JUDGMENT : 1. In this case, E.J. Hooper was convicted by the unanimous verdict of the jury, of an offence punishable under S. 225, I.P.C., and sentenced by the District Magistrate, to pay a fine of Rs. 500. He has appealed. Two grounds are pressed on his behalf, firstly, that the learned Magistrate misdirected the jury, and secondly, that in any event, the sentence is too severe. In my opinion there is no reason to interfere on the first ground. Even granting that the charge to the jury was not happily expressed, and even assuming that there was misdirection in the charge, yet, having regard to the evidence that was before the jury, and the frank admissions made by the appellant himself, it is quite clear there was no failure of justice and consequently Section 537(d) of the Cr PC, fully covers the case. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: 3. Hooper is the Tonga Superintendent in the service of the Rohilkhand and Kumaon Railway Company, stationed at Kathgodam Railway Station, and he is in charge of the tongas, ekkas, ponies and the driving and stabling staffs belonging to, or employed by, the Railway Company. 4. Early in the present year, a Police Inspector reported that a pony belonging to the company was being driven in one of their ekkas while in an unfit condition. This resulted in the company dismissing the jamadar responsible for the particular pony. Here one would have thought that the matter had been appropriately disposed of once for all. 5. About the middle of April however a considerable time afterwards, proceedings were instituted under Section 6 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (Act 11 of 1890) against Jogia (also called Japua), the driver of the ekka. There is nothing to show under what circumstances these proceedings were started, nor why it was thought necessary to prosecute the ekka driver. 6. The police at Kathgodam, on 23rd April, gave the appellant a printed document in the form prescribed by Sch. 5, No. 25 of the Code. The blank spaces in the bond, in which the name of the accused and the offence charged against him should have been entered, were not filled in. The only particulars that were entered in the bond were, the date of the hearing, and the amount of the security. This document (Ex. 5, No. 25 of the Code. The blank spaces in the bond, in which the name of the accused and the offence charged against him should have been entered, were not filled in. The only particulars that were entered in the bond were, the date of the hearing, and the amount of the security. This document (Ex. A) is signed by three persons. The appellant endorsed on it: “This must come through the Traffic Superintendent's Office at Shahamatganj,” and gave it back to the police. 7. The next document on the record, in point of time, is Ex. D. This is a letter purporting to come from the Traffic Superintendent, Rohilkhand and Kamoon Railway, dated 7th May 1913, and addressed to the Joint Magistrate, Terai Bhaber, Naini Tal; and runs as follows:— Sir. King-Emperor v. Jogia, coachman, charge S. 6, Act 11 of 1890. 8. In returning you the warrant to the address of Jogia coachman I have the honour to inform you that this should be served on the above-named through the police or the Court bailiff. His work will be arranged for if the railway is previously informed as to when the man is wanted.” 9. It is signed by the Assistant Traffic Superintendent, for the Traffic Superintendent. 10. On this paper, I find an order dated 2nd June, as follows: “Judicial Clerk. Put up a docket to Traffic Superintendent that the case has been fixed for 17th June 1913, and that summons for Jogia, driver, is enclosed. I must point out that it is very necessary for the accused to appear on the date fixed as the case has been long delayed.” The next document is Ex. C. This is a warrant dated 20th May, for the arrest of Jogia. This was a bailable warrant. It was given by a police officer on 25th May, to the appellant, who gave it back with a similar endorsement i.e.: “Should be sent through the Traffic Superintendent's Office.” 11. The next warrant that need be considered, is Ex. B, dated 19th June. This warrant was without bail. 12. I do not understand why bail should not have been allowed, seeing that the offence alleged against Jogia is a conviction, punishable by a fine only. It is for the obstruction to the police in their attempt to arrest Jogia, under this warrant, that the appellant has been convicted. B, dated 19th June. This warrant was without bail. 12. I do not understand why bail should not have been allowed, seeing that the offence alleged against Jogia is a conviction, punishable by a fine only. It is for the obstruction to the police in their attempt to arrest Jogia, under this warrant, that the appellant has been convicted. On the morning of 25th June last, soon after the train from Bareilly arrived at Kathgodam, two constables arrested Jogia, who was with the ekka, which had already been loaded with a passenger's luggage. Jogia broke away from the police, and tore the warrant into two pieces. At this point the appellant came on to the scene. He was told what had happened. Jogia was standing by. In his own words Hooper says that as the police “could not produce a warrant, which they said had been torn up, I sent the man on duty.” This happened just outside the station. The police called out to constables, at chowki, near the gate leading out of the railway yard on the high road, to stop Jogia; and they, helped by a number of other ekka drivers, who were not in the employ of the railway company, barred his way. Jogia returned to the station and told the appellant, who then escorted him to the gate, opened it, and sent him off on his ekka up the road. He says: “As soon as he (Jogia) was clear of the mob, I turned round and asked the head constable why he allowed a mob at the gate. He said he had a warrant for Jogia's arrest, and that the mob was assisting him, and produced some torn pieces of paper which he said was the warrant.” It is quite clear that but for the appellant's interference Jogia would have been arrested, and his conduct, in my opinion, falls within the scope of the section. 13. The appellant stated in his examination that he received a letter from the Traffic Department on that very day, but after the escape of Jogia, instructing him to make Jogia over to the police, Mr. Alston, who appeared for the appellant, and who was instructed by an officer of the Traffic Department, present in Court, informed the that this statement is true. Why the Traffic Department, which knew on 7th May (vide Ex. Alston, who appeared for the appellant, and who was instructed by an officer of the Traffic Department, present in Court, informed the that this statement is true. Why the Traffic Department, which knew on 7th May (vide Ex. D) that Jogia was then wanted by the police, did not communicate with Hooper sooner than 25th June, is not explained. 14. All the circumstances of this case are unfortunate, and neither the police nor the Traffic Department are altogether to be congratulated. There was obviously little sympathy between the two departments, and this has led to a failure of co-operation between them. I do not propose to discuss this aspect of the case further, and have only commented on it, because of the reasons given by the Magistrate for imposing a very heavy fine. The Magistrate was of opinion that Hooper acted in the way he did because he thought his superior officers would wish him so to act; and he says the jury came to the same conclusion. I can find nothing on this record which bears out this observation. What the jury did find was that Hooper was acting in the interests of the railway. This is by no means the same thing. There is nothing to show that when Hooper endorsed the security bond (Ex. A) and the warrant (Ex. C), as stated above, that he was doing anything more than what he believed was in accordance with the regulations. The rule to which he refers however obviously was made in the interests of the public. It was his duty to assist the police and not to hinder them. He has been rightly convicted, but, in my opinion, a very greatly reduced fine will meet the ends of justice. Hooper's salary is small. I reduce the fine to one of Rs. 10 only. The balance of Rs. 490 will be refunded. To this extent only I allow the appeal.