JUDGMENT : Tudball, J. The facts of this case are as follows. The plaintiff is the owner of the property in suit, 29 bighas 4 biswas and 15 dhurs of land. The defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, were cultivating tenants of this land prior to the 27th of May, 1901. On that date the plaintiff gave a usufructuary mortgage of the land for a period of 7 years to the defendants, Nos. 1 and 3. In 1908, the mortgage debt was paid up and the property redeemed but the defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, remained in possession of the land. The plaintiff brought a suit in the Revenue Court against the defendants alleging them to be his tenants without a right of occupancy and he sought to eject them. Defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, pleaded that they were occupancy tenants. The other defendants pleaded that they had no concern with the land at all. The Revenue Court, on the 27th of November, 1908, held, as between the plaintiff and defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, that the latter were occupancy tenants, and therefore, not liable to ejectment. This decree was upheld in appeal and also by the Board of Revenue on revision. Thereupon the plaintiff came into the Civil Court with the present suit against all the seven defendants seeking for possession and mesne profits on the ground that the defendants constituted a Joint Hindu family, that in spite of redemption of the mortgage they remained in possession, that they were trespassers and liable to ejectment and that the decision of the Revenue Court, mentioned above, had been obtained by means of fraud and was, therefore, not binding on the plaintiff. Defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, pleaded that they were the occupancy tenants of the land and as such not liable to ejectment in a Civil Court and that the decision of the Revenue Court operated as res judicata. The other defendants pleaded that they had no concern with the land and that they were quite unnecessary parties to the suit. The court of first instance, apparently in view of section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act, required the defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, to institute a suit in the Revenue Court for the determination of the question raised by them as to their occupancy tenancy. The court of first instance, apparently in view of section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act, required the defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, to institute a suit in the Revenue Court for the determination of the question raised by them as to their occupancy tenancy. Each of these persons, accordingly, brought a separate suit in the Revenue Court, asking for a declaration of their status as occupancy tenants. The Revenue Court framed three issues:— (i) Does the decision dated the 27th of November, 1908, operate as res judicata between the parties? (ii) Is the plaintiff an occupancy tenant or only a trespasser? (iii) Is a separate suit maintainable? 2. The decision which the Court came to was that the judgment, dated the 27th of November, 1908, operated as res judicata between the parties and that, for all intents and purposes, the Revenue Court was bound to hold the plaintiffs occupancy tenants of the land unless and until the judgment of the 27th of November, 1908, was set aside or cancelled. Having come to this decision on the first two issues, the Revenue Court, however, dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not competent to determine the question which had already been determined by a competent court. The Additional Subordinate Judge, on receiving this decision of the Revenue Court, treated it as a decision in favour of defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, to the effect that they were the occupancy tenants of the land. He further held that there had been no fraud and that the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to maintain his suit which he accordingly dismissed. On appeal, four pleas were taken, none of which were touched by the District Judge in his decision. The District Judge held that the Revenue Court's decision, passed after the reference under section 202 of the Tenancy Act, was a decision to the effect that defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, were not occupancy tenants He, thereupon, set aside the decree of the court of first instance, and remanded the suit for decision on its merits. Defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, have come here on appeal and it is admitted on both sides that the order of remand is bad. In the first place, the court of first instance did not decide the suit on a preliminary point. Defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4, have come here on appeal and it is admitted on both sides that the order of remand is bad. In the first place, the court of first instance did not decide the suit on a preliminary point. Of the four pleas taken before the District Judge, one was to the effect that there had been no issue framed on a point which had arisen between the parties, that this issue ought to have been framed, and a decision arrived at, upon it. Of the other pleas taken, two referred to the decision of the court of first instance 011 two points and the fourth was to the effect that the court of first instance had arrived at a finding in regard to two pieces of land which were not included in the suit between the parties. In the next place, it seems to us that the courts below have gone quite wrong in regard to the view which they have taken in regard to section 202 of the Tenancy Act. The wording of this section is quite plain. “The Civil Court,” says the section, “shall, by order in writing, require the defendant to institute, within three months, a suit in the Revenue Court for the determination of such question.” It seems quite clear to us that this section is intended to operate only in cases in which such question has not already been finally determined between the parties in the Revenue Court. Where, as in the present case, there had been a suit between the parties themselves in which the present plaintiff had alleged defendants to be his tenants and had sought to eject them and the defendants had pleaded rights of occupancy as being a bar to this ejectment and the Revenue Court had finally decided as between them that the defendants were occupancy tenants and not liable to ejectment, the question, in the absence of fraud, is finally decided between the parties, so far as the Revenue Court is concerned and it was quite unnecessary for the Additional Subordinate Judge to pass any order under section 202. It is also worthy of note that the plaintiff came into court, admitting this decision, but seeking to set it aside on the ground of fraud. This made it still further unnecessary to pass any order under section 202. It is also worthy of note that the plaintiff came into court, admitting this decision, but seeking to set it aside on the ground of fraud. This made it still further unnecessary to pass any order under section 202. It is clear that unless and until the plaintiff, in the present suit, can establish fraud, he will be bound by this decision as against defendants, Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The learned District Judge has not gone into the merits of the case nor touched the issues raised in his court. His order of remand being bad, we set it aside and direct the lower appellate court to readmit the appeal under its original number on the file and to proceed to decide the suit on its merits. Costs will abide the result and will be costs in the cause.