Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 21, 1909) which affirmed, subject to a modification, a judgment and decree of the District Judge at Broach (March 12, 1906). The main question in the appeal was whether the respondents suit, commenced in 1901, to redeem a mortgage was barred by the Indian Statutes of Limitation. The mortgage in question was executed on November 4, 1793, by Desai Partibrai Mujatrai, the predecessor in title of the respondents. The mortgagee was the predecessor in title of the appellants. The desais were collectors of revenue under native rule. Their remuneration, called desaigiri dastur, 0 Law Rep. 40 Ind. App. 68 ( 1912- 1913) Majmudar Hiralal Ichhalal V. Desai Narsilal Chaturbhujdas 11 consisted of a fixed sum together with a percentage of the revenue collected, and they also possessed lands in certain villages, which lands were called pasaeta (service) lands. By the mortgage deed Desai Partibrai Mujatrai mortgaged, with possession, his desaigiri dastur and pasaeta lands in the district of Broach. This mortgage was a consolidation of previously existing personal bonds and mortgages, under which there was a debt, part of which was upon personal security only. Under the terms of the deed the mortgagor covenanted to pay interest upon the personal debts, and in lieu of interest upon the mortgage debt the mortgagee accepted the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises. The mortgagor thereby further agreed that the repayment of the personal debt, which was not charged upon the lands, should be a condition precedent to redemption. In 1803 the district of Broach finally came under British rule. In or before 1831 it was resolved that persons entitled to desaigiri dastur and pasaeta rights should not collect it from the raiyats, but that an equivalent allowance should be paid to them from the Government treasury. The mortgagees accordingly procured their names to be entered in the Collectors books as mortgagees under the mortgagee in question. In 1843 the rights of the mortgagees were vested, in unequal shares, in two persons named Lalita Kuvar Lallubhai and Mansukhram Nandkishordas, and on June 8, 1843, the payment of the desaigiri watan allowance for the year ending May 1, 1843, was made to them by the Government. The Collectors books contained an entry of this payment. In 1843 the rights of the mortgagees were vested, in unequal shares, in two persons named Lalita Kuvar Lallubhai and Mansukhram Nandkishordas, and on June 8, 1843, the payment of the desaigiri watan allowance for the year ending May 1, 1843, was made to them by the Government. The Collectors books contained an entry of this payment. In the first column appeared the names of the recipients, described as " the undermentioned mortgagees of Desai Partibrai Mujatrai"; in the second column appeared the amounts paid to the two recipients respectively; in the third column appeared the signatures of Lalita Kuvar Lallubhai and Mansukhram Nandkishordas. In 1845, 1847, and 1849 there were similar entries and receipts by the two persons in whom, at those dates respectively, the mortgagees rights were vested. On October 16, 1901, the present suit to redeem the mortgage was instituted by the respondents in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Broach, it being subsequently transferred to the District Judge. The appellants pleaded, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation under s. 13 of Bombay Regulation I. of 1800 and under the Indian Statutes of Limitation; they also claimed that they were entitled to receive as a condition precedent to redemption a sum which included interest on the amount of the personal debts at the rates specified from the date of the suit down to the actual redemption. The respondents reply was that the suit was within time by reason of acknowledgments made by persons through whom the appellants claimed, and that the appellants, under the rule of damdupat, were not entitled to recover as interest more than the amount of the principal debt. The District Judge held that the case was not barred by limitation ; that Bombay Regulation I. of 1800 did not provide any period of limitation for a suit to redeem a mortgage; and that (in addition to other acknowledgments not material to this report) the signed receipts in the Government books for 1843, 1845, 1847, and 1849 were acknowledgments which, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV. of 1877), s. 19, and art. 148 of Sched. II., were effectual to give a fresh period of limitation from those dates. He further held that the debt in respect of which the claim for interest arose was a personal debt to which the rule of 0 Law Rep. 40 Ind. App. of 1877), s. 19, and art. 148 of Sched. II., were effectual to give a fresh period of limitation from those dates. He further held that the debt in respect of which the claim for interest arose was a personal debt to which the rule of 0 Law Rep. 40 Ind. App. 68 ( 1912- 1913) Majmudar Hiralal Ichhalal V. Desai Narsilal Chaturbhujdas 12 damdupat applied, and he accordingly disallowed the appellants claim to receive the interest. He did not by his judgment expressly state that in so doing he had exercised his discretion under s. 209 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. In the result he directed redemption upon payment of a specified sum. The High Court, upon appeal and cross-objections, affirmed the decision of the District Judge upon all points, except that that Court held that the appellants were entitled to be repaid certain sums which they had paid for local cess. The High Court accordingly ordered that the decree of the District Judge should be affirmed with this modification. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellants. The signatures of the receipts in the Collectors book did not amount to an acknowledgment of the mortgagors right to redeem. They were merely receipts for the amounts stated, and cannot be regarded as acknowledgments that the description of the recipients in the first column was accurate. Further, if the receipts amounted to an acknowledgment it was not an acknowledgment made to the person then entitled as mortgagor. The authorities shew that to be effectual an acknowledgment must be to the person to whom the liability exists Mylapore v. Yeo Kay(( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 168.); Fatimutilnissa Begam v. Soonder Das (( 1900) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 103.); Imam Ali v. Baij Nath Ram Sahu. (( 1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 613.) The rule of damdupat does not apply as from the date of suit. The District Judge had a discretion under s. 209 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, to allow interest Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Haiti Kanno Del (( 1900) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 35.); Dhondshet v. Rarji. (( 1896) I. L. R. 22 Bomb. 86.) It does not appear from the judgment of the District Judge that he exercised this discretion. The District Judge had a discretion under s. 209 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, to allow interest Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Haiti Kanno Del (( 1900) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 35.); Dhondshet v. Rarji. (( 1896) I. L. R. 22 Bomb. 86.) It does not appear from the judgment of the District Judge that he exercised this discretion. He did not exercise it adversely to the appellants on account of any laches or improper conduct, because he ordered the mortgagors to pay the costs. Parikh and Alpaiwalla, for the respondents, were not called upon to argue. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. This is an appeal from a judgment find decree dated January 21, 1909, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, which affirmed with a slight modification a judgment and decree of the Court of the District Judge of Broach, dated March 12, 1906. The main question is whether the present suit is barred by the Indian Statutes of Limitation. The Courts below have held that it is not so barred, and from this decision the appellants (who were defendants in the suit) appeal. The facts of the case so far as they are relevant to the present appeal arc very simple. The mortgage in question was executed on November 4, 1793. By that deed Desai Partibrai Mujatrai, the predecessor in title of the respondents, mortgaged with possession a certain desaigiri dastur and certain pasaeta lands situated in the district of Broach to the predecessor in title of the appellants. In 1803 the district of Broach finally came under British rule, and subsequently the desaigiri dastur in Broach was commuted into a money allowance, payable from the Treasury. Since that settlement the appellants have received the money allowance in lieu of the desaigiri dastur. On October 16, 1901, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit for redemption of the said mortgage. The appellants pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation under the Indian Statutes of Limitation, which provide a period of sixty years for a suit for redemption. Since that settlement the appellants have received the money allowance in lieu of the desaigiri dastur. On October 16, 1901, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit for redemption of the said mortgage. The appellants pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation under the Indian Statutes of Limitation, which provide a period of sixty years for a suit for redemption. Inasmuch as more than sixty years had elapsed since the execution of the original mortgage, this plea must have succeeded in the absence of written acknowledgments sufficient to satisfy the provisions of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, but the plaintiffs contended that certain documents signed by the predecessors in title of the appellants constituted such acknowledgments and gave to the plaintiffs new periods of limitation, which brought 0 Law Rep. 40 Ind. App. 68 ( 1912- 1913) Majmudar Hiralal Ichhalal V. Desai Narsilal Chaturbhujdas 13 the suit within the prescribed period. It will suffice to examine one of such acknowledgments, namely, an entry in a receipt book relating to the payment on June 8, 1848, of the allowance which is above referred to in respect of the year ending May 1, 1843. The mortgagees of the desaigiri dastur had in ordinary course procured the entry of their names in the Collectors books as mortgagees under the mortgage in question, they being entitled to the payment of the annual allowance into which the original rights had been commuted. Consequently the payments of the periodical instalments of that allowance were regularly made to them as such mortgagees as they fell due. The rights of the mortgagees were at that time vested in somewhat unequal shares in two persons named respectively Lalita Kuvar Lallubhai and Mansukhram Nandkishordas. The entry in the book of the Government agent entrusted with the payment of the allowance states that the payment is made to "the undermentioned mortgagees of Desai" Partibrai Mujatrai," and there follow the names of the two above-mentioned mortgagees. The amounts of the shares belonging to each of these mortgagees are set against their names, and against these shares the mortgagees have in their own handwriting written their respective names in acknowledgment of the receipt of their shares. The amounts of the shares belonging to each of these mortgagees are set against their names, and against these shares the mortgagees have in their own handwriting written their respective names in acknowledgment of the receipt of their shares. Their Lordships are of opinion that this is clearly an acknowledgment by them that they received these payments as being the parties interested in the original mortgage, and that their interest in the property was that of mortgagees thereunder. It follows, therefore, that this created a new period of limitation starting from June 8, 1843, and inasmuch as the present suit was instituted on October 16, 1901, it brought within the prescribed period. The only other point raised by the appellants on the hearing of this appeal related to the interest to be allowed on the redemption money for the period between the date of suit and the actual date of redemption. It was not contested that the rule of damdupat applied in the present case and that therefore the amount of arrears of interest to be allowed up to the date of suit was limited to an amount equal to the capital sum. By his decree the judge of first instance had given to the appellants no interest from the date of suit. The appellants admitted that it was discretionary whether he should grant any and what interest for that period, and that if he did exercise his discretion on the point they could not under the circumstances of the present case appeal against it. But they contended that the omission to give interest for that period had been by oversight. The only support for such contention was that in the judgment of that judge no reference was made to the point. On the hearing before the High Court that Court refused to accept that contention and treated the District Judge as having declined to award any interest for the period in question and held that it was a matter left to his discretion, and that under the circumstances of the case that discretion had not been, unreasonably exercised. Their Lordships agree with this decision and the grounds on which it rests. Their Lordships agree with this decision and the grounds on which it rests. No application was made to the District Judge to repair the alleged omission before the order was perfected, or at all; and, therefore, it must be taken that the order made by him represents in all respects his decision on the matter in plaint, and their Lordships see no reason to differ from the view of the High Court that the discretion was not unreasonably exercised. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed and that the appellants should pay the costs of this appeal.