JUDGMENT 1. One Srimati Mohamaya Debi is the owner of certain premises known as 3/1/4 A, Mullik Lane, in the city of Calcutta. She was proceeded against by the Chairman of the Corporation for failure to comply with a direction given her under sec. 361 of the Calcutta Municipal Act to improve the roadway upon which her house abuts. The provisions of sec. 361 apply only to private streets. The Municipal Magistrate has held that the public exercise a right of way over the road, that it is not a private street and that therefore the provisions of sec. 361 do not apply. Against this finding the Chairman has obtained a Rule. The question for our decision is whether the Magistrate erred in law in holding that the road is not a private street. 2. Admittedly the roadway was made in the first instance as part of a bustee and in accordance with a standard plan approved by the General Committee of the Corporation. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 416 of the Act prescribes that a street so made shall, unless the General Committee and the owners concerned otherwise agree, remain private streets. It is conceded on behalf of the Corporation that in the absence of any agreement by the General Committee the road must be held to have remained a private street. We are of opinion that the contention must prevail. It is true that the owner of the bustee has sold the land covered by the bustee to various persons for building purposes and that most of these persons have in fact built residences on the land. It is also true that but for the express provision in sec. 416 referred to there would, as the Magistrate has pointed out, be a strong case for holding that the street had ceased to be a private street by reason of the acquisition of a right of way by the public. So far as the first point: is concerned, however, the meaning of sec. 416 read with sec. 419 appears to be that a street such as that in the present case shall remain a private street until the owner of the bustee initiate proceeding under sec. 419. So far as the first point: is concerned, however, the meaning of sec. 416 read with sec. 419 appears to be that a street such as that in the present case shall remain a private street until the owner of the bustee initiate proceeding under sec. 419. As regards the second point namely the public user of the road, it must be remember, d that in order to create a public right of way there must be a dedication by the owner. The effect of sub-sec. (1) of sec 416 in the present case is that the owner cannot dedicate without the consent of the General Committee. We hold therefore that the road has remained a private street, and that sec. 361 was therefore applicable to the case. 3. We have not adverted to the objection that the road not being 20 feet wide was a passage and not a street. Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the definition of the word 'street' in the Act includes a passage. 4. It has been suggested that the interpretation which we have adopted will lead to oppression. But it must be borne in mind in the first instance that private owners often neglect the duties which they owe to the poor from whom high rents are exacted for wretched tenements in private streets and alleys. It is not oppressive to provide a remedy for such cases. In the next place the interpretation we have adopted is in general accordance with the provision of the English law contained in sec. 23 of the Highways Act, 1835, and the Private Streets Works Act, 1892, in so far at any rate as the liability to repair is concerned. 5. These are however certain differences in the English law which we may take the opportunity of commending to notice. First, the English Statutes do not touch the common law which governs the acquisition by the public of rights of way, Roberts v. Hunt 15 Q.B. Rep. 17 (1850), R. v. Wilson 18 Q. B. Rep. 348 (1852). 5. These are however certain differences in the English law which we may take the opportunity of commending to notice. First, the English Statutes do not touch the common law which governs the acquisition by the public of rights of way, Roberts v. Hunt 15 Q.B. Rep. 17 (1850), R. v. Wilson 18 Q. B. Rep. 348 (1852). In the next place, the liability to repair a road which a private owner wishes to dedicate to the public can be refused by the public authority concerned in England (if the road is of suitable width and construction) only upon the ground that the road is not of sufficient utility to justify its being kept in repair at public expense (sec. 23, Highways Act, 1835). These are points which might be borne in mind in the event of the Act coming under amendment. 6. A preliminary objection was made on behalf of the Opposite Party upon the ground that the Chairman was not competent to initiate a prosecution. It is contended that this was within the competence of the General Committee alone. We can find no substance in this contention. The result is that the acquittal is set aside. We direct that the case be retried.