JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - This is an Appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent from a judgment of Mr. Justice Coxe who has confirmed the decree of the lower Appellate Court. The suit was one brought by the Plaintiff, the auction-purchaser of a durputni, to recover possession of the land in suit from Defendant No. I and the case made in the plaint is that Defendant No. 1 was a trespasser. The Munsif gave the Plaintiff a decree for rent though he described it as wasilat in the shape of rent only. He did not give a decree for possession. The decree of the lower Appellate Court which has been confirmed gave a decree for possession with mesne profits. The basis of the Plaintiff's suit is that she is entitled to recover possession from Defendant No. 1 on the ground that the tenancy which existed in favour of one Kangali Madak has come to an end-whether by reason of forfeiture or abandonment is not clear. The Defendant No. 1, on the other hand, resists this claim alleging that Radhika Pershad Singh, under whom Defendant No. 1 claims, was purchaser of this holding from Kangali Madak. To this the Plaintiff retorts that the holding was not transferable and that there was no recognition. The Defendant No. 1 seeks to meet this by production of receipts extending over a great many years showing receipt of rent paid by Radhika Pershad. But it is said on the other side that those receipts do not amount to a recognition because they are marfatdari receipts and therefore have no such legal effect as Defendant No. 1 claims. I am inclined to think that Courts have yielded too freely to the temptation of being blinded to realities by the words marfatdar and gujratdar and so the true facts have suffered. At the same time I am bound to admit that there are expressions in the cases which would suggest that where these words appear no recognition can be inferred. At the same time I am bound to admit that there are expressions in the cases which would suggest that where these words appear no recognition can be inferred. I think, however, each case must be determined on its own circumstances, and the Court should determine in each case whether, on a consideration of all the facts not merely by giving undue weight to words used -a legal inference is or is not to be drawn that there has been a recognition establishing a relationship of landlord and tenant between one who has paid and another who has received rent for a number of years. But in the view I take it is not necessary to come to a decision in this case on that ground. I think there is a complete answer to the Plaintiff's claim in the bar of limitation. The right to recover, as I have already said, must be by reason of forfeiture or abandonment. Whichever it be, this event occurred very many years, more than twelve, prior to the commencement of this suit, and the only way of overcoming this bar would be by establishing a case within sec. 18 of the Limitation Act. No such case has been made. Therefore, I think that it must be held that the Statute of Limitation bars the suit so far as it seeks possession. But I should be slow in a case of this kind to hold that that was a complete extinguishment of the Plaintiff's title, although there is authority that in cases not dissimilar from the present it may have that effect. But here I think the circumstances invite the application of the doctrine which enables us to hold that the Statute of Limitation only operates to create a limited interest of tenancy, and that I think has been established For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of Mr. Justice Coxe as well as the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and restore the decree of the Munsif on the understanding that it is no: wasilat in the shape of rent but rent that is awarded to the Plaintiff in this case. We restore also the Munsif's decree as to costs. The costs of the lower Appellate Court and of the two Appeals in this Court must also be paid by the Plaintiff.