JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order made under sub-sec. (I) of sec. 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act for the temporary protection of the property of an infant. The Opposite Party Bachhan Singh is the maternal grandfather of the infant and is one of the rival claimants for the office of guardian of his property. He was appointed guardian by the District Judge: but his appointment has been set aside by this Court on appeal and the District Judge has been directed to reconsider the question of the appointment of a proper guardian. During the pendency of this matter the District Judge has made an order under sub-sec. I of sec. 12 and has appointed the maternal grandfather as Receiver of the estate of the minor. On behalf of the paternal grandmother of the infant objection has been taken to this appointment on the ground that one of the applicants for the office of guardian should not have been placed in a position of undue advantage by appointment as Receiver before the respective claims of all the applicant have been examined. It has also been urged that he resides at Gorakpur, beyond the limits of the local jurisdiction of the Court and that it is unlikely that he will be able to supervise effectively the management of the estate of the minor which is situated in the District of Bhagalpur. It has finally been contended that whoever is appointed Receiver should be required to furnish adequate security. In answer to these contentions it has been urged that selection of a suitable person as Receiver is largely a matter of discretion with the primary Court: and that a Court of Appeal or Revision should not interfere with the choice made by that Court. It need not be disputed that the selection and appointment of a particular person as Receiver is a matter of judicial discretion, to be determined by the Court according to the circumstances of the case, and the exercise of this, like other matters of judicial discretion, will rarely be interfered with by an Appellate tribunal, [Perry v. Oriental Hotels Co. L. R. 5 Ch. App. L. R. 5 Ch. App. 420 (1870)] or, as has been sometimes said, to induce an Appellate Court to interfere with the decision of an inferior tribunal in the selection of a Receiver, it is necessary to show some overwhelming objection in point of propriety or some fatal objection in principle, to the person named. Cookes v. Cookes 2 De G. J. and S. 526 (1865) As will presently be shown, the case before us falls within this exception, and the order of the Court below must be discharged in the interest of the infant. In the first place, as was observed by Sir George Jessel in the case of In re Lloyd 12 Ch D. 447 at p. 451 (1879), it is a settled rule that one of the parties to a cause shall not be appointed Receiver without the consent of the other party unless a very special case is made. [Sargant v. Read 1 Ch. D. 600 (1876), Budgett v. Improved etc. Syndicate [1901] W. N. 23] In the present case, the person selected for appointment as Receiver is interested in the matter before the Court, he is one of the rival claimants to the office of guardian of the property of the infant. What is more, he was appointed guardian but that order has been set aside by this Court. The effect of his appointment as Reciever is to restore him forthwith to the position which he occupied under the order which has been cancelled by this Court. 2. In the second place, not only is no special case made out to take the matter out of the ordinary rule that a party to the proceedings should not be appointed Receiver, serious objections may be and have been taken to his appointment. He resides ordinarily at a place far beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court: and as he has not been called upon to furnish any security, much less tangible security, within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have practically no control over him in the event of default. Residence beyond jurisdiction is not by itself a fatal objection, but where a non-resident is appointed Receiver there must be adequate guarantee that he will be subject to the effective control of the Court. Similar observations apply to the question of eligibility as affected by distant residence. Residence beyond jurisdiction is not by itself a fatal objection, but where a non-resident is appointed Receiver there must be adequate guarantee that he will be subject to the effective control of the Court. Similar observations apply to the question of eligibility as affected by distant residence. The fact that the Receiver chosen resides at a great distance from the property which is to be subjected to his management and. control, while not regarded as an absolute disqualification for the office, is an important circumstance to be taken into consideration [Tharpe v. Thatpe 12 Ves. 317 (1806) Wynne v. Lord Newborough 15 Ves. 283 (1808), In re Carshalton Park Estate [1808] 2 Ch. 62, 68]. In the case before us the person selected resides at Gorakhpur in the United Provinces, and if his appointment stands, the estate of the infant in Bhagalpur will practically be in the charge of other people. It has not been disputed that from such distance constant and regular supervision is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 3. The result is that this Rule is made absolute and the order of the Court below discharged. The Judge will proceed under sub-sec. I of sec. 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act to appoint a suitable outsider as Receiver of the properties, in such terms as to remuneration and security as may be reasonable. We may add that several names have been mentioned in this Court but we have no materials to enable us to deal with the qualifications of those or any other candidates. The record will be sent down at once so that this matter may be taken up for disposal as also the question of the appointment of a guardian. There will be no order as to the costs of this Rule.