JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal against an order of the District Judge of 24-Pergunnahs rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the Respondents that no appeal lies against such an order. The dicision of this question depends upon whether an order dismissing an appeal as having been filed beyond time is a decree passed in appeal from which a second appeal is allowed under sec. 100 of the Code. We are of opinion that it is such a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Code. It was held by Wilson and Beverley, JJ., in the case of Gunga Das Dey v. Ramjoy Dey I. L. R. 12 Cal. 30 (1885), that, reading the definition of a decree under sec. 2 which includes an order rejecting a plaint, with sec. 582, an order rejecting or dismissing an appeal is a decree of the Appellate Court under the terms of the definition. However that may be, the order passed by the lower Appellate Court confirmed the decree of the Court of first instance and thereby conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy in the suit. Had the appeal been admitted and then dismissed on a preliminary objection raised at the hearing that the appeal was filed out of time, there could be no question that the order dismissing the appeal, though on a preliminary point, would be a decree and we do not see why an order dismissing an appeal before it is admitted should not be considered a decree. In either case, the decree of the Court of first instance is confirmed and the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy in the suit are finally determined by the order dismissing the appeal. We are accordingly of opinion that a second appeal lies. The next question is whether a miscalculation of the period of limitation by a pleader in consequence of which an appeal is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation may constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, for admitting the appeal filed out of time. The next question is whether a miscalculation of the period of limitation by a pleader in consequence of which an appeal is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation may constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, for admitting the appeal filed out of time. The learned Judge was of opinion, having regard to the authorities referred to by him, that a miscalculation by a pleader is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of sec. 5. The learned Judge referred to the case of Gopal Chunder Lahiri v. Solomon I. L. R. 11 Cal. 767 (1884), and the same case on appeal reported in Gopal Chunder Lahiri v. Solomon I. L. R. 13 Cal. 62 (1886).. The facts of that case, however, are different. There, in a suit, the Counsel for the Defendant accepted the statement made by the Counsel for the Plaintiff in respect to the contents of a conveyance (the Counsel for the Defendants not having read it) that under it the Plaintiff in chat suit was entitled to the whole of the property and a decree was accordingly made in favour of the Plaintiff on the 5th February 1885 and the decree was signed on the 25th February. Subsequently a suit was instituted by the Defendant to set aside the conveyance on the ground of fraud and, in the course of that suit, on the 30th March 1885 it was discovered by the Counsel for the Defendant that the title to a portion of the property was in the Defendant under the conveyance and thereupon an application for review of the judgment in the first suit was filed out of time and it was held by the first Court that there was " sufficient cause" for not presenting the application for review within the period prescribed. The Court of Appeal pointed out that if this were to be deemed a sufficient excuse for the application not being made in due time, it would be an equally good excuse for delaying the application for a year or any longer time whenever the learned Counsel might happen to read its contents. 2. The question whether a bond file mistake on the part of a pleader in calculating the period of limitation for preferring an appeal can constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sec. 2. The question whether a bond file mistake on the part of a pleader in calculating the period of limitation for preferring an appeal can constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has been considered in two recent decisions of this Court In the case of Bishendut Tewari v. Nandan Pershad Dubay 12 0. W. N. 25 (1907), there was a miscalculation by the pleader for the Appellant as regards the period within which the appeal was to be filed and upon an application for the admission of the appeal which was filed out of time by two days, an order was made admitting the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal an objection was raised that the appeal was barred by limitation and the case of Gopal Chunder Lahiri v. Solomon I. L. R. 13 Cal. 62 (1886) and certain other cases were cited, but the learned Judges, under the circumstances of that case, came to the conclusion that the order admitting the appeal should not be discharged. It is true that importance was attached to the fact that an order (though ex parte) had already been made admitting the appeal and to the delay in raising the question of limitation after costs had been incurred but Mr. Justice Woodroffe considered the question of bond fide mistake of the pleader in calculating the period of limitation and held that each case must be decided upon its own facts. In another recent decision of this Court in Civil Rule No. 8097 of 1911 decided on the 3rd August 1911 by Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ., the learned Judges considered this question and after referring to the authorities on the point came to the conclusion that they were not prepared to lay down as an inflexible rule of law that in no case can the circumstance that a litigant has under the erroneous advice of Counsel or pleader presented an appeal out of time be deemed a sufficient cause within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and that the true rule is whether under the special circumstances of each case the Appellant acted under an honest though mistaken belief formed with due care and attention or there was any negligence or inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the Appellant. 3. 5 of the Limitation Act and that the true rule is whether under the special circumstances of each case the Appellant acted under an honest though mistaken belief formed with due care and attention or there was any negligence or inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the Appellant. 3. There are authorities in which a contrary view has been taken, specially in some English cases. In the last case, In re Coles and Ravaneshaw [1907J 1 K. B. 1., however, the learned Judges felt themselves bound by the current of decisions in that Court but two of the learned Judges observed that if the matter were free from authority they would have approved of a rule different from that which they laid down. No doubt as pointed out by James, L. J, in International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Co. 7 Ch. D. 241 (1887), the limitation of the time to appeal is a right given to the person in whose favour a Judge has decided and that time should not be enlarged except under very special circumstances Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act gives the Court power to admit an appeal, if the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the time limited. It is neither necessary nor desirable that any attempt should be made to find precisely and exhaustively the meaning of the expression " sufficient cause " which should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bond fides is imputable to the Appellant. It was observed by Lord Justice Bowen In re Manchester Economic Building Society L. R. 24 Ch. D. 488: (1883).: "It seems to me that to attempt in any one case to lay down a set of iron rules on which the discretion of the Court of Appeal was always to be obliged to run and to say that the leave of the Court would never be granted except in special circumtsances and in a defined way would be very perilous. The rules leave the matter at large. The rules leave the matter at large. Of course, it is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised, upon principles which are well understood but which had better not be defined in a case except so far as may be necessary for the decision of that case, otherwise there is the great danger, as it seems to me, of crystallizing into a rigid definition that judicial power and discretion which the Legislature and the Rules of the Court have for the best of all reasons left undetermined and unfettered." We think, that a bond fide mistake committed by a pleader in calculating the period of limitation may constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Whether the miscalculation of the period of limitation by a pleader does constitute a sufficient cause in any particular case must be decided by the Court having regard to all the facts and circumstances of that case. It has been contended on behalf of the Respondents that the learned Judge of the lower Court has, as a matter of fact, exercised his discretion and has come to the conclusion that the appeal should not be admitted under the circumstances of this particular case. Had that been so, we would not have interfered with the judgment of the lower Appellate Court as, in fact, in that case, we would have no power to do so. But we think that, upon the judgment, there can be no doubt that the learned Judge thought that having regard to the authorities a miscalculation by a pleader could not be a sufficient cause within the meaning of sec. 5 and that he had no option but to reject the appeal. We are of opinion, therefore, that the order of the lower Appellate Court should be set aside and the case sent back to that Court in order that it may consider whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the facts stated in the affidavit of the pleader for the Appellant, there was sufficient cause for admitting the appeal out of time. Costs will abide the result. The Rule is discharged.