JUDGMENT : RAFIQ, J. It appears that Sher Singh and Khaman Singh were two brothers who owned 76 bighas and 5 biswas of land in mauza Band in equal shares. They executed a deed of usufructuary mortgage in respect of that land in 1855 in favour of Gulab Rai and Kundan Lal in lieu of Rs. 1,000. On the 22nd of December, 1861, the mortgagees executed a deed of sale of their mortgagee rights in favour of Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan and the latter entered in possession of the mortgaged land. Subsequent to the sale of 1861 the equity of redemption of Sher Singh was sold up in execution of a decree against him and purchased by one Deo Kishan. The equity of redemption of Khaman Singh was sold after his death in execution of a decree against his widow Musammat Gaura and purchased by the brother of Deo Kishan. Deo Kishan's brother died leaving no issue and Deo Kishan thus became the owner of the entire equity of redemption of the mortgage of 1855. He sued for the redemption of that mortgage in 1897 and obtained a decree on the 13th of September, 1898, against Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan, the son of the vendee of the mortgagee rights. The Subordinate Judge, in whose court the suit was brought, decreed redemption on the payment of Rs. 1,000. Both Deo Kishan and Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan preferred appeals to this Court. Deo Kishan died on the 15th of February, 1899, during the pendency of the appeals and his widow, Musammat Ganga, was brought on the records of the two appeals as his legal representative. Musammat Ganga and Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan came to terms and a compromise was filed under which the decree of the first court for redemption was to be set aside on the payment of Rs. 4,000 to Musammat Ganga by the Nawab. This Court accordingly passed a decree on the 28th August, 1900, in terms of the compromise. Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan paid Rs. 4000 to Musammat Ganga in accordance with the decree of the 28th of August, 1900. 2. 4,000 to Musammat Ganga by the Nawab. This Court accordingly passed a decree on the 28th August, 1900, in terms of the compromise. Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan paid Rs. 4000 to Musammat Ganga in accordance with the decree of the 28th of August, 1900. 2. Sometime after the decree of this Court dated the 28th of August, 1900, the reversionary heirs of Khaman Singh sued Nawab Faiyaz Ali Khan for redemption of half the mortgaged land on the allegation that the equity of redemption of Khaman Singh was sold in execution of a personal decree against his widow and that the sale affected her life-interest only. The claim was resisted but it was decreed. The case came up to this Court and the reversioner's claim was upheld [vide 5 A.L.J.R., 367]. Musammat Ganga, the widow of Deo Kishan, died in 1907. Bhikamber Das instituted the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh in 1910 for the redemption of the remaining half of the mortgaged land. He sued as the reversioner of Deo Kishan on the allegation that the latter's widow, Musammat Ganga, had no right to enter into a compromise which was made without any justification and was collusive and fraudulent, intended to injure, and did injure his rights as a reversioner. The claim was resisted on several grounds. The main pleas in defence which will have to be considered in this appeal, raised the questions of res judicata, limitation, validity of the compromise, acquiescence of the plaintiff-respondent in it and his liability to repay Rs. 4,000, paid to Musammat Gunga. The learned Subordinate Judge did not accept any of the pleas in defence and decreed the claim, and his decree was upheld in appeal. 3. The defendant has come up in second appeal to this Court. It is contended on his behalf that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent is barred by the rule of res judicata inasmuch as no second suit for redemption of a mortgage can be maintained. It is said that the effect of the invalidity of the compromise of Musammat Gunga is to annul the decree of this Court dated the 28th of August, 1900, and to restore that of the first court dated the 13th of September, 1898. It is said that the effect of the invalidity of the compromise of Musammat Gunga is to annul the decree of this Court dated the 28th of August, 1900, and to restore that of the first court dated the 13th of September, 1898. The latter decree being a decree for redemption of the mortgage of 1855 bars the present claim by which the same mortgage is sought to be redeemed a second time. The following cases are cited in support of this contention:— Vedapurathi v. Vallabha Valiya Raja,[1962] I.L.R., 25 Mad., 300 and Lachman Singh v. Mudsudan, [1907] I.L.R., 29 All., 481 If the argument for the appellant were correct the effect of the invalidity of the compromise would be to restore the appeals pending in 1898 in this Court, and not to restore the decree of the first court. But the argument is not sound. The plaintiff-respondent can claim to avoid all the consequences that followed the compromise in case he establishes its invalidity. He can say with reason that as the decree for redemption in favour of Deo Kishan was set aside by reason of the compromise and has now become incapable of execution he should be placed in a position as if no redemption suit had been brought before. I do not think that the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata, as the decree dated the 13th September, 1898, is no more subsisting and has been set aside. The cases relied upon by the learned Vakil for the appellant are not in point as the first decrees for redemption in those cases were never set aside but were not put into execution by the decree-holders. 4. The plea of limitation is advanced on the allegation that the claim should have been brought within six years of the decree of the 28th of August, 1900, as the said decree is said to have been obtained by fraud and collusion. It is said that article 95 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act governs the case. The contention assumes that the plaintiff-respondent has or should have sued for the cancellation of the decree of the 28th of August, 1900. The assumption is unwarranted, for the plaintiff-respondent has not sued for the cancellation of that decree nor need he have done so. The plea of limitation therefore fails. 5. The contention assumes that the plaintiff-respondent has or should have sued for the cancellation of the decree of the 28th of August, 1900. The assumption is unwarranted, for the plaintiff-respondent has not sued for the cancellation of that decree nor need he have done so. The plea of limitation therefore fails. 5. It is next urged that the compromise between the defendant-appellant and Musammat Gunga is binding on the reversioner of the latter's husband as it was effected in good faith after a fair contest to put an end to a litigation involving troublesome questions of law and disputed facts and was free from the taint of collusion and fraud. The finding of the lower courts that it was collusive is challenged on the ground that the finding is based on no legal evidence. Besides, it is said that no question of collusion arises, as the plaintiff-respondent knew of the compromise and acquiesced in it. The learned Vakil for the appellant wishes to make out the validity of the compromise on three grounds, namely, that under the circumstances it was the best possible settlement of the dispute between Musammat Gunga and the defendant-appellant, that it was not tainted by collusion and that in any case it was acquiesced in by the plaintiff-respondent. The last two grounds raise questions of fact which have been found against the defendant-appellant by both the lower courts. An attempt is made to get round the finding as regards collusion, that it is not based on legal evidence but on surmise only. I do not think so. The lower courts took into consideration in deciding the question of collusion the conduct of Musammat Gunga in not employing her husband's pleader during the compromise proceedings and in accepting an inadequate sum for the redemption decree. It cannot be said that either fact is not a piece of legal evidence. The finding as to the alleged acquiescence of the plaintiff-respondent is clearly based on the evidence produced in the case. But it is said that the lower courts did not take into consideration the fact that the plaintiff-respondent had deposited the redemption money in the Subordinate Judge's court, He must, therefore, have known when the redemption did not take place that the widow of Deo Kishan had compromised. And as no steps were taken in her life-time the plaintiff-respondent must be taken to have acquiesced in the compromise. And as no steps were taken in her life-time the plaintiff-respondent must be taken to have acquiesced in the compromise. It is possible that the plaintiff-respondent came to know of the compromise sometime after it was made. But his silence during her life-time would not amount to acquiescence by him. The findings of the lower courts as to collusion and absence of acquiescence therefore stand good. In view of the findings of fact that the compromise in question was collusive it is unnecessary to consider the other ground advanced for the appellant in support of its validity, namely, that it was the best possible settlement under the circumstances and was made after a fair contest. I would, however, remark that there was no contest at all in this Court when the compromise was filed and that the considerations which show its collusive character also show that it was not the best possible settlement under the circumstances. 6. The last argument for the appellant relates to the sum of Rs. 4,000 paid to Musammat Gunga under the compromise. I do not see how the plaintiff-respondent can be made liable for its repayment as he was no party to the compromise and derived no benefit from the said payment. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.