JUDGMENT 1. The principal question in this Appeal is the issue of limitation. The suit out of which this Appeal arises was a title suit. The cause of action arose on the 28th May 1895 and the plaint was filed on the 28th May 1907, the last day it could be filed. It was however filed in a wrong Court, that of a Subordinate Judge instead of that of a Munsif, and the Court-fee paid was insufficient. The fact that it was filed in a wrong Court was at first overlooked and the Plaintiffs-Respondents in this Appeal were ordered to file the deficit Court-fee by the 3rd June. This was done. On the 4th June the Subordinate Judge passed an order on the plaint directing that it should be returned for presentation to the proper Court. The plaint was actually returned to the Plaintiffs on the 7th June and was filed in the proper Court, the Munsif's Court, on the following day. It is undisputed that under the provisions of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act the Plaintiffs are entitled to include the period up to the 4"h June when the order for the return of the plaint was passed. On behalf of the Appellants it is contended that the Plaintiffs cannot include the period between the 4th and 7th June. In support of this contention the decision in the case of Abhoya Charan Chackrabartty v. Gout Mohan Dutt 24 W. R. 26 (1875) is relied on. In that case the order directing the return of the plaint was passed by an Appellate Court and it was held that the Plaintiff was entitled, to include the time during which he had been prosecuting the suit in the regular Courts up to the date of the lower Appellate Court's judgment, but not the time during which he waited to get the plaint back. This ruling has been considered and distinguished in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and we agree that it is distinguishable. In the reported case a strong presumption arose that the order for the return of the plaint, which was a judgment of an Apellate Court, was made known to the Plaintiff on the date the judgment was signed. This ruling has been considered and distinguished in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and we agree that it is distinguishable. In the reported case a strong presumption arose that the order for the return of the plaint, which was a judgment of an Apellate Court, was made known to the Plaintiff on the date the judgment was signed. In the case now before us we can make no such presumption as the order was probably passed in chambers and may have bean promulgated on a later date than the 4th June. In the case of Bisheshir Singh v. Ram Daur Singh 1887, A.W.N. 302., the Allahabad High Court held under circumstance somewhat similar to those of the resources? that the proceedings did not terminate until the plaint was returne J. That case is distinguishable on the ground that his delay in returning the plaint was clearly dueto the action of the Court. It however supports our view that proceedings do not necessarily end when the final order is signed. 2. In our opinion there is no hinge in the W. R. ruling to prevent our holding that in a case where the final order is promulgated on a later dare than it has been signed, the date of promulgation should be held to be the day on which the proceedings ended within the meaning of explanation I of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. 3. The lower Appellate Court has found that the 7th June, the; date on which the pleader took back the plaint, must be taken to be the date on which the order was promulgated. This is a finding of fact which is binding on us as a Court of second appeal. We therefore hold that as the plaint was filed on the day following that on which the proceedings ended, the suit is not barred by limitation. It is also contended that the suit is barred by limitation because it was not instituted within six years from 1897 when an entry adverse to the Plaintiff was made in the record-of-rights. This entry only created a presumption of evidence against the Plaintiffs and did not affect their rights. 4. It is lastly contended that the lower Appellate Court has held that the presumption created by the entry in the record-of-rights has not been rebutted as regards a portion of the property called Filarial property. This entry only created a presumption of evidence against the Plaintiffs and did not affect their rights. 4. It is lastly contended that the lower Appellate Court has held that the presumption created by the entry in the record-of-rights has not been rebutted as regards a portion of the property called Filarial property. In discussing issue No. 4 the learned District Judge has written in his judgment "here is no documentary evidence and the survey record is against the Respondents' claim. I hold the issue for these reasons and those advanced by the Subordinate Judge, against the Appellants." The two sentences as they stand are contradictory but a reference to the portion of the judgment of the Court of first instance which deals with this issue leaves no doubt in our mind that the learned District Judge made a mistake and wrote Respondents instead of Appellant s in the first of the sentences quoted above. In any case his actual finding is quite definite against the Appellants. No other points were urged at the hearing of this Appeal and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.