JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal by the Plaintiffs in a suit for rent. The case for the Plaintiffs is that the Defendants are liable to pay rent on the basis of a putni as also a darmokurari. The Courts below have decreed the claim based on the putni, but dismissed the claim founded on the darmokurari, on the ground that no such claim can be put forward in view of sec. 25 of Reg. III of 1872. The Plaintiffs are zemindars to the extent of ten annas and they also claim to be mokuraridars of sixteen annas in respect of some lands included in the zamindari. Their case is that the Defendants hold under them as putnidars and also as dar mokuraridars ; the hypothesis is that the dar-mokurari lands are distinct from and not included in the putni lands. In the record-of-rights prepared under Reg. III of 1872, the Defendants are, however, described as putnidars ; and there is no mention that they are dar-mokuraridars in respect of any land included in the villages now in dispute. The Courts below have accordingly held that the Defendants are liable to pay rent, only in their character as putnidars, and that it is not open to the Plaintiffs to establish in a suit in the Civil Court that the putni does not exlend over all the lands of the village and that the Defendants are dar-mokuraridars of lands not included in the putni. It appears to have been argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs in the Courts below that notwithstanding the absence of an entry in the record-of-rights to the effect that the Defendants are dar-mokuraridars, they are at liberty to establish by evidence in this suit that the Defendants are as a matter of fact dar-mokuraridars of some Kinds. This contention has been, in our opinion, very properly overruled. The fact that the Defendants have been recorded as putnidars of all the lands in the village implies a decision that they have no dar-mokurari right in respect of any of the lands included in that village. This decision operates as a decree of Court under sec. 11 of Reg. III of 1872. The fact that the Defendants have been recorded as putnidars of all the lands in the village implies a decision that they have no dar-mokurari right in respect of any of the lands included in that village. This decision operates as a decree of Court under sec. 11 of Reg. III of 1872. Sec. 9 provides that the Lieutenant-Governor may declare that a settlement shall be made of the whole or any part of the Santhal Pergunnahs for the purpose of ascertaining and recording the various interests and rights in the land. Sec. 10 lays down that the Lieutenant-Governor may appoint officers by whom the settlement is to be made and may invest any officer or officers with the control over them by way of appeal and revision and may make rules for the procedure of such officers in investigating into rights in the land, and the hearing of suits and generally for the guidance of such officers. Sec. 11 then provides that except as provided in sec. 25A, no suit shall lie in any Civil Court regarding any matter decided by any Settlement Court under these rules, and the decisions and orders of the Settlement Court made under these rules regarding the interests and rights mentioned above shall have the force of a decree of Court. It has been argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs that as there is no express decision by the Settlement Court upon the question of the dar-mokurari status of the Defendants, the matter is open for investigation in a Civil suit. In our opinion, this contention is obviously fallacious. If this view were accepted, the object which the Legislature had plainly in view in flaming sec. 11 might be completely defeated by the omission of a party, it may be a deliberate omission, to raise a question before the settlement authorities. In the present case, as we have already explained, there is a decision, though a decision by implication, that the Defendants are not dar-mokuraridars in respect of any land included in the disputed villages the whole of which is held by them in putni right. That decision has the force of a decree of Court. The question consequently arises whether it is open to the Plaintiffs to avoid in any manner the effect of this decree. 2. That decision has the force of a decree of Court. The question consequently arises whether it is open to the Plaintiffs to avoid in any manner the effect of this decree. 2. One of the methods by which a decree of this character may be avoided is mentioned in sec. 25 A, namely, where only the rights of zemindars and other proprietors as between themselves are concerned, a suit may, unless it is barred under sec. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, be brought in a Civil Court to contest the finding or record of the Settlement Officer within three years from the dale of the publication of the record-of-rights or of the final order of the Revenue Court. But no such suit shall be brought in any Civil Court after the expiration of three years from such date. Another method is provided in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 25 which provides that after the expiration of six months from the date of the publication of the record-of-rights in any village, such record shall be conclusive proof of the rights and customs therein recorded other than the rights mentioned in sec. 25A, except so far as concerns entries in such record regarding which objection by parties interested may still be pending in Original or Appellate Courts or may still be open to appeal. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), the Settlement Officer may, at any time, before the settlement is declared by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette to have been completed, enquire into and correct any material error in such record and revise any order or decision passed by himself or by an Assistant Settlement Officer. The Plaintiffs have not adopted either of these methods. 3. But it has been explained on their behalf that they have not done so, because till the settlement records were produced at the trial of the suit and used against them, they were not aware that an entry had been made therein to their detriment. It has further been argued that they were kept out of the knowledge of their right to challenge the record-of-rights, by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants who concealed from them the fact that the record had been made in their favour. It has further been argued that they were kept out of the knowledge of their right to challenge the record-of-rights, by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants who concealed from them the fact that the record had been made in their favour. In support of this allegation, it has been stated that, even after the record had been made, the Defendants confessed judgment in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent of the dar-mokurari and that they have thereafter amicably paid rent on the same basis. Under these circumstances, it has been argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants that they should be allowed even now an opportunity to controvert the record-of-rights, specially as the record-of-rights was not specially pleaded as a bar in the written statement, although a vague reference was made thereto. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the decisions in Ram Narain Singh v. Ram Runjan Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 13 Cal. 245 (1886) and Nadiar Chand Singh v. Chundra Sikhor Sadhu I. L. R. 15 Cal. 765 (1888). In our opinion, there is considerable force in the contention of the Appellants. In the case last mentioned, it was pointed out that an entry in the settlement record had, under sec. 11 of Reg. III of 1872, the force of a decree of Court, consequently when a Defendant pleads the record-of-rights as a bar to the suit, he raises in essence a plea of res judicata, and it is therefore obligatory upon him to establish the circumstances under which the decree was made and to prove conclusively that the decree does operate as res judicata. Here it is worthy of notice that under sec. 24, after the Settlement Officer has made the record-of-rights for any village, he shall notify the publication of such record to the persons interested by posting it conspicuously in the village and otherwise in such manner as may be convenient. The object of this procedure is obviously to enable persons interested to bring forward, in the Settlement Court, within the prescribed period, any objection they may desire to make to any part of such record : and under sec. 25, it is only after the record-of-rights has been published as provided in sec. 24, that it becomes conclusive proof of the customs and rights therein recorded. 25, it is only after the record-of-rights has been published as provided in sec. 24, that it becomes conclusive proof of the customs and rights therein recorded. Consequently, if the Defendants rely upon the record-of-rights as conclusive under sec. 25 and urge that the entry therein operates as a decree under sec. 11, they must prove that the requirements of the statute have been fulfilled. As soon as this has been accomplished, it becomes open to the Plaintiffs to urge under sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act that the entry which operates as a decree was obtained by fraud. It is not necessary that the Plaintiffs should institute a separate suit to set aside the record-of-rights on the ground of fraud: the same result may be attained if they are allowed to take the plea of fraud under sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. [Rajib v. Lakhan I. L. R. 27 Cal. 11 (1899), Nistarini v. Nundalal I. L. R. 30 Cal. 369 (1902)]. In view of the circumstances of this litigation, we are of opinion that there should be a full enquiry into this matter. 4. The result is that this Appeal is allowed, the decree of the Court below set aside, and the case remanded to the Court of first instance for the determination of three points : namely, first, was the record-of-rights published in accordance with the statutory provisions on the subject and does it operate as a decree between the parties under sec. 11, and conclusive under sec. 25 of Reg. III of 1872? secondly, if the record was published in strict conformity with the statute, was the entry therein obtained by fraud as the Plaintiffs allege ; and, thirdly, are the lands alleged to be comprised in the dar-mokurari distinct from and independent of the lands included in the putni. If the first question is decided against the Defendants, the second question need not be investigated : but if the first is determined against the Plaintiffs, the second must be examined. If the second question is determined in favour of the Defendants, the record is conclusive and the claim for dar-mokurari rent must stand dismissed. If the second question is decided against the Defendants, the third need not be investigated. If the second question is determined in favour of the Defendants, the record is conclusive and the claim for dar-mokurari rent must stand dismissed. If the second question is decided against the Defendants, the third need not be investigated. As the ground on which the Appeal succeeds was not taken in the Courts below, the Appellants must pay the Respondents their costs both in this Court and in the Court of Appeal below : the costs in the Court of first instance will abide the result.