JUDGMENT : Tudball, J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the sister of a deceased Musalman to recover her share in the estate of the latter. The deceased Hidayat Ali left a widow, Musammat Imaman Bibi, and several sisters. The widow, Musammat Imaman Bibi, took possession of the estate. According to the plaintiff, she took possession in lieu of her dower-debt with the consent of the other heirs, the plaintiffs case being that the dower-debt having been paid off, she is now entitled to her share. Musammat Imaman Bibi transferred the property to the defendant-appellant and the plaintiffs case is that she had no power to transfer the property and against her the transfer has no force. The other heirs of Hidayat Ali were riot impleaded. The defence pleaded that Musammat Imaman was the owner of the property, it having been gifted to her by a will, dated the 10th of November, 1886, in satisfaction of her dower-debt, and that she was therefore the full owner and empowered to transfer. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, that the defendant had purchased the property in good faith and for consideration from the ostensible owner and therefore section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act operated in his favour. He further pleaded that if the will was defective and passed no title to the widow, the dower-debt had not been satisfied and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the property until the dower-debt was satisfied. Lastly, he pleaded that the suit was bad for non-joinder of parties. The Munsif decided in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed. The learned District Judge expressed an opinion on several of the points which arose between the parties, but left some of the points untouched, e.g., whether the dower-debt had been satisfied or not, and if the former, when was it satisfied? He held that the other heirs of Hidayat Ali were necessary parties and he remanded the case to the court of first instance to be tried de novo as against those heirs. It is against this order of remand that the present appeal has been filed. It is quite clear to us that the order of remand is bad. 2. He held that the other heirs of Hidayat Ali were necessary parties and he remanded the case to the court of first instance to be tried de novo as against those heirs. It is against this order of remand that the present appeal has been filed. It is quite clear to us that the order of remand is bad. 2. The plaintiff is one of the heirs of Hidayat Ali and as such she was suing for only her share of the property. 3. If she was claiming more than her share, the defendant could have pleaded that she had so done; but we fail to see that it was necessary to implead the other heirs of Hidayat Ali. It was open to those heirs either to claim or forego their shares, but whatever action they may take, it cannot hamper the plaintiff in her claim and when the plaintiff sued for her own share, it was unnecessary to implead other heirs. The learned District Judge ought to have gone on to decide the appeal on the merits. We decree the appeal, set aside the order of remand and send back the case to the learned District Judge with directions to readmit the appeal on its original number and decide it according to law. Costs will abide the result.