JUDGMENT : Lyle, J. This is a suit for redemption of a mortgage. The court of first instance dismissed it on various grounds which are fully discussed in its judgment. The lower appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal on one point only, that point being one which was never raised in the court of first instance, vis., that the suit, was barred under section 20 of Act IX of 1859. It appears that the property of one Abdul Latif was confiscated for rebellion and that a grant of the property so confiscated was made to the predecessors-in-title of defendant some years later. Section 20 of Act IX of 1859 runs as follows:— “Nothing in this Act shall be held to affect the rights of parties not charged with any offence for which, upon conviction, the property of the offender is forfeited in respect of any property attached or seized as forfeited, or liable to be forfeited to Government provided that no suit brought by any party in respect of such property shall be entertained unless it be instituted within the period of one year from the date of the attachment or seizure of the property to which the suit relates.” It will thus be observed that a period of one year's limitation is laid down for suits by parties, not charged with any offence, whose property has been attached or seized as forfeited on the ground that it is the property of persons so charged. In this case it is clearly proved that the property attached and seized as forfeited consisted not of the proprietary rights in the village in question, but only of the mortgagee rights held by Abdul Latif. The interests of the mortgagors were in no way affected. Their interests had neither been attached nor seized as forfeited and they were in no way bound to take proceedings under the above section. The lower appellate court has laid great stress on the fact that what was granted to the predecessors-in-title of the defendant was not the mortgagee rights only, but the full proprietary rights in the property in question. In my opinion, so far as section 20 is concerned, it is quite immaterial what was granted under the Government Sanad. What we have to see is what was attached or seized as forfeited. In my opinion, so far as section 20 is concerned, it is quite immaterial what was granted under the Government Sanad. What we have to see is what was attached or seized as forfeited. The Government having forfeited merely the mortgagee rights, had no right to confer complete proprietary rights on the defendant's predecessors. The case of Ram Dhun v. Raja Bhawani Singh Bahadur, [1868], N.W.P., H.C.R., 139, appears to be a case exactly in point. On behalf of the respondent, great reliance is placed on the ruling of Ramphul Tiwari v. Badri Nath, [1888], I.L.R., 13 All., 108, and rulings which are discussed in the judgment in that case. In all these cases, however, what was confiscated was the whole proprietary right in the property and it was laid down that any one who had any claim to such property was bound to proceed within the period laid down by section 20. In this case, the mortgagor's rights were never confiscated and they had no occasion to proceed under the Act. In my opinion, the decision of the lower appellate court was wrong and as that court decided the case on a preliminary point, I decree the appeal and remand it for decision on the merits. The costs of this Court including fees on the higher scale will be costs in the cause and will be within the discretion of the court below.