JUDGMENT 1. The facts out of which this Second Appeal arises are these.-Biswa Nath Sardar was the recorded tenant of a holding. He died in 1884 and was succeeded by his son Narendra, by a grandson Haripada, the son of a predeceased son Aswini, and by the son Gouri, and the grandson Triguna, of another predeceased son, Nabu. In 1897, a partition decree was passed and by it each branch became entitled to one-third. In 1901, the sole landlord brought a suit for rent of the whole holding against Narendra alone and in execution of that decree there was a sale and the Appellant, Srimati Chamatkari, the wife of Narendra, became the purchaser. This suit is brought by Triguna, Haripada and Gouri to establish their right to two-thirds of the property notwithstanding sale in execution. Both the lower Courts have decided in the Plaintiffs' favour, and so Srimati Chamatkari, the purchaser, has appealed. The sale professes to have been made under Ch. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act and, if it was rightly so made, title of the purchaser must prevail. 2. Was it then rightly so made ? As the Act stood in 1901, the date of the sale, Ch. XIV commenced with sec. 159 which provides that where a holding is sold in execution of a decree for arrears due in respect thereof the purchaser shall take subject to the interest defined as protected interests but with power to annul the interests defined as incumbrances. 3. We have no concern in this case with " protected interests " or " incumbrances." This and the other sections of the chapter make it clear that on a sale under the chapter it is not merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor that passes, but the holding. For the purpose of a sale under the chapter however the decree must be for arrears due in respect of the holding, and so it must be a decree obtained by the sole landlord, or by all the landlords, if there are more than one. The decree in this case was for arrears due in respect of the holding, and the Plaintiff was the sole landlord: so far, therefore, no difficulty arises. The decree in this case was for arrears due in respect of the holding, and the Plaintiff was the sole landlord: so far, therefore, no difficulty arises. But then only one of the tenants was a Defendant, and this is where the difficulty comes in for it has been contended, and with success in both the lower Courts, that as all the tenants were not parties to the suit for rent, the holding could not be sold in execution of the decree. It is common ground that at the institution of the suit there were several tenants interested in the holding, and that they were jointly liable for the rent. 4. Their liability was contractual and sec. 43 of the Contract Act provides that when two or more persons make a joint promise the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform, the whole of the promise. At the same time, Chap. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, while requiring the presence as Plaintiffs of the whole body of landlords, makes no similar provision as to the tenants. Why then, it may be asked, does not a decree against some of the tenants come within Chap. XIV ? 5. The answer is furnished by decided cases binding on us, and I refer in particular to Roopnarain v. fuggoo Singh 10 W. R. 304 (1868). and Ananda Kumar v. Hari Das I. L. R. 27 Cal. 545 (1900). The decision in Asok v. Karim 9 C. W. N. 843 (1905) is also to the same effect. These cases go to show that whatever may be required for the purposes of a mere money decree, ordinarily all the tenants of a holding are necessary parties to the suit in order that the decree and the sale in execution of it may have the important consequences described in Chap. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. I say ordinarily, because there may be conditions in which the presence of even one or some of the tenants as a Defendant may be as effective as that of all. And I now propose to consider whether those conditions are established in this case. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. I say ordinarily, because there may be conditions in which the presence of even one or some of the tenants as a Defendant may be as effective as that of all. And I now propose to consider whether those conditions are established in this case. The authorities sanction the view that where one of a number of tenants is put forward by the rest as their representative, he can be regarded as the sole tenant for the purposes of a suit for arrears of rent within Chap. XIV. Whether one of several can be regarded as a representative of the rest must depend on the circumstances of each case, and is, if not essentially, at any rate largely a question of fact. 6. Both Courts have negatived representation in this case. This finding has been forcibly criticised, but no error of law has been established, though I realise, and in some measure sympathise with, the view that a different view of the facts might have been taken. Much reliance has been placed on the decision in Doolar Chand Sahu v. Chabeel Chand L.R.6 IndAp (1878) but it cannot however be treated as governing this case as it turned on considerations which are applicable to a tenure, and not to a holding. The result is that we must confirm the decree with costs.