JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - This is an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent from a judgment of Mr. Justice Digambar Chatterjee, whereby he reversed the decree of the lower Appellate Court and remanded the case for re-trial. The Plaintiff claims to be a purchaser at an execution sale, and on the strengh of that purchase he has brought this suit for a declaration of his title to a 4/7ths share of Taluk No. 12437 of the Mymensingh Collectorate and also for possession. 2. The Defendant against whom the suit is brought is a lady named Durlavi Dassya who unquestionably was at one time entitled to the property in suit, and the Plaintiff's claim relates to a title alleged to be derived from her. In 1897, this lady executed a kobala which purported to be in favour of her daughter Pateswari. The land in suit was then attached in execution of a decree obtained against Pateswari's sons. A claim to the property was advanced by Pateswari, but it was rejected. Thereupon, Pateswari brought a suit as contemplated by sec. 283 of the CPC of 1882 making as parties the decree-holder and her sons. This suit failed in the Court of first instance, and on appeal the decree of dismissal was confirmed. It was in these execution proceedings that the Plaintiff bought the property in 1904. There was opposition offered to the Plaintiff by the Defendant Durlavi Dassya ; so this suit has been brought. 3. The Defendant's contention was that she never parted with the property, and if she had established that, there would have been a complete answer to the claim. It has, however, been held by the lower Appellate Court that the kobala was executed by her in 1897, and that it was an effective kobala, and so the title passed out of her. The question then is whether the Plaintiff has made out a title to the property. 4. The lower Appellate Court has decided this in the Plaintiff's favour, and for that purpose has relied on the result of the litigation which commenced with the claim in the execution proceedings and terminated in the suit and on the orders and decrees in that litigation. 5. Mr. 4. The lower Appellate Court has decided this in the Plaintiff's favour, and for that purpose has relied on the result of the litigation which commenced with the claim in the execution proceedings and terminated in the suit and on the orders and decrees in that litigation. 5. Mr. Justice Chatterjee appeared to think that that was not a sufficient foundation for the Plaintiff's title, and so it was that he reversed the decree of the lower Appellate Court. 6. Before us it has been contended that this was erroneous, but the Defendant-Respondent maintains that it was correct. 7. There is a decision in a recent issue of the Indian Law Reports, Madras Serirs [Ramamurti Dhora v. The Secretary of State for India in Council I. L. R. 36 Mad. 141 (1911)], which practically covers this case, for it was there decided in circumstances substantially resembling the present, that a party could not set up a title at variance with what had been determined in a previous litigation although his opponent in the suit then before the Court had not been a party to the previous litigation. And, in disposing of the case, it was said, "The question does not depend on the application of the doctrine of res judicata between the parties as expounded in sec. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section does not cover all cases of estoppel by judgment. We must hold that the Plaintiffs cannot be permitted to prove that they are the owners of the land in question. They have therefore no cause of action." Though I do not for one moment question the propriety of the result in that suit, I hesitate to act on that line of reasoning, and more particularly when I bear in mind what was said by the Privy Council in the case of Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh 6 C. W. N. 825 : s. c. I. L. R. 29 Cal. 707 at p. 715 (1902). Their Lordships there dealing with the topic of res judicata remarked as follows :--"They will further observe that the essence of a Code is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law, and it is not the province of a Judge to disregard or go outside the letter of the enactment according to its true construction." 8. But I think there is another and sounder basis on which our decision must go in favour of the Appellant. It is not disputed before us that the decrees in the previous litigation are relevant as evidence, nor indeed can this be disputed when regard is had to the long line of authorities of which it will suffice for me to refer to the decision in Denomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani 6 C. W. N. 386 : s. c. I. L. R. 29 Cal. 187 (1901) decided by the Privy Council, Brew v. Haren Ir. Rep. 9 Com. Law 29 ; 11 Com. Law 198 and Davies v. Lowndes 6 Man. and Gr. 471 (1843), so that what we have to see is whether, as they were admissible, they were not a sufficient basis for the judgment of the lower Appellate Court. Now, the Judge of the lower Appellate Court seems to me to have perceived with clearness that there was not a res judicata as between the parties to this litigation, but the learned Judge says, and I think correctly, that as between the parties to the previous litigation the decrees were binding. That appears to me to be a correct view of the law, and I may here refer not inappropriately to sec. 283 of the CPC of 1882, which says that "the party against whom an order under secs. 280, 281 or 282 is passed may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive." The result of the former suit we know was that the claimant's alleged right was negatived. So then we have this result that as between the decree-holder, Pateswari, and her sons there has been an adjudication by Court, which affirms the right of Pateswari's sons, and negatives the right of Pateswari. Why that should not be, in the circumstances of this case, cogent evidence I fail to see. Indeed the Defendant herself has not made any suggestion in the course of this litigation as to how things stand as between Pateswari and her sons. Her contention throughout has been that the title did not pass away from her. Why that should not be, in the circumstances of this case, cogent evidence I fail to see. Indeed the Defendant herself has not made any suggestion in the course of this litigation as to how things stand as between Pateswari and her sons. Her contention throughout has been that the title did not pass away from her. So we have this result that as against the adjudication in favour of Pateswari's sons, there is no evidence of any sort or any contention brought in rebuttal of the result of that litigation, and the decree in which it resulted. In appears to me that in these circumstances, and having regard to the facts with which we have to deal in this case, the result of that litigation is at least as cogent against the Defendant as would have been an instrument of transfer executed by Pateswari, the ostensible owner, in favour of her sons. I wish to make it clear that in the view I take, I cannot regard the decree in the previous litigation as amounting to res judicata which would bar all possibility of evidence on the part of the Defendant. It would, I conceive, have been open to the Defendant to show that, notwithstanding that decree, there were circumstances either vitiating the result of that litigation or affecting its result so as to prevent its operation in favour of Pateswari's sons. But we have nothing of that sort in this case, as, we merely have on one side the evidence furnished by the orders and decrees in the previous litigation, and nothing by way of rebuttal of that, on the other. 9. In these circumstances, I think, the necessary conclusion is that we must hold that the Judge of the lower Appellate Court had evidence which justified the conclusion at which he arrived, and it was erroneous to have interfered with his decree. 10. We must accordingly set aside the judgment of Mr. Justice Chatterjee and restore the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and the Appellants must get their costs of both appeals in this Court. It has been brought to our notice that there has been an order by the Munsiff consequent upon the judgment of Mr. Justice Chatterjee. The order necessarily is of no effect and inoperative.