JUDGMENT 1. These are appeals by the Defendants in suits commenced by the Plaintiffs-Respondents for declaration of their right to recover certain sums of money as dasturat at specified annual rates and for recovery of the sums as a charge on properties in the possession of the Defendants. The Courts below have decreed the suits. On the present appeal, two points have been taken, namely, first, that the Plaintiffs have no enforceable right to realise the sums claimed as dasturat from the Defendants; and, secondly, that the right, if it ever existed, has been extinguished by operation of the statute of limitation. In so far as the first point is concerned, it is necessary to ascertain the exact nature of the right claimed by the Plaintiffs. The Courts below have observed that the precise origin of the right cannot be traced; but it has been found that the right has a lawful origin, and the theory put forward in explanation of the origin of the right is plausible. It is stated that the predecessor-in-interest of- Raja Brijnand who was the proprietor of estate Sabung transferred, towards the end of the eighteenth century, portions of his estate to different persons on condition that the latter and their reprcsentatives-in-interest would in perpetuity pay to the transferor and his representatives-in-interest certain sums as daslurat. Why an agreement of this description was made may not be possible to ascertain at this distance of time; but if the proprietor treated himself as entitled to the profits of the estate, he might very well reserve to himself the right to receive a portion of these profits, although the estate itself was transferred to other persons. In any event, in 1795 when the right was asserted by the predecessor-in-interest of the present Plaintiffs and the claim was discussed by the predecessors-in-interest of the Defendants, it was found that the then Plaintiffs and their predecessors had been in enjoyment of the right from time immemorial, and it has been stated before us that at that time the period of enjoyment had extended over nearly two centuries. From these facts the Courts below have properly drawn the inference that the right had a lawful origin. The right was asserted successfully in 1795. It was again in controversy in 1854, when the claim was resisted on the ground that the sum demanded constituted an abwab or illegal cess. From these facts the Courts below have properly drawn the inference that the right had a lawful origin. The right was asserted successfully in 1795. It was again in controversy in 1854, when the claim was resisted on the ground that the sum demanded constituted an abwab or illegal cess. This contention was overruled by the Sudder Court [Ram Mohun v.. Bam Churn Beag. S. D. A. for 1854, p. 504], and the claim of the then Plaintiffs was allowed. Later on the sum was sought to be realised as rent, but the claim was dismissed on the ground that the money could not be recovered as rent in a Revenue Court [Bam Churn Banerjee v. Torita Ch. Pal 18 W. R. 343(1872)]. But it is worthy of note that the decision last mentioned did not negative the right itself. "We have also the fact that, on many occasions, the predecessors of the Plaintiffs obtained decrees against the predecessors of the Defendants, either upon contest or ex-parte, on the basis of the alleged right, though, no doubt, in some instances, the decrees were made by Revenue Courts on. the erroneous assumption that the sums claimed were recoverable as rent. But although these decrees were made without jurisdiction, the fact remains that the claim was asserted and allowed, sometimes in spite of opposition, on other occasions without opposition. From all these circumstances, the Courts below have drawn the inference that the right alleged by the Plaintiffs does exist. In our opinion that inference is perfectly legitimate, and consequently the first ground taken by the Appellants must be overruled as entirely unsustainable. 2. In so far as the second point is concerned, the question arises whether the right has been extinguished by limitation. It is clear that Art. 131 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 is applicable to the case. That article provides that a suit to establish a periodically recurring right must be commenced within twelve years from the date when the Plaintiff is first refused enjoyment of the right. Now "refusal " plainly implies a previous demand [Raoji v. Bala ) I.L.R 15 Bom. 135 (1890), Kamman v. Budha Singh [1882] Punj. Rec. 146, Durga v. Bhonatu [1883] Punj. Rec. 106, and Gohna v. Iklas Khan [1889] Punj. Rec.134]. Now "refusal " plainly implies a previous demand [Raoji v. Bala ) I.L.R 15 Bom. 135 (1890), Kamman v. Budha Singh [1882] Punj. Rec. 146, Durga v. Bhonatu [1883] Punj. Rec. 106, and Gohna v. Iklas Khan [1889] Punj. Rec.134]. As the Plaintiffs assert that there has been no demand and refusal within twelve years of the commencement of the present suit, the burden is cast upon the Defendants to establish that the Plaintiffs did make a demand and that the Defendants did refuse. Of this, there is no evidence. Consequently the suit is prima facie not barred under Art. 131. 3. But it has been contended that. as there was no provision in the Limitation Act of 1859, corresponding to Art. 131 of the Limitation Act of 1877, the right now claimed might conceivably have been barred before the Limitation Act of 1871 came into force, and if the right was so barred, subsequent statutes could not operate to revive a right already extinguished under the previous statute. It is consequently necessary to determine whether the right had been extinguished under the Limitation Act of 1859. For the decision of this question, we must examine the precise nature of this right. In our opinion, the right claimed is clearly in the nature of an interest in immoveable property, as it is a right vested in the proprietors of a specified estate to receive certain sums of money periodically from proprietors of other estates in their character as such. The right on the one hand and the obligation on the other are annexed to immoveable property. In fact, the right has been so recorded ever since 1795 by the revenue authorities, and on the occasion of the sale of the estate claimed by the Plaintiffs, it had been proclaimed that the purchaser was entitled to the right to receive this dasturat. In fact, the right has been so recorded ever since 1795 by the revenue authorities, and on the occasion of the sale of the estate claimed by the Plaintiffs, it had been proclaimed that the purchaser was entitled to the right to receive this dasturat. Now, if the right is annexed to land, it is clearly an interest in immoveable property; for as pointed out by Sir James Colville in the case of Maharana Fateh Sangji v. Dessai Kallianraiji L. R. 1 I. A. 34 at p. 53 (1873), a right of this description to receive an annual payment, which has a legal foundation and of which the enjoyment is hereditary and the liability to make the payment whereof is not personal to the Defendant but one which attaches to him into whose hands the village may pass, is an interest in land; it is money payable by the Defendant virtute tenurae, the interest possesses the qualities both of immobility and of infinite duration in a degree which would entitle it to the character of a freehold interest in, or issuing out of, real property under the English Law (Cruise's Digest, Vol. I, p. 47, pl. 10). If then the right in question is an interest in immoveable property, under the Limitation Act of 1859, a suit to recover such an interest would have to be brought within twelve years from the time when the cause of action arose; and the cause of action would obviously arise upon the denial or refusal of the right. Consequently, the question arises, whether there was a denial of the right at any time when the statute of 1859 was in force. In this connection, it has been urged that in the litigations of 1861, the predecessors of the Defendants denied their liability to pay the sum claimed. The written statements, however, have not been produced; on the other hand, from the abstracts given in the decrees, it is clear that there was no denial of the right of the Plaintiff to receive dasturat. There was a denial of the liability of the Defendant on special grounds, such as the transfer of the estate into other hands. In one of the cases, indeed, there is evidence to show that not only was there no denial, there was an admission of liability. There was a denial of the liability of the Defendant on special grounds, such as the transfer of the estate into other hands. In one of the cases, indeed, there is evidence to show that not only was there no denial, there was an admission of liability. One of the predecessors of the Defendants required his subordinate tenure-holder to pay the dasturats to the predecessor of the Plaintiffs; this justifies the inference that at, that time the dasturat was still lawfully payable to the Plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, as it is not shown that there was any refusal while the Act of 1859 was in force, we must hold that the claim of the Plaintiffs was not extinguished before 1873, and we have already held that since 1873, nothing has happened which could extinguish the right. The second ground consequently fails. The result is that the decrees of the Courts below are affirmed and these appeals dismissed with costs.