JUDGMENT : Ryves, J. The facts, out which this appeal arises, are given fully in the judgments of the courts below. It is enough to say that Resal, defendant-appellant, in certain partition proceedings, acquired in his share a particular plot of land, No. 591. It appears that Maha Ram, the plaintiff-respondent, was not a recorded co-sharer in the village but nevertheless he objected at the time of the partition but his objections were overruled on the ground that as he was not a recorded co-sharer he had no locus standi. After partition was completed, Resal brought a suit in the Revenue court against Maha Ram with the object of getting Maha Ram's rent fixed by that court. Maha Ram pleaded in his defence that he was the owner of the plot or rather that he had acquired a good title by adverse possession. The court trying the suit proceeded under section 199(i)(a) of the Agra Tenancy Act and directed Maha Ram to establish his title in the Civil Court. Hence this suit. Both courts have decreed Maha Ram's suit. 2. In appeal before me, it has been very strenuously argued that section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act bars this suit and great reliance is placed on the decision of Mr. Justice CHAMIER in Musammat Tarifan v. Fateh Din, [Unreported case]. It is strenuously argued that that decision is in conflict with other decisions of the Court and notably that of Khasey v. Jugla, [1906] I.L.R., 28 All., 432. 3. It seems to me that neither of these rulings applies to this particular case. I do not think that section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act was meant to prohibit a Revenue court from acting under section 199(I)(a) of the Agra Tenancy Act, if in some indirect way the result of such a suit might possibly affect the share obtained by one co-sharer on a partition. It must be remembered that the suit brought by Resal in the Revenue court for the fixation of rent against Maha Ram is still pending. It must be remembered that the suit brought by Resal in the Revenue court for the fixation of rent against Maha Ram is still pending. It was open to that court under section 199 to try the issue itself, and if that court had done so and decided in the way in which the Civil Courts have ultimately decided it, the result would have been the same, yet that would be a decision of a Revenue court and would, in exactly the same way, affect the partition as it is said the decision of the Civil Court does or may do eventually. 4. Now section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act cannot possibly bar a Revenue court deciding itself a question of title such as is referred to in section 199 of the Agra Tenancy Act. Under that section the Revenue Court can proceed in one of two ways. It can either try the issue of proprietary title itself or it can refer that issue virtually for trial by the Civil Court, that is to say, it can direct the defendant to have his title established by a civil suit, to be instituted within 3 months of its order and it is bound if such a suit is instituted and decided to follow that decision. The object of the suit in the Civil Court, after all, is the decision of a particular issue raised in a Revenue court and which the Revenue court must follow. 5. It seems to me, therefore, that the lower court was right in holding that section 233(k) does not bar the suit. The findings are findings of fact and that is the only question on which this appeal has been pressed. In my opinion it fails and I dismiss the appeal with costs.