JUDGMENT 1. This was a Rule on the District Magistrate of Gaya to show cause why the order under sec. 517 should not be set aside on the ground that the order is entirely illegal and without jurisdiction. The facts of this case may be shortly stated to be that the Petitioners dispossessed the Complainant of his garden by breaking the padlock of its gate and entering it, whereupon they were convicted of an offence of criminal trespass. 2. There is no evidence to show that there was any force or violence used in the commission of the offence. The Magistrate who tried this case passed an order under sec. 517, Cr. P. C., restoring the garden to the Complainant. The question in this case is whether sec. 517 of the Code applies to moveable and immoveable property alike. We have no hesitation, after comparing sec. 517 with sec. 522, in saying that the former section has no application to immoveable property. If that section had any application to immoveable property, the provisions of sec. 522 would become superfluous ; because if the word "property" comprehends both moveable and immoveable property, sec. 517 then becomes much more comprehensive in its meaning than sec. 522. The Magistrate obviously proceeded to pass an order under sec. 517 in this case on the interpretation of the word "property" which, being commonly applicable to moveable and immoveable property alike, has been taken to mean by him property of either kind. 3. In this connection, as to the interpretation of the word "property," the learned Vakil on behalf of the Petitioners has drawn our attention to the case of Jugdown Sinha v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 23 Cal. 372 (1895), where the word "property" as used in sec. 405, I. P. C., has been explained to mean moveable property only. Similarly, in sec. 517 from the language employed we do not understand the word "property" to mean immoveable property. In the case of Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo Khan I. L. R. 36 Cal. 44 (1908), where a person had been dispossessed of a bungalow and its contents, it was contended with force, and Brett and Ryves, JJ., held that in respect of them, orders ought to have been passed under secs. 522 and 517, Cr. In the case of Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo Khan I. L. R. 36 Cal. 44 (1908), where a person had been dispossessed of a bungalow and its contents, it was contended with force, and Brett and Ryves, JJ., held that in respect of them, orders ought to have been passed under secs. 522 and 517, Cr. P. C. Although the point was not discussed, we clearly see that the learned Judges in that case did not think that an order under sec. 517 could have been made in respect of the bungalow. Following, therefore, the decision above referred to, we make this Rule absolute and set aside the order under sec. 517 passed in respect of the garden.