JUDGMENT : Rafiq, J. The facts, out of which this appeal arises, are as follows:—Pirthi and Dungar executed a deed of usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Debi Singh some time in 1870. About eight years after, on the 24th of July, 1878, a deed of further charge was executed by Pirthi and Dungar in favour of Debi Singh in lieu of Rs. 300. On the 8th of July, 1902, Nathi, Ram Sarup and Fakir Chand purchased the equity of redemption in respect of the property mortgaged by the deeds of 1870 and 1878 from the sons of Pirthi and Dungar. In 1904, Fakir Chand alone brought a suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1878. The suit was brought against Khachera and Badli, the sons of Debi Singh, the original mortgagee. Nathi and Ram Sarup who had joined Fakir Chand in the purchase of the equity of redemption were made pro forma defendants as they did not join in the suit. The claim of Fakir Chand was resisted on the ground among others that he could not sue for possession of the property as he had not sought to redeem the prior mortgage of 1870. The Munsif, in whose court the suit was filed, allowed the plea in defence, decreeing the claim for redemption of the mortgage of 1878, but dismissing the claim for possession. The Munsif further directed that the sum of Rs. 300, due on the mortgage of 1878, should be paid by the plaintiff within six months and, in case of default, the plaintiff shall be absolutely debarred to redeem the property. Fakir Chand failed to make the requisite deposit and the decree was made absolute. On the 23rd of August, 1910, Nathi and Ram Sarup brought the suit out which this appeal has arisen. They sued to redeem the mortgages of 1870 and 1878 and they impleaded as defendants the sons of the original mortgagors and the descendants of the original mortgagee. Fakir Chand was made a pro forma defendant in the case. The claim was resisted. It was urged in defence, among other pleas, that the decree of 1904 operated as res judicata and that the present claim was not maintainable. The learned munsif of Hawaii Aligarh in whose court the suit was filed, accepted the plea in defence and dismissed the suit. The learned Judge in appeal affirmed his decree. The claim was resisted. It was urged in defence, among other pleas, that the decree of 1904 operated as res judicata and that the present claim was not maintainable. The learned munsif of Hawaii Aligarh in whose court the suit was filed, accepted the plea in defence and dismissed the suit. The learned Judge in appeal affirmed his decree. The plaintiffs have come up in second appeal to this Court. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs can maintain the suit in view of the decree of 1904. There is no doubt that that decree should not have been framed in the manner it was. In case of default in payment of Rs. 300, the decretal amount, the mortgaged property should have been ordered to be sold. The direction in the decree that all rights of redemption would stand barred in case the decretal amount was not paid within six months was obviously erroneous. However as no objection was taken to the decree and as it was made absolute, we have to see whether that decree stands in the way of the present suit. It cannot be denied that if Fakir Chand had brought the present suit, he could not have maintained it. The case of Lachman Singh v. Madsudan, [1907] I.L.R., 29 All., p. 481, is an authority for this view. It is, however, contended for the plaintififs-appellants that whatever might have been the fate of Fakir Chand's suit if he had brought one, they are not affected by the decree of 1904 as they ware only pro forma defendants in the suit in which that decree was passed. Moreover it sis argued that the said decree was passed in a suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1878. It did not relate to the mortgage of 1870. For the respondents the reply is that Fakir Chand brought the suit not only for himself but for himself and his co-purchasers of the equity of redemption. Whatever questions were raised and decided in that suit were raised and decided as between the purchasers of the equity of redemption and the mortgagees. The plaintiffs in the present case are, therefore, bound by the decree in that case. I think the contention of the respondents is correct. Whatever questions were raised and decided in that suit were raised and decided as between the purchasers of the equity of redemption and the mortgagees. The plaintiffs in the present case are, therefore, bound by the decree in that case. I think the contention of the respondents is correct. Had the decree of 1904 been framed in a different form and directed the sale of the mortgaged property, in case of default in payment of the decretal amount and had the mortgaged property been sold, Nathi and Ram Sarup would have had no right to bring the present suit. If the contention of the plaintiffs-appellants be correct, there would be no check on multiplicity of suits. Take, for example, the case of a mortgage where there are twelve mortgagors. Each of them, according to the plaintiffs-appellants, can bring a separate suit for redemption of the mortgage in spite of the dismissal of the suit of each on the same ground. The argument that the decree of 1904 did not affect the rights of the mortgagors with regard to the mortgage of 1870 does not help the case of the plaintiffs-appellants. According to the deed of 1878, the prior mortgage of 1870 could not be redeemed without redemption of the mortgage of 1878. And as the plaintiffs-appellants cannot redeem the mortgage of 1878, they cannot redeem that of 1870. I think the lower courts were correct in holding that the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants was not maintainable. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.