JUDGMENT : Lyle, J. This is a suit by the plaintiff for possession of a certain property as an heir to his sister, Musammat Hamidan. Musammat Hamidan made a gift of this property to the defendant, Mohammad Siddiq, who is the son of her husband's brother, Shadi Khan. Shadi Khan died some 8 years ago, leaving a widow, Musammat Kulse Bibi, and a son, the defendant. The plaintiff attacks this deed of gift on various grounds. He stated that the deed is altogether invalid and inoperative and also that even if valid, it was executed by Musammat Hamidan when on her death-bed, and is, therefore, subject to the same restrictions and limitations as a will, in accordance with the doctrine of Mohammedan Law. In support of his plea, that the deed of gift is altogether invalid, the plaintiff-appellant argues, in the first place, that not having been accompanied by delivery of possession it is inoperative according to Mohammedan Law. This was not a point which was urged in the lower courts. There may be some excuse for this omission in the court of first instance, because the appellant was plaintiff in that court and it might reasonably be urged that he was entitled to plead that the deed of gift was invalid, without giving every reason which he intended to adduce in support of his plea. When, however, the case was decided against him and he went to the lower appellate court, I do not consider that he had any excuse for not raising this plea, in specific terms. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that he has a right to raise the plea, for the first time in second appeal, I do not think that there is any good foundation for it. He relies on several rulings including Chaudhri Mehdi Husan v. Mohammad Husan, [1905] I.L.R., 28 All., 439, P.C., Mir Azmat-ul-lak Saheb v. Boyapati Nagayya, [1906] I.L.R., 30 Mad., 518 and Ismail v. Ramji, [1899] I.L.R., 23 Bom., 682. There is no doubt that these rulings lay down that a gift is not valid in Mohammedan Law unless accompanied by delivery of the thing given so far as it is capable of delivery. There is no doubt that these rulings lay down that a gift is not valid in Mohammedan Law unless accompanied by delivery of the thing given so far as it is capable of delivery. Now in this case the donor expressly recites that she had given proprietary possession of the property to the donee and that she will register the deed and obtain mutation of names in the revenue papers. She did, in fact, register the deed, but was unable to obtain mutation of names owing to her death, which the lower courts have found to have occurred 4 or 5 days after. It is difficult to see what more she could have done in order to deliver possession of the property. On behalf of the appellant, it is suggested that she ought to have given directions to her tenants to pay rent in future to the donee. The illustrations in the first edition of Sir Roland Wilson's book on Mohammedan Law, page 249, are relied on, but it is significant that these illustrations have disappeared from the later editions of the same book. It is also difficult to see how any such directions could be given to the tenants at the time of making the gift, unless they happened to be present. It is also suggested that directions should have been given to persons who collected rent to collect it in future on behalf of the donee, instead of the donor. Shahzad Khan was admittedly the agent both of the donor and of the donee's mother and natural guardian. He was present both at the execution and the registration of the deed of gift and in fact, took an active part in bringing it about. It cannot be contended that he did not know that in the future he was to collect the rent on behalf of the donee instead of on behalf of the donor. I am, certainly, not prepared to hold that there was no delivery of possession, so far as such delivery was possible, merely because there is no evidence that express and specific directions were given to Shahzad Khan to collect rent in future on behalf of the donee. As regards mutation of names, it is impossible to carry out such mutation at the actual time of making the gift. It is sufficient that the donor indicated that she would file an application for mutation. As regards mutation of names, it is impossible to carry out such mutation at the actual time of making the gift. It is sufficient that the donor indicated that she would file an application for mutation. It seems to me that the donor could not possibly have done more than she did to indicate actual delivery of possession. In the lower courts, it was also urged that the deed was invalid, because the donor was not in possession of her senses at the time she made it. Both the lower courts have held that she was and this finding of fact is conclusive. 2. As regards the question whether she was suffering from a mortal illness at the time, the lower appellate court has apparently not realised that this was a material point whether the donor was in full possession of her senses or not and it has, therefore, recorded no finding on the question. Instead of remanding the appeal for decision upon it, I thought it better to come to a decision myself. The court of first instance has discussed the evidence and has come to the conclusion that Musammat Hamidan was not suffering from a mortal illness at the time she made the gift. The court of first instance has fully discussed the evidence. I have also perused it and have no hesitation in coming to the same, conclusion as the court of first instance. I see no reason whatever to disbelieve the evidence of the Sub-Registrar or of the patwari, who appear to be independent witnesses and who swear that Hamidan showed no signs of illness at the time she registered the deed. The mere fact that she died 4 or 5 days afterwards is not sufficient to warrant a finding that she was suffering from a mortal complaint at the time. I need scarcely say that in this country especially, death very frequently ensues after a short period of illness. In my opinion, the decision of the lower court is correct, and I therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.