JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order under Rule 101 of Or. 21 of the CPC of 1908. That Rule provides for an adjudication of a claim preferred by persons who have been dispossessed by a decree holder auction-purchaser, and lays down that where the execution Court is satisfied that a claimant of this description was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than he judgment-debtor, it shall direct that the applicant be put in possession of the property. The Petitioner before us obtained a mortgage decree against a member of a joint Mitakshara family. He became the purchaser in execution of that decree. When possession of the property was delivered to him, a person who claimed to be a purchaser from a member of the family other than the judgment-debtor preferred a claim under sub-r. (1) of r. 101. The contention of the claimant, who is the Opposite Party in this Rule, was that he was in possession of the property on his own account and that consequently he was not liable to be dispossessed by the auction-purchaser. The Court below has found as a fact that the claimant was in joint possession of the property along with the judgment-debtor. The question consequently arises whether his claim may be allowed under r. 101. On behalf of the execution purchaser, it has been contended that rr. 100 and 101 do not apply to a case of this description. It has been urged that when two persons are jointly in possession of a property, and in execution of a decree obtained against one of such persons, the decree-holder proceeds to take possession of the property, or if a purchaser at a sale held in execution of a decree obtained against one of such persons proceeds to take delivery of the property, the other person who is dispossessed cannot contend that he is in possession on his own account, as his possession admittedly is joint possession with the judgment-debtor. In support of this view reliance has been placed upon the case of Cooverji Heruji v. Dewersey Bhojal ILR 17 Bom. 718 (1893). In this case, Mr. In support of this view reliance has been placed upon the case of Cooverji Heruji v. Dewersey Bhojal ILR 17 Bom. 718 (1893). In this case, Mr. Justice Strachey observed that a member of a joint Hindu family cannot say that he is in possession of any particular portion of the joint property on his own account, as his possession is possession of the family, unless there is evidence to show that he set up a right to a particular piece of land adversely to the family, which, it has always been held, must be very strictly proved. In so for as the learned Judge lays down that a member of a joint Mitakshara family cannot say that he is in possession of a specific portion of the joint property on his own account, the proposition is unquestionably correct; but in so far as the learned Judge lays down that a person who is in joint possession is not in possession on his own account, the proposition appears to us to be open to criticism. The point now taken was raised before this Court in the case of Sankar Nath v. Madan Mohan 11 C.L.J. 61 (1909), where it was observed, on the assumption that r. 100 and 101 were applicable to a case of this character, that an order for restoration of possession ought not to specify the share held by the claimant. It was pointed out in this case that, upon the question raised, there was a divergence of judicial opinion and that, in the case of Gobinda Nair v. Kesava I.L.R.3 Mad. 81 (1880), a view had been taken contrary to that adopted in the case of Cooverji v. Dewey ILR 17 Bom. 718 (1893). The point, however, was left open, as the case was decided on other grounds. We are of opinion that the view taken in Govinda Nath v. Kesava I.L.R.3 Mad. 81 (1880), is well-founded on principle. In this case Mr. 718 (1893). The point, however, was left open, as the case was decided on other grounds. We are of opinion that the view taken in Govinda Nath v. Kesava I.L.R.3 Mad. 81 (1880), is well-founded on principle. In this case Mr. Justice Mutu Swami Ayyar held that a claimant who has an interest in the land, of which possession has been delivered, either as a member of the family or otherwise and who is affected by the delivery of possession, as he himself is in possession, is really a person who is in possession in respect of his own interest though jointly with the judgment-debtor, and he can, consequently, claim to be in possession of the property on his own account within the meaning of sec. 331 of the Code of 1882. His joint interest with the judgment-debtor cannot prevent him from claiming in good faith in respect of his own interest. The effect of his obstruction and claim may be to set up a case in favour of the judgment-debtor against the execution purchaser, if the joint right of the judgment debtor is in every respect similar to his." But this can make no difference, as the claimant should not lose his joint right, because his co-tenant cannot set up his right as against the execution purchaser. In our opinion the terms of r. 101 are comprehensive enough to cover a case of this description. There is no anomaly involved in the view we take. The only effect of our order in favour of the claimant is to restore him to joint possession in the same manner as before in other words, the execution purchaser is placed in possession only to this extent that the possession of his judgment-debtor is terminated and he has to remain in joint possession, along with the claimant, as his judgment-debtor had previously done. We must hold accordingly that the Court below had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The result is that this Rule is made absolute in part and the order of the Court below varied to this extent only, namely, that the claim is allowed and the claimant is restored to joint possession as before, so that he will be in joint possession with the execution purchaser. There will be no order for costs in this Rule.