JUDGMENT : Piggott, J. The essential facts of this case may be stated as follows:— The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that they themselves together with certain persons, impleaded as pro forma defendants, were the owners and in possession of certain specified zamindari property. The property in question stood recorded in the name of one Musammat Jhandia, who was defendant No. 2 in the suit. The court of first instance framed a number of issues and finally came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory decree in respect of ¾ths of the property claimed by them and the suit was accordingly decreed to this extent only. In this decree the plaintiffs acquiesced, but it was taken in appeal to the District Judge by Musammat Jhandia and by Shams-ud-din, defendant No. 1, who was a transferee from defendant No. 2. The memorandum of appeal to the court of the District Judge raised a number of questions, but the appeal was disposed of upon a single finding, viz., that the suit was barred by article 120 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act as not having been brought within six years of the date on which the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs. The learned Additional District Judge, who decided the appeal, also talks about the suit as being “barred by twelve years' rule of Limitation.” He does not explain what article of the Indian Limitation Act he considers applicable to the facts of this case so as to impose a twelve years' rule of limitation, and I am honestly unable to understand this part of his judgment. I must deal with the appeal before me as raising the simple question whether or not the suit was barred by article 120 aforesaid. The name of Musammat Jhandia had been recorded in the revenue papers some twenty-eight years before the institution of the suit, and the entry in her favour was continued in the papers drawn up at a revision of settlement which took place some sixteen years later. It is perfectly possible that either of these circumstances might have furnished the plaintiffs with a cause of action for a suit like the present. The question is, however, whether anything has happened since which furnishes the plaintiffs with a fresh cause of action. It is perfectly possible that either of these circumstances might have furnished the plaintiffs with a cause of action for a suit like the present. The question is, however, whether anything has happened since which furnishes the plaintiffs with a fresh cause of action. The ruling relied upon by the court below is the decision of a Bench of this Court in Akbar Khan v. Turabati, [1968] 5 A.L.J.R., 637 but it seems to me quite clear from that ruling, as well as from the previous decision of another Bench of this Court, which is referred to therein, that a plaintiff will not necessarily be debarred for ever from maintaining a declaratory suit in respect of a particular right or title possessed by him, merely because there was a slander of his title on the part of the very same defendant more than six years previously, in respect of which the plaintiff did not think it worth while to take any action. This was clearly laid down by a single Judge of this Court in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh v. Harnam Singh, [1898] W.N., p. 215. In the present case, Musammat Jhandia was the widow of one Kalwa who died possessed of certain property leaving behind him the said widow and two brothers. The plaintiffs in this case and the pro forma defendants are the heirs and successors of the aforesaid two brothers. What the evidence on the record proves is that these brothers and their heirs after them acquiesced in the entry of Musammat Jhandia's name in the revenue papers as having succeeded to the entire share which had formerly belonged to Kalwa. As to what the result of their acquiescence was, that is to say, as to whether Musammat Jhandia did or did not derive any benefit from the property which stood recorded in her name, there has been a conflict of evidence and no clear finding by the lower appellate court. This much is certain that Musammat Jhandia never sued the plaintiffs or the particular plaintiff, Rahmatullah, who in his capacity of lambardar has been realizing the profits of the share in question, to recover by process of law any portion of the profits apparently due to her on the face of the entry in the village papers. This much is certain that Musammat Jhandia never sued the plaintiffs or the particular plaintiff, Rahmatullah, who in his capacity of lambardar has been realizing the profits of the share in question, to recover by process of law any portion of the profits apparently due to her on the face of the entry in the village papers. What has happened recently is that Musammat Jhandia has transferred a portion of the share recorded in her name to the defendant, Shamsuddin and that Shamsuddin has brought a suit for profits against the lambardar. In my opinion this transfer and the institution of a suit by Shamsuddin, both of which events have occurred well within six years of the institution of the present suit did furnish the plaintiffs with a fresh cause of action. It must always be remembered that when a court is dealing with a plea that the suit as brought is barred by limitation, it must take the facts alleged by the plaintiff and look at the case from that point of view. The plaintiffs say that Musammat Jhandia left the village not long after her husband's death, that she never received any share of the profits and that the entry of her name in the village papers would therefore cause them no trouble or annoyance. They did not, in fact, think it worth while to institute any suit on the cause of action afforded by that entry, until Musammat Jhandia herself went further and brought things to an issue by making a transfer in favour of Shamsuddin who promptly instituted a suit for recovery of profits. I am quite satisfied that the plaintiffs thereby obtained a new cause of action and that their suit should not have been dismissed on the sole ground upon which it has been dismissed by the court below. I, therefore, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and remand the case to that court under the provisions of Order 41, rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure with directions to readmit the appeal under its original number and proceed to determine the same with reference to the remaining pleas raised in the memorandum of appeal.