JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside proceedings in execution of a decree for money, which have been taken under circumstances of a somewhat exceptional character. On the 18th February 1909, Pelaram Mondal, the Opposite Party in this Rule, obtained a decree for mesne profits against Surendra Nath Ray whom he described as the infant adopted son of Panchanon Ray. His claim was against Punchanon Ray; but before he could commence his suit, Punchanon died. He accordingly sued the alleged infant adopted son represented by Ashi Bhusan Dasi as mother and guardian ad litem, and obtained a decree. Before execution could be taken on the basis of this decree, in another suit tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction, it was declared that the infant had not been validly adopted. The decree-holder, however, proceeded to attach properties which formed part of the estate of Punchanon Ray. Objection was thereupon taken by Ashi Bhusan Dasi, who claimed to be in possession as the widow of Punchanon Ray. The objection was allowed, and there is no room for controversy that it was allowed very properly. The decree-holder then proceeded to make an application that Ashi Bhusan Dasi might be substituted in place of Surendra Nath Ray in the decree, and that execution might proceed against her. The order was made ex parte, and in proceedings in execution the properties in the hands of Ashi Bhusan Dasi have been sold and purchased by the decree-holder himself. In our opinion, these proceedings are entirely without jurisdiction and must be set aside. The decree was obtained against Surendra Nath Ray as the representative of Punchanon Ray, and could be executed against him to the extent of the assets in his hands. Admittedly there are no assets in his hands, because he is not the adopted son of Punchanon Ray. The decree holder has not got any decree against Ashi Bhusan Dasi and he is not entitled to ask that her name be substituted in the place of Surendra Nath Ray. If we were to give effect to the contention of the decree-holder, the result would be really a new decree in his favour against Ashi Bhusan Dasi. But it has been argued that she is bound by the decree against Surendra Nath Ray, the alleged adopted son, because she acted as his guardian ad litem. If we were to give effect to the contention of the decree-holder, the result would be really a new decree in his favour against Ashi Bhusan Dasi. But it has been argued that she is bound by the decree against Surendra Nath Ray, the alleged adopted son, because she acted as his guardian ad litem. It is plain, however, that she is in no way bound by the decree mads against Surendra Nath Ray [Mohunt Das v. Nil Komul Dewan 4 C. W. N. 283 (1899) and Joy Chandra Banerjee v. Sreenath Chatterjee I. L. R. 32 Cal. 357 (1904)]. The remedy of the decree-holder may possibly be by way of a suit against Ashi Bhusan Dasi, if it be still open to him to sue her successfully, in view of the provisions of the statute of limitation; but it is clear that it is not competent to him to execute the decree against Ashi Bhusan Dasi. The result is that this Rule is made absolute and the order of the Court below set aside. The sale will stand cancelled. The Petitioner is entitled to his costs of this Rule. We assess the hearing-fee at one gold mohur.