JUDGMENT : RYVES, J. Thisappeal arises out of a suit for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage of a twelve anna share in mauza Malgaon. The alleged mortgage is said to have been made on the 1st of April, 1857. 2. The only evidence to prove the mortgage is a certified copy of a Sulehnama of that date. The record of the suit was destroyed in the Mutiny. This Sulehnama was filed in the court of the Zillah Judge in a litigation between the predecessors of the parties to this suit in which partition of the twelve anna share was sought. The genuineness of this copy was contested in both the lower courts, but both courts have held that it was genuine. This finding is binding on us. The copy shows that the Sulehnama was signed by the pleaders for the parties and filed in court. After reciting the facts of the litigation then pending it goes on to say: “Now between the parties agreement has been arrived at in this manner that we, the respondents, admit the proprietary title of the appellants and the fact of their claim being within the period of limitation, and the possession of the respondents shall remain on the above-mentioned property for twelve years in lieu of Rs. 1,600 mortgage consideration and after twelve years the appellants shall redeem the mortgaged property on payment of the above-mentioned mortgage consideration out of their own pockets, etc.” 3. There is an endorsement in the following terms. “To-day the pleaders of parties presented this compromise and in the presence of their respective clients verified and accepted all the terms contained in this deed of compromise, therefore it is ordered that the deed of compromise may be placed on the record and this suit shall be put up to-morrow at the commencement of the sittings for final decision. 4. Written on the Ist of April, 1857, signed by the Judge in English characters.” 5. Relying on this copy the first court decreed the suit. On appeal it was argued, inter alia, that even if the copy were genuine it is not admissible in evidence because the original was not properly stamped. The learned Judge upheld this contention and came to the conclusion that “the original compromise bore a stamp of one rupee only, that the document required a stamp of Rs. On appeal it was argued, inter alia, that even if the copy were genuine it is not admissible in evidence because the original was not properly stamped. The learned Judge upheld this contention and came to the conclusion that “the original compromise bore a stamp of one rupee only, that the document required a stamp of Rs. 10, and that as the document was insufficiently stamped its copy was not admissible in evidence.” He goes on to say, “when that document is removed there is no evidence to prove the mortgage alleged by the plaintiff.” In the result he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 6. Before us the only question is whether the learned Judge was right in discarding this copy. In my opinion he was not. The copy itself was admitted in evidence by the first court and although there is no distinct finding by that court, in so many words, that the document was properly stamped, yet such a finding must be inferred from the fact that the court relied on the case of Ram Dyal v. Dhoobey Jhamman Lal., 3 N.W.P. p. 14 and another case as its authority for holding that the document was admissible in evidence. The head-note in Ram Dyal v. Dhoobey Jhamman Lal runs as follows:— “A document in the shape of petition to a court setting forth an arrangement come to between the parties in a suit, may be received in evidence in support of a fresh suit founded upon the agreement recited in such petition, although only stamped as a petition, it not appearing that the agreement recited was made in writing.” As the document was admitted in evidence, no further question can arise under section 36 of the Stamp Act of 1899 as to its admissibility on the ground that it was not duly stamped. If, however, it could be shown that the original document of which it was a copy was not duly stamped, it would not be available as secondary evidence of the original. But there is no evidence whatsoever as to what stamp, if any, was affixed to the original. The learned Judge holds that the copy required to be stamped in accordance with Article 20 of Regulation No. 10 of 1829. But there is no evidence whatsoever as to what stamp, if any, was affixed to the original. The learned Judge holds that the copy required to be stamped in accordance with Article 20 of Regulation No. 10 of 1829. The Article runs as follows:— “Copy or counterpart of any deed or instrument attested to be a true copy and furnished to a party to the same, for the purpose of being given in evidence for the recovery of any sum of money, property, interest or rights secured thereby:— The same duty as prescribed for the original deed by this Regulation.” 7. He considers that the compromise should have been stamped as a mortgage with a ten rupee fee stamp. Inasmuch as the copy is on a paper with a one rupee engraved stamp he says, “it is clear therefore that on the original deed of compromise the stamp affixed was of one rupee.” Even if article 20 was applicable to a copy like this, given by a court, of a document filed in a judicial proceeding, I do not think it at all follows that because the copy bears a particular stamp that the original must have borne a stamp of the same value. The concluding words of the article are “the same duty as prescribed for the original deed.” If they had been “the same duty as paid for the original deed” there might have been some force in the argument. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I think we must presume that the court acted according to law, and according to section 3 of the said regulation was satisfied that the document was duly stamped before it was placed on the record. 8. The various cases which have been cited by the learned Judge are all distinguishable from this case, inasmuch as every one of the original documents was before the court and the stamp was patent on the face of it. Here, as I have said, the original records were destroyed in the mutiny and there is nothing to show how the document was stamped. In my opinion, therefore, there was no evidence on which the learned Judge could come to the conclusion that the original document was not duly stamped. Here, as I have said, the original records were destroyed in the mutiny and there is nothing to show how the document was stamped. In my opinion, therefore, there was no evidence on which the learned Judge could come to the conclusion that the original document was not duly stamped. I would therefore allow the appeal, and setting aside the decree of the lower court, would restore that of the first court with costs. GRIFFIN, J.:— I agree. 10. By the Court.— The appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the court of first instance is restored. The plaintiffs-appellants will have their costs in all courts.