JUDGMENT Ayling, J. 1. The suits out of which these Second Appeals arise are all of a similar character. They are brought by various proprietors of land under the Godavari anicut system for a declaration of their right to irrigate their lands with anicut water free of water rate, for an injunction restraining Government from levying water rate under Act VII of 1865, and, except in Second Appeal No. 1774 of 1911, for a refund of the amounts collected. 2. The substantial question involved in each is the extent to which Government is bound to allow the irrigation free of water rate. It is not denied that the water used is Government water; the only question is whether Government is bound by an "engagement" within the meaning of Section 1 of Act VII of 1865 to allow the irrigation free of charge, 3. Some of the suits deal with mokhasa villages, others with minor inams, and such may conveniently be treated separately. 4. Second Appeals Nos. 1398 to 1401 and 1770 and 1774 of 1911 all arise out of suits relating to mokhasa villages, all in the Ellamanchili Zamindari with the exception of one (that resulting in Second Appeal No. 1898 of 1911) which relates to a village in the Nidadavole Zamindari. These suits will be considered first. 5. All these suits are laid on the basis of an alleged engagement with Government embodied in an order of Government (G.O. No. 101, Revenue, dated the 16th January 1864) to the effect that Government water would be supplied free of charge to all these lands, whose pre-existing sources of irrigation were out off by the anicut works. This general engagement, or undertaking, on the part of Government is said to have been subsequently given practical effect by the proceedings of a Deputy Collector named Subba Rao who in 1876 determined the actual extents to be allowed rate free in each case, and the proceedings of Mr. Subba Rao are said to have been ratified by Government in its Order No. 661, Revenue, dated the 13th September 1894. 6. Government denies both the alleged engagement and the ratification. 7. The first point for determination is as to the meaning of the word "engagement" in Section 3 of Act VII of 1865. Subba Rao are said to have been ratified by Government in its Order No. 661, Revenue, dated the 13th September 1894. 6. Government denies both the alleged engagement and the ratification. 7. The first point for determination is as to the meaning of the word "engagement" in Section 3 of Act VII of 1865. It has been repeatedly held, and is not now disputed, that in all cases of permanently-settled estates where the income derivable from wet lands has been taken into consideration in settling the peshkash payable to Government, there is an implied undertaking of the nature of an enforceable contract on the part of Government to allow the use of Government water to such wet lands without charge; and that this implied undertaking amounts to an engagement within the meaning of the Act. There is a similar implied engagement as regards enfranchised inams. If I understand the learned Government Pleader aright, he contends that these undertakings deducible from the circumstances under which the peshkash (or quit-rent in the case of an inam) was determined arc the only engagements contemplated by, or within the moaning of, the Act. I can find nothing in the Act tending however remotely to justify such a narrow construction. The word "engagements" is not qualified in any way, as it would have been, had it been intended to limit it to the cases just referred to. An imaginary case may be taken: suppose that Government bar), prior to the Act, constructed a channel through a Zamindars land for the benefit of Government lands on the understanding that, in consideration of the Zamindar allowing the use of the ground through which the channel was dug, he should be allowed to irrigate his own lands from it, free of charge; can it be contended that such an agreement could not be pleaded under the Act as a bar to the subsequent imposition of water-rate or would it not rightly be held to be an "engagement" within the meaning of Section 1? 8. 8. I am content to rest my decision on the plain wording of the Act, and do not propose to follow in detail the arguments of the learned Government Pleader and vakils for the appellants based on previous rulings of this Court or on various Government Orders and other official documents written shortly before the passing of the Act., and referred to as showing the probable intention of Government. As regards the former, it is true that the earlier cases [Chidambara Row v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (1903) I.L.R., 26 Mad., 66, Lutchmee, Doss v. Secretary of State for India I.L.R., 32 Mad., 456 and Secretary of State for India v. Ambalavana Pandarasannadhi (1911) I.L.R., 34 Mad., 366], only deal with what I may call permanent Battlement engagements; but they contain nothing suggesting the exclusion of other engagements. In Kandukuri Mahalakshmamma Gam v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R., 34 Mad., 295 (Urlam case), the learned Judges discuss the evidence of another engagement, though they find it not proved; and in two other cases, Secretary of State v. Kameshwaramma (1904) Appeals Nos. 182 to 184 and Sri Raja Venhatarangayya v. The Secretary of State for India (1913) M.W.N., 417, they find a similar engagement to that now set up as coming within the scope of the section. The most recent case, Kesari Venkatasubbiah v. The Secretary of State for India (1913) 14 M.L.T., 131 is also a distinct authority in support of my view. 9. In the last named case one of the learned Judges has to some extent based his conclusions on a consideration of antecedent official correspondence. Before us much argument has been devoted to this line of reasoning, and the Government Pleader was permitted to file some fresh exhibits in the shape of Government Orders and Boards Proceedings connected with the documents considered in that case, but not referred to in the judgment. Before us much argument has been devoted to this line of reasoning, and the Government Pleader was permitted to file some fresh exhibits in the shape of Government Orders and Boards Proceedings connected with the documents considered in that case, but not referred to in the judgment. The admission of these documents was allowed on the understanding that they were to be referred ho only as bearing on the interpretation of the term "engagement." I do not propose to discuss any of these documents or their effect, inasmuch as, with all deference, 1 doubt whether it is either necessary or advisable to interpret the plain wards of the Act in the light of expressions of the views of Government before its enactment - -vide Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick (1895) I.L.R., 22 Calc., 788 (P.C.), Kadir Bakhsh v. Bhavani Prasad (1892) I.L.R. 14 All., 145 at p. 148 judgment of Edge, C.J.,-and Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1808) I.L.R., 22 Bom., 118. I may remark that, if debates in the legislature should not be referred to, it seems still less legitimate to refer to expressions of the antecedent views of Government, which may have been modified during the passage of a Bill through the legislature, 1. may also refer to the remarks of Lord Halsbury in Milder v. Dexter (1902) A.C., 474. 10. Assuming, then, that an engagement of the kind alleged by the appellants would be an engagement within the meaning of the Act, has such an engagement been proved? It is, of course, entirely distinct from, and independent of, the engagement deducible from the condition of permanent settlement and inam grants, to which reference has been made and which in admitted by Government. The District Judge haw held that it has not been proved; and, although his finding, based chiefly on the interpretation of documents, in open to question in this Court, I am of opinion that he is right. The plaint in the suit ending in Second Appeal No. 1398 of 1911 (with which the other plaints are identical or practically so) sets out the engagement as follows: That prior to the introduction of the anicut system of irrigation into the Godavari delta the mokhasa village of China Nindrakolanu had a wet ayakut of katties 24 watered under old and independent sources of irrigation. The introduction of the anicut system interfered with these sources of irrigation and rendered then useless for irrigation purposes; Government were therefore bound to compensate the mokhasadars (plaintiffs predecessors-in-title) for the loss either in money or otherwise and to cover up all such cases. Government in its Order No. 101, Revenue, dated the 16th January 1864, declared that Government water would be supplied free of charge to all those lands whose pre-existing sources of irrigation wore cut off by the anicut works. Agreeably with the said declaration of Government and tinder the orders of his departmental superiors M.R. Ry. Subba Rao Pantulu Garu, then in charge of the division, recognised on 17th July 1876, acres 54686 as mamool wet, i.e., as land entitled to Government water free of charge, fixing the old wet ayacut at katties 22-6 and converting it into acres at the average conversion rate of acres 2453 per katti. Though full justice was not done to the mokhasadare (plaintiffs and their ancestors) they submitted to the above settlement and it has now been in force for nearly 30 years having been ratified by the Board and Government, There is thus an engagement between the plaintiffs and the defendant in regard to the extent of mamool wet in China Nindrakolanu and it is not now open to the defendant to go behind it and re-open the question. 11. A copy of G. 0. No. 101, Revenue, dated 16th January 1864, is filed as Exhibit XXIV in Original Suit No. 24 of 1905 (Second Appeal No. 1400 of 1911); and as this is alleged to contain the "engagement," it obviously calls for very careful consideration, The Government Order was passed on a letter from the Board of Revenue which was not tiled in the lower Courts. A copy was tiled and exhibited before us, but subject to the conditions that it was only to be used, as already stated, in connection with the interpretation of the word "engagement" in the Act. Fortunately, however, the purport of the Boards letter is set forth vary fully in the Government Order itself. It apparently dealt with two subjects: (1) the submission of a draft Act for levy of water-cuss. (2) a proposal to modify the rules previously in force in Godavari and Kistna for the levy of water-cess. 12. Fortunately, however, the purport of the Boards letter is set forth vary fully in the Government Order itself. It apparently dealt with two subjects: (1) the submission of a draft Act for levy of water-cuss. (2) a proposal to modify the rules previously in force in Godavari and Kistna for the levy of water-cess. 12. We are only concerned with the second of these which is dealt with in paragraphs 7 to 12 of the Government Order as follows: 13. [His Lordship then set out, the Government Order (vide pp. 999-1000 supra) and proceeded as follows:] 14. The decision of Government is set forth in paragraph 12 to confine the concession to "land whether inam or zamindari shown to be entitled to irrigation at the cost of Government." It is not a very happy phrase, but I can only understand it as meaning" land entitled to be irrigated with Government water without charge." It cannot be contended that a right to the use of. Government water without charge was enjoyed by lands which wore brought under wet cultivation between the time of Permanent Settlement and the introduction of the anicut system; and the reference to an "engagement to supply water" in the last sentences of the paragraph cannot have referred to such lands. 15. It is, of course, in the order of Government and not in the proposals of the Board that the alleged "engagement" must be sought, and it is to be noted that Government do not accept the Boards proposal as quoted verbatim in paragraph 10; but formulate the terms of the concession themselves. 16. I can find nothing in the Government Order relied on by the appellants more than a resolution to abandon the charge of half water-rate on wet lands so cultivated at the time of Permanent Settlement or inam grant on the ground that the charge was arbitrary, impolitic and an infringement of rights acquired at the Permanent Settlement, or under the terms of the inam grant, This is a totally different thing from the engagement pleaded in the plaint. 17. It is true that, as appears from various exhibits, in later years some misapprehension prevailed as to the reasons which influenced Government in passing its Order of the 16th January 1864, as well as the exact definition of the concession. 17. It is true that, as appears from various exhibits, in later years some misapprehension prevailed as to the reasons which influenced Government in passing its Order of the 16th January 1864, as well as the exact definition of the concession. The Board in drafting rules (which were duly approved by Government) followed the wording of their original proposal, as set forth in paragraph 10 of the Government Order: and this naturally led to some confusion. But I may refer to Exhibit XXIX in Original Suit No. 24 of 1905 (Second Appeal No. 1400 of 1911), from which it will he quite clear that in 1888 both the Board and Government entertained no doubt that the concession allowed by Government in 1864 was limited to the "Gudikat wet area," that is, the area entered as wet in the Permanent Settlement accounts. It is unnecessary to discuss these later documents in detail, inasmuch as it is not suggested that any of thorn constitute an addition to the "engagement" which has to be found within the tour corners of G.O. No. 101, Revenue, dated the 16th January 1864. As a matter of fact, the question of whether the wet area at the time of Permanent Settlement or at any later time before the introduction of the anicut system should be adopted as the teat was never viewed as a matter of any practical importance, probably for the simple reason that no general increase or material variation of wet ayacut took place in the interval. 18. It is necessary however to consider another argument put forward on behalf of the appellants. It is said that, whatever may have been the intention of Government in passing G.O. No. 101, Revenue, dated the 16th January 1864, the concession was interpreted by their officers and given practical effect in a particular way, and this procedure was approved and ratified by Government in 1894, so that as thus given effect to it must now be treated as a binding engagement- 19. The officers in question are Messrs. Hope, Collector of Godavari in 1875-76, and K. Subba Rao, Deputy Collector on General Duty. Mr. Subba Rao, under instructions from Mr. Hopes predecessor, made an investigation in sixteen villages, including these now in question, and submitted proposals to Mr. Hope for the determination of the "usual wet-area" on which exemption was to be allowed. Copy of Mr. Hope, Collector of Godavari in 1875-76, and K. Subba Rao, Deputy Collector on General Duty. Mr. Subba Rao, under instructions from Mr. Hopes predecessor, made an investigation in sixteen villages, including these now in question, and submitted proposals to Mr. Hope for the determination of the "usual wet-area" on which exemption was to be allowed. Copy of Mr. Subba Raos report is filed as Exhibit IX in Original Suit No. 46 of 1906 (Second Appeal No. 1468 of 1911). He took the "highest" area of wet cultivation in any one year before the villages were brought under the anicut as the basis of his recommendation: and converted this area (recorded in the Bhuband accounts only in terms of seed grain, into acres on a system of calculation of his own. The appellants contend that his procedure in both particulars has been ratified by Government and cannot now be called in question. It embodies the exemptions they now claim. It was not argued before us that Subba Rao was acting under the authority of Government, or that, in the absence of ratification by Government, Government would be bound by his action. A clear authority against such a view, if it were needed, is to be found in The. Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kasturi Reddi (1903)) I.L.R., 26 Mad., 268 at p. 279. The only question is whether his settlement was ratified by Government. There was certainly no ratification by Government at the time, Exhibit X (in the same suit) shows that the Collector Mr. Hope (influenced apparently by the sole idea of saving himself trouble) told Subha Rao to dispose of the matter himself, and let parties aggrieved appeal to him. No appeals seem to have been filed: and no further question was raised hill 1892, when Mr. Higgins, then Collector of Godavari, raised the question of whether the unauthorised settlement of Mr. Subba Rao should be repudiated. No appeals seem to have been filed: and no further question was raised hill 1892, when Mr. Higgins, then Collector of Godavari, raised the question of whether the unauthorised settlement of Mr. Subba Rao should be repudiated. The Board in a resolution, dated the 31st March 1894, recommended that it should, on the ground that Subha, Raos conversion rate was excessively high: hut Government in its Order No. 661, Revenue, dated the 13th September 1894, directed that "having regard to the official position held by that officer when he made the Battlement and to the circumstance that in fixing the rates, ho proceeded under the orders of the then Collector of the district and followed the sanctioned rules on the subject, the settlement made by him should not now be repudiated." 20. This in the order, which is now put forward as it ratification which is irrevocably binding on Government. 21. The District Judge states that the order "was never communicated to the parties concerned and was not in fact acted upon." This statement appears to be correct: and it has not boon traversed before us. The whole question was reconsidered shortly afterwards on receipt of a further report, and on the 17th Juno 1895 Government passed a fresh order (copy filed as Exhibit XII in Second Appeal No. 1468 of 1911) directing that in all cases in which the rates of conversion had not been accepted for at least 20 years they might be revised. This, in effect, repudiated Subba Raos settlement, which was only submitted for the Collectors orders on 31st December 1875, and this was Governments final decision in the matter. 22. In these circumstances, I do not consider that the order dated the 13th September 1894 can be treated as a ratification which would bind the hands of Government. There can be no estoppel, for it was never communicated to the landholders, much lease acted upon by them. Mr. Seshagiri Ayyar for the appellants contends that no communication of the ratification is necessary, and that any expression (written or oral) of a resolve to ratify contract is absolutely irrevocable oven though uncommunicated and though the ratifier may change his mind a moment later. This is a startling proposition and one in support of which no authority has been cited. 22. This is a startling proposition and one in support of which no authority has been cited. 22. The sections of the Contract Ant which deal with ratification (sections 196-200) are silent on this point, and no rulings which have any bearing upon it have been quoted before us. But on a consideration of the principles which seem to underlie the Act, it seems to me that an express ratification within the meaning of Section 197 cannot become complete until it is communicated to the other party. Till than it is liable to revocation. This is in accordance with the principles embodied in the provisions of Sections 3-6 of the Act, which deal with proposals, acceptances and revocations (vide, in particular, Section 5). 23. The Government Order, dated the 13th September 1894, in so far as it purports to ratify Subba Raos sittlement, must therefore be treated as an incomplete ratification, having been revoked before communication, and is therefore noli binding upon Government. 24. I therefore agree with the District Judge in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the engagement set up by them, and that the suits as framed must fail. In one case only (Second Appeal No. 1774 of 1911) the appellants vakil has in this Court applied for, and been granted, permission to amend his plaint by basing his claim not on the engagement first pleaded, but on the usual engagement to allow free irrigation to all the wet ayakat at permanent settlement. In the other appeals the appellants vakil on mature consideration elected not to apply for a similar amendment. This case (Second Appeal No. 1774 of 1911) will have to be considered separately. The other appeals (Second Appeals Nos, 1D98-1401 and 1770 of 191.1) must be dismissed with costs. 25. [His Lordship then dealt with Second Appeal No. 1774 of 1911, and reversed the decree in the same and then disposed of Second Appeals 1308, 1468 and 1563 of 1911 which were dismissed; but the judgment relating to the same has been omitted herein as not material to be reported.] Sadasiva Ayyar, J. 26. Of the nine suits out of which these nine second appeals have arisen six fall under one class and three under another class. The latter three are the suits out of which Second Appeals Nos. 1368, 1468 and 1563 have arisen. Of the nine suits out of which these nine second appeals have arisen six fall under one class and three under another class. The latter three are the suits out of which Second Appeals Nos. 1368, 1468 and 1563 have arisen. The other six suits form a distinct though connected class, the allegations in the plaints in those six suits being very similar. But during the arguments before us, the plaint in suit No. 1774 was allowed to be amended and hence the suit out of which the Second Appeal No. 1774 arose has to be separately dealt with from the other five suits. I shall first, therefore, shortly deal with the Second Appeal No. 1774. 27. As amended, the material allegations in the plaint in that suit are as follow: (a) The plaintiff is the proprietor of the village of Navarasapuram, Narasapur taluk, Kistna district. (b) Prior to the introduction of the anicut system of irrigation into the Godavari delta, the plaintiffs proprietary village of Navarasapuram had a wet ayacut of P. 48-19 (T).--11 M. irrigated under independent sources of irrigation. The construction of the river embankment by the Government intercepted those sources and rendered them useless for irrigation purposes. (c) Under such circumstances, the Government were bound to compensate the proprietor, and they declared by a general order (G.O. No. 101, dated 1864) that in all cases where the pre-existing sources of irrigation were out off by the anicut works Government water would be supplied free of charge. (d) Under the orders at his departmental superiors, M.B.Ry. K. Subba Rao Pantulu Garu, the officer in charge of the division, in 1875, settled the extent entitled to free irrigation in the plaintiffs village to be 603 acres 48 cents by converting the old wet ayacut (P. 48-19-11) into acres at the average conversion rate of the village, viz., acres 1232 per putti, and it is not open to the Government; to go behind this settlement of Kanchi Subba Rao and re-open the question. At the time of the Permanent Settlement between Government and the plaintiffs ancestor, the wet ayacut was also of the extent of 48 puttis 19 (T) and 11 manikkas. At the time of the Permanent Settlement between Government and the plaintiffs ancestor, the wet ayacut was also of the extent of 48 puttis 19 (T) and 11 manikkas. There was therefore an engagement at the time of the said Permanent Settlement (1837) between Government and the plaintiffs ancestor that the plaintiffs estate was not to be charged water-rate for water used in irrigating the said area, which was being cultivated as wet at the time of the Permanent Settlement. (e) From 1875 to 1905 the plaintiff enjoyed free irrigation for the 603 acres 48 cents settled by Kanchi Subba Rao; but meanwhile another Deputy Collector appointed by Government, M.R.Ry. P. Negeswara Rao Pantulu Garu, reduced the mamul wet extent of the suit village from 603 acres 48 cents to 430 acres 76 cents, i.e., by 172 acres 72 cents; and Government has been illegally levying water-rate on this difference of 172 acres 72 cents from 1905. 28. On the above material allegations, the plaintiff brought the suit against the Secretary of State for a declaration of the plaintiffs right to enjoy these 172 acres 72 cents also free from water-tax and for an injunction. The defendant, the Secretary of State, raised several defences to the plaint as originally framed; but after the plaint was amended by inserting the allegation that the plaintiff was entitled to free irrigation as regards the area which was classed as wet at the time of the Permanent Settlement of 1837, the only defence pressed is found in paragraph 6 of the written statement. The said paragraph 6 is as follows: The conversion rate of 8 acres to the putti adopted by M.R.Ry. P. Nageswara Rao Pantulu Garu is correct, and the plaintiff is not entitled to any greater extent of irrigation free of water-cess than has been allowed by M.R.Ry. P. Nageswara Rao Pantulu Garu, viz., 430-76 acres. 29. The only questions, therefore, for decision in this case are: (1) What was the extent in puttis of wet lands at the time of the Permanent Settlement, it being admitted that there was an implied engagement by Government that area should be free of water-rate? (2) What is the correct rate of conversion for such area? 29. The only questions, therefore, for decision in this case are: (1) What was the extent in puttis of wet lands at the time of the Permanent Settlement, it being admitted that there was an implied engagement by Government that area should be free of water-rate? (2) What is the correct rate of conversion for such area? Is it 1232 acres per putti as was decided by Kanchi Subba Rao Pantulu Garu in 1875-76, or is it 8 acres par putti as decided by Nageswara Rao Pantulu Garu in 1904? 30. As regards the first question, three officers of the Government, viz., K. Subba Rao Pantulu Garu in 1875, C.K. Venkatachalam Pantulu Garu in 1895 and P. Nageswara Rao Pantulu Garu in 1904, all proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff was entitled to free irrigation as regards 48 puttis 19 (T) and 11 manikkas. They differed only as regards the conversion rate. The documents produced for the defendant, the Secretary of State, VIZ., husband accounts, Exhibit I series, show that, at the time of the settlement, the wet area was 48 and odd puttis. The next question is as to the conversion rate. The learned District Judge in his judgment in the connected suit No. 1898 of 1911 dealt with this question at length. In paragraphs 31 and 32 of that judgment the learned District Judge holds that the rate of conversion for puttis at 8 acres per putti, which was adopted by the Inam Commissioner (who was followed by P. Nageswara Rao Pantulu), was an arbitrary rate and was not at all accurate. As the District Judge remarks in that judgment, the area given in the Inam Commissioners title-deed at 8 acres per putti and the area in acres as found by actual measurements at the survey of these inam villages do not tally at all, and "we have no evidence that any inamdar has encroached on any area outside what was granted him under his title-deed." As the learned District Judge says in another place, the area entered in the title-deed of tine inamdar in acres "was not measured before that area was entered in the title-deed" and "the old area shown in the husband accounts was merely converted into acres by multiplying it by whatever commutation rate the Inam Commissioner had fixed for that taluk" and was so entered in that title-deed. 1 [once the true area for the inam lands mentioned in puttis in the husband accounts should be arrived at in the mode in which similar areas were arrived at by the High Court in Appeal No. 182 of 1904 and in Mahalakshmamma v. Secretary of State for India (1910) M.W.N., 595 at p. 603. The learned District Judge practically adopted that same plan in the present case and arrived at the area of mamul wet as 49-101X1131-93 acres i.e., about 550 acres I might add that in Macleans Manual of Administration (Volume II, Glossary, page 711), the area of a putti is admitted to be not a uniform area but to vary between 8 and 11 1/2 acres it different villages. In the case decided by Benson and Miller, JJ., a putti was found to be 11 to 16 acres. In Mahalakshmamma v. Secretary of State for India (1910) M.W.N., 595 at p. 603, a putti was found equal So 20 acres. We think that on the question of the conversion rate of a putti we are bound by the finding of the District Judge as it is a question of fact, and the learned District Judge has given good reasons for his finding, based on the evidence and probabilities!. The District Judge, however, has dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the ground that the plaint was based upon an implied engagement at the time of the construction of the Godavari anicut (about 1855) instead of on an engagement at the time of the Permanent Settlement of 1837, and that, as the implied engagement of 1855 has not been proved, the suit failed though the plaintiff was really entitled to free irrigation for 550 acres by reason of the engagement at the time of Permanent Settlement. As we have allowed the plaint to be amended so as to enable the plaintiff to rely upon the engagement at the time of the Permanent Settlement, we must set aside the decree of the District Judge dismissing the suit wholly, and a decree will issue in plaintiffs favour declaring his right to irrigate his lands by the Godavari anicut works to the extent of 550 acres and granting the injunction prayed for against Government. As the plaintiff has substantially succeeded in this case I was rather inclined at first to allow some coats to the plaintiff against the Government, but I do not think it necessary to differ from the opinion on this point of my learned brother that each side should bear its own costs throughout. Second Appeals Nos. 1398 to 1401 and 1770 of 1911. 31. In the suits out of which these 5 appeals arose, the plaintiffs are mokhasadars and proprietors of villages containing wet lands irrigated by the Godavari anicut system. In the plaints, the plaintiffs set up implied engagements with the Government as regards their right to free irrigation. To avoid confusion, we have to distinguish between two implied engagements made at two separate times, This distinction has not been uniformly recognized in the numerous proceedings of the Board of Revenue and the Government Orders, which have been adduced in evidence in these cases, and hence much confusion has arisen. The first engagement was admittedly at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The Permanent Settlement as regards the village in dispute it Second Appeal No. 1398 was made in 1802, that village being in the Nidadavole estate. In the four other Second Appeals, the villages in dispute are in the Elamanchili Zamindrai, which was granted by a sanad of 1837. Both sides agree that at the time of the Permanent Settlement (1802 in one case and 1837 in the other four cases), Government did impliedly engage not to charge water-tax upon the wet area cultivated as mamul wet at the time of the said Settlement (1802 or 1837 as the case may be). The learned Government Pleader further conceded (he could not but make this concession in view of the proceedings of the Board of Revenue and the Government Orders filed as evidence on the aide of the defence itself) that, even if the area cultivated as wet at the time of the Permanent Settlement in 1837 or 1802 had become diminished by neglect of tanks and channels by the proprietor when the Godavari anicut system was established in 1855, the proprietors were entitled to free irrigation from the new works for the whole wet area mentioned in the Gudicat accounts prepared at the time of the Permanent Settlement. So much as to first or primary engagements which took place at the time of the Permanent Settlement. So much as to first or primary engagements which took place at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The next implied engagement had (according to the plaintiffs) its birth about the time of the construction of the Godavari anicut works, that is about 1855. As I understood the Government Pleader, he admitted that the introduction of the anicut system interfered with the older sources of irrigation and rendered those older sources of irrigation useless for the purposes of irrigation of all the wet lands which were under cultivation as wet in 1855. He farther admitted that the Government were bound to compensate the proprietors the a certain extent on account of such obstruction to the old sources of irrigation, but he contended that they were bound to compensate only to the extent of the area which was mamul wet at the time of the Permanent Settlement (in 1802 or 1837) but not the extent of the further area which might have been brought under cultivation as wet land by the proprietors between the date of the Permanent Settlement (1802 or 1837 as the case may be) and the construction of the anicut works in the fifties. He further contended that, as these suits were based on the allegation that there was an implied engagement by the Government to allow free irrigation for the area under wet cultivation in 1855 and not merely for the area under wet cultivation in 1802 or 1837, the suits were rightly dismissed by the learned District Judge. We have seen that the first engagement at the time of the Permanent Settlement is admitted by both sides. The second engagement of the fifties, according to the Government Pleader, merely altered the first engagement by adding a clause that the mamul wet area at the time of the Permanent Settlement which was being irrigated by the old works free of payment of water-tax to Government might continue free from water-tax when irrigated by the new anicut works channels instead of by the older irrigation works destroyed by the new anicut works. The plaintiffs contention on the other hand is that the second engagement did not relate to the Permanent Settlement mamul wet area of 1802 or 1837 but to the mamul wet area as it existed at the time of their interference by the anicut works in 1855. The plaintiffs contention on the other hand is that the second engagement did not relate to the Permanent Settlement mamul wet area of 1802 or 1837 but to the mamul wet area as it existed at the time of their interference by the anicut works in 1855. The important question in these five appeals therefore is whether the implied engagement of 1855 (which modified or superseded the engagement of 1802 or 1837) related to the mamul wet area as it stood at the time of the Permanent Settlement or to the mamul wet area as it stood at the time of the construction of the anicut works.