JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit for declaration that the proceedings in a rent suit brought against him by the first and second Defendants were fictitious and have not affected his title to the lands mentioned in the schedule to the plaint, and also for confirmation of possession of those lands. The circumstances under which the Plaintiff seeks relief are not now in controversy. The subject matter of litigation was held by the Plaintiff under the Kar Defendants as a tenant. In 1894, his landlord sued to eject him on the allegation that he was a trespasser. This suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance and that decree was ultimately affirmed, on appeal, by this Court on the 20th July 1897. In this litigation, the Plaintiff was assisted by the Jana Defendants. Accordingly in 1898 he executed fictitious conveyances in their favour with a view to protect himself from further aggression on the part of the Kars. In 1899, he found that the Janas were unfaithful, and so to protect himself against the Janas, he induced his landlord to institute a fictitious suit for rent. That suit was decreed on the 7th November 1899. The Kars took out execution of this decree, the Janas thereupon preferred a claim which was disallowed on the 20th January 1900. The decree was subsequently executed and at the sale which followed, the Kars purchased the holding on the 29th March 1900. The Plaintiff alleges that possession was formally delivered to the Kars on the 5th June 1900, as a matter of fact he himself has ever since continued in occupation of the land. On the 10th April 1900, the Janas sued the Plaintiff and the Kars for declaration of their title on the basis of their conveyances ; but on the 23rd July 1900 this suit was withdrawn. In 1906 the Kars turned against the Plaintiff, and with the help of the Police took away by force the crops raised by him. On the 15th March 1907, the Plaintiff commenced this suit for declaration that the entire proceedings in the rent suit of 1899 were fictitious and that the Kars did not acquire any title on the basis of their purchase at the execution sale. On the 15th March 1907, the Plaintiff commenced this suit for declaration that the entire proceedings in the rent suit of 1899 were fictitious and that the Kars did not acquire any title on the basis of their purchase at the execution sale. The Court of first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff and made a decree in accordance with the prayer in the plaint. Upon appeal that decree has been set aside by the District Judge on the ground that as the Plaintiff entered into this fraudulent arrangement with the Kars with a view to defraud the Janas, he is not entitled to any relief in a Court of equity. The District Judge has further found that the suit is in essence a suit for specific performance of a contract and is consequently barred by limitation. On the present appeal the decision of the District Judge has been assailed on two grounds, namely, first, that the suit is not barred by limitation and, secondly, that the conduct of the Plaintiff has not been such as to (sic) him to relief in a Court of equity. These points have been controverted on behalf of the Kar Defendants' who have further urged that the suit is barred under sec. 317 of the CPC of 1882. In our opinion, the decree of the District Judge cannot be supported. In so far as the first ground is concerned, no question of limitation arises in this case. The suit is not one for specific performance of a contract. No doubt, the Plaintiff alleged that the Kar Defendants had agreed to execute a release and in the prayer clause of the plaint he asked for a decree for execution of such release by the Kars. But the suit is in essence one for declaration of title to land and for confirmation of possession. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the proceedings in the rent-suit were fictitious and did not operate to affect his title in any manner ; he also prays for confirmation of possession. As the Kars turned against the Plaintiff and took away the crops grown by him in November 1906, and the suit was commenced on the 15th March 1907, it is amply in time. We hold accordingly that the suit is not barred by limitation. 2. As the Kars turned against the Plaintiff and took away the crops grown by him in November 1906, and the suit was commenced on the 15th March 1907, it is amply in time. We hold accordingly that the suit is not barred by limitation. 2. In so far as the second ground is concerned, it is clear that the Plaintiff is not disentitled to relief in a Court of equity. It may be conceded that the fictitious suit for rent was instituted against him by the Kars at his instance with a view to make it impossible for the Janas to assert their claim under the conveyances. But the Janas cannot be said to have been defrauded unless it is established that they had a valid title. Upon this point, the Court of first instance found that the Janas who are said to have been defrauded paid no consideration for the conveyances in their favour ; in other words, that the conveyances were fictitious documents which had been executed by the Plaintiff with a view to protect himself from any invasion of his right by the Kars. Under these circumstance, it is impossible to maintain the view that the Janas were defrauded. On behalf of the Kars, we have been pressed to remand the case for consideration of the question whether the Janas had any subsisting title ; but we cannot accede to this request. It is plain from the grounds of appeal taken by the Kars before the District Judge that the findings of the Court of first instance upon this question were not specifically assailed and it is clear that if the point had been argued before the District Judge, there would have been a discussion of the evidence on this point in the judgment. It appears to have been assumed before the District Judge that the Janas were defrauded, because the effect of the execution sale was to make it impossible for the Janas to assert their title. But it appears to have been overlooked that if they had no real title to the property, they could not be defrauded. The case thus falls within the principle of the decision of this Court in Jadunath Poddar v. Ruplal Poddar I. L. R. 33 Cal. 967 (978) (1906), and of the Judicial Committee in Petherpermal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai I. L. R. 35 Cal. The case thus falls within the principle of the decision of this Court in Jadunath Poddar v. Ruplal Poddar I. L. R. 33 Cal. 967 (978) (1906), and of the Judicial Committee in Petherpermal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai I. L. R. 35 Cal. 551 (1908), namely, that to enable a fraudulent confederate to retain properly transferred to him in order to effect a fraud, the contemplated fraud must be effected, when and when alone does the fraudulent grantor or giver lose the right to claim the aid of the law to recover the property he has parted with. The Plaintiff is consequently not disentitled to protection in a Court of equity. The only other point which requires consideration is whether the suit is barred under the provisions of sec. 317 of the Code of 1882. That section provides that no suit shall be maintained against a certified purchaser on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of any other person or on behalf of a man through whom such other person claims. The case before us is not a suit of this description ; sec. 317 contemplates a real sale in execution of a real decree in a real suit. Here we find a fictitious suit for rent in which there was no controversy between the parties. In that fictitious suit a fictitious decree was made and the sale held in execution of that decree was equally fictitious. To a suit of this description the observation of Lord Brougham in Bandon v. Becher 3 Cl. and F. 479 (1835) applies : " A sentence is a Judicial determination of a cause agitated between real parties, upon which a real interest has been settled. In order to make a sentence, there must be a real interest, a real argument, a real prosecution, a real defence, a real decision. Of all these qualities, not one takes place in the case of a fraudulent and collusive suit; there is no Judge but a person invested with the ensigns of a Judicial office, is misemployed in listening to a fictitious cause proposed to him ; there is no party litigating, there is no party Defendant, no real interest brought into question" [see Radhamadhab v. Kalpataru 17 C. L. J. 209 (212) (1912)]. To a suit of this description sec. 317 cannot possibly have any application. To a suit of this description sec. 317 cannot possibly have any application. The result is that this Appeal is allowed, the decree of the District Judge set aside, and the suit decreed with costs in all the Courts in the manner following. The decree will declare that the suit for rent (No. 369 of 1899) instituted against the Plaintiff by the Kar Defendants in 1899 and all proceedings based thereon were fictitious and have not affected his title in any manner ; his possession will further be confirmed, or if he has mean while been dispossessed, he will be restored to possession in execution of this decree.