JUDGMENT Walmsley, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for money due on an adjustment of accounts. The Plaintiff alleged that the predecessor of the Defendants had money transactions with him and that there was a settlement in Jait 1312; then Defendants' predecessor died and the transaction continued, and the last adjustment was made on Jait 30th, 1315, when Rs. 965-8-0 was found due to the Plaintiff, and a promise was made by the Defendants to pay the money. 2. The Defendants denied the alleged transactions, the adjustment of accounts, and the promise to pay, and they also pleaded limitation. 3. The Court of first instance held that the suit would not be barred by limitation if there really was an adjustment on Jait 30th, 1315, but he found that there was no such adjustment. 4. The learned District Judge, on appeal, held that the Defendants did not on Jait 30th, 1315, promise to pay the amount due and that in consequence the suit was barred by limitation. 5. The case is clearly governed by Art. 57 of the Limitation Act, and on the findings the suit is barred unless Plaintiffs can get the benefit of sec. 20 of the Act. 6. The suit was instituted on May 28th, 1909. 7. It is urged before us that there were payments made by Defendants in 1907, of a nature to save limitation, and a page in Plaintiff's bahi khata is shown to us to prove the allegation, and we are asked to hold that the lower Courts have erred in not taking this document into consideration. The page in question is in the same book in which Ex. 2 is to be found, and it relates to the year 1313. We do not think, however, that we can pay any attention to this page; for, after examining the record, we find that it was not put in evidence before either of the lower Courts. We come to this conclusion for the following reasons : the page has not been marked as an exhibit, while the account for 1314 was marked : no copy was left with the record when the book was taken back; no reference was made in the examination of Plaintiff's witnesses or the cross-examination of Defendants' witnesses to the very important entry of a payment of Rs. 43 as interest in 1907 : no allusion to the page is made either by the Munsif or by the District Judge, and in appeal to this Court the only reference to it in the grounds of appeal is in some supplementary grounds filed at the time of hearing. As the page in question is the only evidence of the alleged payment of Rs. 43 in 1907 on account of interest, and as we hold that we cannot receive it at this stage, it follows that the payment of Rs. 43 on account of interest is not proved. 8. There remains one further question. The learned Judge found that Defendants-took a loan of Rs. .50 on June 21st, 1906, but he refused to give the Plaintiff a decree for that amount, because Defendants paid Rs. 52 in 1907, although he believed the Plaintiff's books and evidence to be genuine, and there must at the time have been over Rs. 700 due from the Defendants. It is urged that the Judge is wrong in appropriating the Rs. 52 to the repayment of the loan of Rs. 50 and that it ought to be regarded as a payment of "interest as such" within the meaning of sec. 20. 9. We have no hesitation in holding that the learned Judge was in error in treating the Rs. 52 as a repayment of the recent loan of Rs. 50; for, under sees. 60 and 61 of the Contract Act, the creditor might exercise his discretion to apply the money in discharge of the oldest debt. 10. In regard to the question whether it was a payment of " interest as such ", we have been referred to the cases of Subraya v. Pakaya 4 Bom. L. R. 231 (1902) by reasoning, which would apply equally well to Rai Mohan Saha's case, payments were made expressly on account of principal and interest. On the other hand, there is the case of Damodar Ram Chandra Bapat v. Bai Jankibai 5 Rom. L. R. 350 (1903), where payments were made without any specification of their object; there Tyabji, J., distinguishing the case of Subraya v. Pakaya(1) by reasoning, which would apply equally well to Rai Mohan Saha's case, held that it was incumbent on the Plaintiff to establish clearly in some way that the payment was on account of interest as such. L. R. 350 (1903), where payments were made without any specification of their object; there Tyabji, J., distinguishing the case of Subraya v. Pakaya(1) by reasoning, which would apply equally well to Rai Mohan Saha's case, held that it was incumbent on the Plaintiff to establish clearly in some way that the payment was on account of interest as such. In doing so, he followed the case of Hanmant Mal Motichand v. Rambai I. L. R. 9 Bom. 198 (1879) : in that case there was a large balance due from Defendant by way of principal and interest; and Defendant made numerous payments, but without any intimation that any payment was to be appropriated to interest. It was held that there was no payment of interest as such. To these may be added the cases of Surju Prasad v. Khawhish Ali I. L. R. 4 All. 512 (1882), Narronji v. Magniram Chandaji I. L. R. 6 Bom. 103 (1880), Santeswar Mahata v. Lakhi Kanta Mohanta I. L. R. 35 Cal. 813, 817 (1908), and Moheshur Panda v. Baidya Nath Jana Unreported: special appeal No. 2757 of 1908, all of which lay down that a creditor cannot claim the benefit of sec. 20 unless he can show that the payment was made on account of interest as such : there must be either some express declaration by the debtor or there must be circumstances from which such an intention on the part of the debtor may be inferred. 11. In view of these authorities we think that the payment of Rs. 52 did not operate to save limitation under sec. 20 of the Act; for there was no declaration by the debtor of his desire that the money should be received on account of " interest as such ", and the circumstances do not lead to such an inference. On these findings, the Plaintiff's appeal fails except in regard to the loan of Rs. 50; for that he will get a decree with interest at 1 per cent, per mensem from June 21st, 1906, to May 28th, 1909, and at 6 per cent, per annum from that date to the date of decree, and with proportionate costs in all Courts.