JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order made under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In execution of a decree for arrears of rent, the disputed holding was brought to sale on the 29th November 1912 and was purchased by the Petitioner who was a stranger to the proceeding. On the 7th January 1913, the judgment-debtor applied under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for reversal of the sale. This application, on the face of it was made more than 30 days after the sale had taken place. The judgment-debtor explained the delay on two grounds ; namely, first, poverty on his own part, and, secondly, fraud on the part of the execution creditor by reason of which, he alleged, he had been kept ignorant of the sale. The Court did not give notice of this application either to the decree-holder or to the auction-purchaser, but set aside the sale. The Deputy Collector observed that although the application had been made after the expiry of the prescribed period, yet in the circumstances of the case, it was just that the application should be entertained and allowed. He was evidently moved by the poverty of the Petitioner and considered that there was no hardship on the auction-purchaser who would get his money back with interest, or on the landlord who would get his tenant back. The auction-purchaser now invites this Court to set aside the order as made without jurisdiction. There can in our opinion be no room for controversy that the order must be deemed to have been made without jurisdiction, unless it can be held that the Court below had authority to extend the time prescribed by sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Brij Mohan Thakur v. Rai Umanath I. L. R. 20 Cal. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Brij Mohan Thakur v. Rai Umanath I. L. R. 20 Cal. 8 (1892), that when a sale has taken place and no ground has been established for its reversal in accordance with statutory provisions, there is only one duty incumbent upon the Court, namely, to confirm the sale in so far as the parties to the proceeding and the auction-purchaser are concerned and, if the Court, under these circumstances, refuses to give effect to the sale, it fails to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, namely, to confirm the sale, and exercises a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, namely, to cancel a valid and operative sale. The only question which consequently requires consideration is, whether upon the facts stated in the petition, assuming those facts to be established, the Court below had authority to extend the time. 2. The judgment-debtor alleges that the entire execution proceedings have been fraudulent and that in substance he had been kept out of the knowledge of the sale, and consequently, of his light to have the sale set aside within the period prescribed by law. This in substance is an allegation that the judgment-debtor is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sec. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act. But that section is clearly inapplicable to the case before us. Read with sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, sec. 18 merely provides that every application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, shall be dismissed, unless facts are established to attract the operation of sec. 18. In the case before us, however, the period of limitation is not prescribed by the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. There is this further difficulty that cl. (b) of sub sec. 1 of sec 29 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 provides that nothing in the Act shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any application by any special or local law now or hereinafter in force in British India. Consequently, sec. 18 by itself has no application to a proceeding under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Consequently, sec. 18 by itself has no application to a proceeding under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This view is in accord with the principle recognised in the cases of Girija Nath Ray v. Patani Bibee I. L. R 17 Cal. 263 (1889) and Akhoy Kumar Soor v. Bejoy Chand Mohatap L. L. R. 29 Cal. 813 (1902). 3. The only other point which requires consideration is, whether there is any provision in the Bengal Tenancy Act, which authorises the Court to extend the time prescribed by sec. 174. The only provisions in the Bengal Tenancy Act relevant to this subject are contained in secs. 184 and 185. Sec. 184 provides that the limitation applicable to certain specified suits, appeals and applications are to be found in the third schedule annexed to the Act. Sub sec. (1) of sec. 185 excludes the operation of secs. 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 to suits and applications mentioned in sec. 184. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 185 then lays down that, subject to the provisions of Chap. XVI of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the provision of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply to all suits, appeals, and applications mentioned in sec. 184. The application with which we are now concerned was made under sec. 174, and is not an application mentioned in the third schedule to the Bengal Tenancy Act. Consequently, sub-sec. (2) of sec. 185 is of no assistance to the applicant under sec. 174. The position, therefore, is that notwithstanding the fraud alleged by the Petitioner, he is not entitled to protection under sec. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act. Whether he had any remedy under r. 90 of Or. 21 of the Code of 1908 read with sec. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, it is needless to consider now, nor is it necessary to consider whether he may still have a remedy by a regular suit, if the proceedings are fraudulent as alleged by him. On the present application, we are constrained to hold that the order of the Court below was made without jurisdiction. The Rule is made absolute and the order of the Court below discharged. The sale will stand confirmed. There will be no order for costs either in this Court or in the Court below.