an injunction. The fact that the Court '' may " grant an injunction if the matters stated in the Rule are proved, implies that the Court has the power to refuse an injunction, if those facts are not proved. So that notwithstanding that the words or refuse such injunction' have been omitted from Or. 39, r. I, the Court has as much power to refuse such an injunction under the present Code as it had under sec. 492 of the old Code which expressly stated that the Court may refuse the injunction. If the words " an order under r. I of Or. 39" in Or. 43, r. I, mean only an order granting an injunction, we must hold that the only order which can be passed under Or. 492 of the old Code which expressly stated that the Court may refuse the injunction. If the words " an order under r. I of Or. 39" in Or. 43, r. I, mean only an order granting an injunction, we must hold that the only order which can be passed under Or. 39, r. I, is an order granting an injunction, in other words, that an order refusing an injunction cannot be passed under that Rule. This certainly cannot be held. Or. 39, r. I, is the only order under which the Court can deal with an application for temporary injunction, and there is no other section which gives the Court power to refuse an injunction. "An order under r. I of Or. 39 " therefore refers to any order passed under Or. 39, r. I, and since under that Rule, the Court has the power of refusing an injunction we think an appeal lies against an order refusing an injunction. The view we take is supported by the observations by the Privy Council in the case of Reasut Husain v. Hudjee Abdullah I. L. R. 2 Cal. 131 (1876). where in considering the question whether sec. 76 of the Registration Act VIII of 1871 (of which the final words were " no appeal lies from any order made under this section") excluded an appeal not only where the Judge directed the Registrar to register a deed, but also when the application for registration was rejected, their Lordships observed: " Their Lordships would have great difficulty in saying that an order of rejection does not fall within the term an order made under this section, because if the Judge does not make his order of rejection under the 76th section, it is difficult to see what other section gives him jurisdiction to make it," but their Lordships did not think it necessary to decide the point in that case. 3. Sec. 104 of the new Code no doubt lays down that an appeal shall lie from the orders mentioned in that section and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code, or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders, and cl. (i) mentions " any order made under Rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Rules." But cl. (t) of r. I, Or. (i) mentions " any order made under Rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Rules." But cl. (t) of r. I, Or. 43, expressly gives an appeal from an order under r. I of Or. 39 and if an order refusing to appoint a Receiver is an order under that Rule, an appeal is expressly allowed from such an order under cl. (r). 4. In all the clauses (except one) of r. I, Or. 43, the words used are ''an order," but the clauses themselves show that ''an order " under a particular Rule includes an order refused under that Rule, although the Court is not expressly authorised by that Rule to pass an order of refusal. For instance, cl. (c) gives an appeal against "an order under r. 9 of Or. IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal by a suit." But Or. IX, r. 9, says that the Court "shall make an order setting aside the dismissal" if satisfied of certain matters. It does not expressly authorise the Court to reject an application for setting aside an order of dismissal, but cl. (c) of Or. 43, r. I, shows that an order rejecting such an application is an order under Or. IX, r. 9. Similarly cl. (t) in Or. 43, r. I, gives an appeal against " an order of refusal under r. 19 of Or. 41 to re-admit or under r. 21 of Or. 41 to re-hear an appeal" although those rules do not expressly authorise the Court to pass orders of refusal. Similar observations apply to els. (d), (k) (n) and (0) of Or. 43, r. I. So that, notwithstanding the fact that the Rules to which they refer mention only orders granting an application, the clauses themselves show that orders of refusal are within the Rules. Some of the clauses of r. I, Or. 43, expressly give a right of appeal only against an order of refusal, and they do not create any difficulty, because the Legislature expressly restricts the right of appeal against orders of refusal. But cls. (j), (l) and (m) give a right of appeal against an order granting an application as well as against an order of refusal. Cl. (f) refers to orders under r. 72 and r. 92 of Or. But cls. (j), (l) and (m) give a right of appeal against an order granting an application as well as against an order of refusal. Cl. (f) refers to orders under r. 72 and r. 92 of Or. 21 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale, but r. 92 expressly provides for confirming as well as for setting aside a sale, whereas r. 72 provides only for setting aside a sale. Cl. (m) gives an appeal against an order under r. 3 of Or. 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement or compromise, but r. 3 only provides for the Courts ordering an agreement or compromise to be recorded and does not expressly authorise the Court to refuse to do so. Similar observations apply to cl. (I). It may be said that when an appeal is intended to be given both against an order of refusal as well as against an order granting an application, it is so expressly stated as in cls. (j), (I) and (m); but the same argument might have applied to some of the clauses of sec 588 of the old Code. Cl. 7 gave an appeal from orders under sec. III setting-off or refusing to set off one debt against another and cl. 16 gave an appeal from orders under sec. 312 or sec. 313 for confirming or setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale. Cl. (24) gave an appeal from orders under sec. 503. Sec. 503 (like Or. 40, r. I of the present Code to which it corresponds) mentioned only an order appointing a Receiver and not an order refusing to appoint a Receiver. Sec. 588, cl. (24), did not expressly mention an order refusing to appoint a Receiver just as cl. (s) of Or. 43, r. I, does not expressly mention it. But notwithstanding the fact that cls. 7 and 16 of sec. 588 expressly mentioned orders refusing as well as orders granting and sec. 503 did not expressly mention an order of refusal, it has always been held that an appeal lay against an order refusing to appoint a Receiver. See Baidya Nath v. Makhan Lal I L. R. 17 Cal. 680 (1890). Dulmit Putt v. Het Narain 6 C. L. R. 467 (1880). Venkath Sami v. Shidavamma I. L. R, 10 Mad. 179 (1887). 5. However that may be, when cl. See Baidya Nath v. Makhan Lal I L. R. 17 Cal. 680 (1890). Dulmit Putt v. Het Narain 6 C. L. R. 467 (1880). Venkath Sami v. Shidavamma I. L. R, 10 Mad. 179 (1887). 5. However that may be, when cl. (r) gives an appeal against an order under r. I of Or. 39, and an order refusing an injunction can be passed under that Rule, and must be taken as an order under that Rule, we think that an appeal lies against an order refusing an injunction. The order of the learned District Judge is accordingly set aside and the case is sent back to that Court for a re-hearing of the appeal according to law. The costs of this Rule which we assess at I gold mohur will abide the result.