JUDGMENT : RYVES, J. This is a suit on a so-called simple mortgage. The facts are fully stated in the judgments of the two lower courts. It is sufficient to say that in 1871 Jawad Husain, defendant No. 1, executed the document in suit whereby he agreed to pay to one Amin Daulat and her descendants a certain yearly allowance. He secured the allowance on certain zamindari property (makful aur mustaghrak karke) and agreed that if he failed to pay it the annuitants might take possession of a portion of it sufficient to give them the stipulated income. The allowance has not been paid since 1880. The plaintiffs now sue for the whole amount due to them by sale of the property contending that the above document is a simple mortgage. 2. The two lower courts have found the document in suit to be a simple mortgage basing their decision solely on the fact that the words “makful aur mustaghrak” are used, and relying on the decision in Kishen Lal v. Ganga Ram, [1890] I.L.R., 13 All., 28. 3. For the appellants it is contended that the above document is not a simple mortgage but merely constitutes a charge on the property. 4. We have fully discussed the question in our judgment in Second Appeal No. 872 of 1912, Reported in 11 A.L.J.R., 570 and are of opinion that the ruling quoted above does not lay down that wherever the words “makful” and “mustaghrak” are used, in spite of the other terms and conditions of the document, it must necessarily be held that it is a simple mortgage. No doubt the use of these words ordinarily implies a power of sale, but we do not think that in a case where the parties clearly did not contemplate the property being sold these words necessarily imply such a power. Now if we examine the terms of the document in suit we cannot see how it can possibly be held to be a simple mortgage. 5. The document is nowhere described as a mortgage deed. On the contrary it is described in two places as an ikrarnama. 6. Not only does the document not provide for the sale of the property but such a sale would defeat the whole purpose of the agreement. 5. The document is nowhere described as a mortgage deed. On the contrary it is described in two places as an ikrarnama. 6. Not only does the document not provide for the sale of the property but such a sale would defeat the whole purpose of the agreement. Amin Daulat and her descendants are declared entitled to a certain allowance which is secured on the property so that if default is made they can take possession of it or of a portion of it in order to pay themselves the amount due to them. Suppose Amin Daulat had lived and sued, say after ten years, for the arrears of the allowance due to her and had put the property to sale, the effect would be that her descendants would be deprived of their security. Again it is an essential of a mortgage in this country at any rate that it should be capable of redemption and we do not see how this so-called mortgage could ever be redeemed. It is true that every mortgage cannot be redeemed at any given time as laid down by the rulings quoted to us by the learned vakil for the respondent, but he has shown us no authority for the proposition that there can be a mortgage which can never be redeemed at all. 7. The most that can be contended is that the document is an agreement which, in the case of default, may be converted into an usufructuary mortgage. Even in this view of the case the plaintiff “could not sue for sale. 8. Then we were pressed by the learned Counsel for the respondent that if we hold that the ikrarnama created a charge only on the property we should at least decree the claim for twelve years before suit under article 132 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act, and reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Gajpat Rai v. Chumman Rai,[1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 189 and Chhagan Lal v. Bapu Bhai[1880] I.L.R., 5 Bom., 68. We do not think that we can accede to this request, at any rate, at this stage of the litigation, because to do so would involve a complete change in the frame of the suit and in the pleadings. 9. As the suit was brought the only prayer was: “Rs. We do not think that we can accede to this request, at any rate, at this stage of the litigation, because to do so would involve a complete change in the frame of the suit and in the pleadings. 9. As the suit was brought the only prayer was: “Rs. 1,320, the said amount of demand which is due to the plaintiff, may be awarded with costs and future interest up to the date of realization or the hypothecated property, or a sufficient part thereof, may be sold by auction and the sale proceeds may be applied in payment of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, as mentioned above.” Had the suit been brought on the allegation that the property was charged with an annuity and that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive payment for the twelve years before suit, it would virtually have been a suit (1) for a declaration that the property was charged with the payment of an annuity to the plaintiff and (2) for payment for so many years as was within the law of limitation. It would have been open to the defendants to allege that if the charge ever existed it had ceased to be operative as having become barred by limitation, and the first vital issue in the case would have been whether the charge still subsisted at the date of suit. The plaintiffs would at first have to prove their title to the annuity before they could receive anything under it. The case in 16 All., 189, merely followed the Bombay case. In both these cases, the title of the plaintiff in the annuity had been finally settled between the parties or their predecessors, and the only question for the court to decide was how much was payable having regard to the law of limitation. The present case is much more like Madvala v. Bhagwanta[1872] 9 Bom., H.C. Rep., 260. That case was cited with approval in I.L.R., 5 Bom., p. 68. 10. The property has changed hands and we cannot assume, especially against transferees, that the annuity is still payable, seeing that the last payment, even alleged, was twenty-nine years before suit. 11. For these reasons we think the plaintiff's suit must fail. We therefore set aside the decrees of both courts and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs in all courts. 12. Cur. Adv. Vut.