JUDGMENT Coxe, J. - This Appeal is against an order of the Subordinate Judge at Dacca refusing an application by the Appellant who is a judgment-debtor under a mortgage decree. The decree-holder had sold the mortgaged property and had applied for delivery of possession. The judgment-debtor objected on the ground that it had been agreed between the parties that possession should not be taken and asked that that agreement might be recorded. The learned Subordinate Judge refused the application on the ground that the alleged arrangement did not come within the scope of Or. 21, r. 2. 2. No enquiry was made into the merits and we must assume for the purposes of this appeal that the assertions in the petition are true in fact. They are to the effect that after the sale and before the confirmation the judgment-debtor applied to have the sale set aside on the usual grounds. That proceeding was compromised by an agreement between the decree-holder and himself to the following effect. It was settled between the decree-holders and the judgment-debtor that the judgment-debtor should get the sale confirmed instead of carrying on the suit but that the decree-holders should not take possession of the auction purchased property within 2 years and that on the judgment-debtor paying to the decree-holders the sum of Rs. 9,100 and a moiety share of the income of the property accruing from the date of confirmation of the sale to that of the realisation of the said money, the decree-holders should give up these properties by executing a kobala in favour of the judgment-debtor. 3. A preliminary objection is taken that no appeal lies. This turns on the question whether proceedings under Or. 21, r. 95, do or do not come within the scope of sec. 47, C.P.C. This is a question on which there is the greatest diversity of judicial opinion which will be found reflected and summarised in the case of Bhagwati v. Banwari Lal I. L. R. 31 All. 82 (1908). The case which for the most closely resembles the present case is that of Muttia v. Appasami I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504 (1890). In that case an assignee of the decree bought the property in execution and asked to be put in possession. The judgment-debtor pleaded an agreement subsequent to the sale. It was held that the matter came within the scope of sec. 504 (1890). In that case an assignee of the decree bought the property in execution and asked to be put in possession. The judgment-debtor pleaded an agreement subsequent to the sale. It was held that the matter came within the scope of sec. 244, C.P.C., and that an appeal lay. This decision has not commended unreserved assent in the Court of Madras but in a comparatively late case [Sultan Sahib Marakayar v. Chidambaram Chettiar I. L. R. 32 Mad. 136 (1908)], the learned Judges held that though an application for delivery of possession was not an application for execution, they were bound by a number of decisions to hold that it raised a question relating to execution. 4. In this Court it was held in 1897 in the case of Bhimal Das v. Ganesha Kuer 1 C. W. N. 658 (1897), that an application by a decree-holder auction-purchaser to be put in possession was not a matter relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree and that consequently no appeal lay. With regard to the case of Muttia v. Appasami I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504 (1890) cited above, the learned Judges observed that if it affected the question they were unable to agree with it but added--"In that case the judgment-debtor set up an agreement between him and the applicant in bar of the application. It does not appear from the report what that agreement was. It may well be that it was one which operated to affect the execution of the decree." 5. On the other hand it was held in 1899, in the case of Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Pria Chowdhurani I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34 (1899), that proceedings for the delivery of possession to a decree-holder who purchases at an execution sale are proceedings in the execution of the decree, and in Sariatoola Molla v. Raj Kumar Roy I. L. R. 27 Cal. 709 (1900) it was held that such an application is an application to the Court to take a step in aid of execution. 6. The next case to which I may refer is that of Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad I. L. R. 31 Cal. 737 (1904) decided in April 1904. In that case a Defendant in possession being ousted by a decree-holder auction-purchaser applied to be restored to possession. 6. The next case to which I may refer is that of Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad I. L. R. 31 Cal. 737 (1904) decided in April 1904. In that case a Defendant in possession being ousted by a decree-holder auction-purchaser applied to be restored to possession. The learned Judges followed Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Pria Chowdhurani I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34 (1899) and held that sec. 244 authorised an enquiry into the question of possession when it arose between the parties to a suit and their representatives, and that proceedings for the delivery of possession to an auction-purchaser, who is himself the decree-holder, are proceedings in the execution of the decree. 7. However in August of the same year the opposite view was taken in Mahomed Masraf v. Habil Mia 6 C. L. J. 749 (1904), and it illustrates in what uncertainty the matter is involved, that one of the learned Judges was also a party to the decision of the preceding April. In the later case the assignee of a decree-holder auction-purchaser applied for possession and the application was opposed by the judgment-debtor. It was held, following Bhimal Das v. Ganesha Kuer 1 C. W. N. 658(1897) cited above, that the matter did not relate to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree and that no appeal lay. It was held that Madhusudan Das v. Gobind Pria Chowdhurani I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34 (1899) cited above had no application but no reasons are given for this view and I do not myself perceive why it was less applicable than the case of Bhimal Das v. Ganesha Kuer 1 C. W. N. 658 (1897). 8. It seems to me that the balance of authority is in favour of the view that the decision of an objection such as that now under review comes within sec. 47 of the Code and is appealable. Muttia v. Appasami I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504 (1890) is directly in point and supports that view. The cases of Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Pria Chowdhurani I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34 (1899), Sariatoola Molla v. Raj Kumar Roy I. L. R. 27 Cal. 709 (1900) and Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad I. L. R. 31 Cal. 737 (1904) also support it. 504 (1890) is directly in point and supports that view. The cases of Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Pria Chowdhurani I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34 (1899), Sariatoola Molla v. Raj Kumar Roy I. L. R. 27 Cal. 709 (1900) and Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad I. L. R. 31 Cal. 737 (1904) also support it. On the other hand, in Bhimal Das v. Ganesha Kuer 1 C. W. N. 658 (1897), the learned Judges thought it possible that an objection pleading an agreement in bar of an application for possession might possibly operate to affect the execution of the decree. And in Mahomed Masraf v. Habil Mia 6 C. L. J. 749 (1904), one of the parties to the dispute was a person who had purchased the property from the decree-holder after the sale. A purchaser of the decree must be regarded as a party to the suit but a purchaser of the property sold in an execution sale from the auction-purchaser might possibly not be so regarded. I think therefore that the balance of authority is in favour of the view that this question comes within the scope of sec. 47 of the Code, and on the question of principle, I agree with the reasoning of Stanley, C.J., in the case of Bhagwati v. Banwari Lal I. L. R. 31 All. 82 (1908) cited above. I hold therefore that an appeal lies. 9. On the question whether the agreement alleged in this case was an adjustment or not within the meaning of Or. 21, r. 2, I find it very difficult to come to a conclusion, because the term "adjustment" is itself so indefinite I am inclined to think however that it was not. The decree was to remain unaltered and the sale under it, and all that was stipulated was that possession should be delayed and that under certain circumstances there should be a reconveyance. There was apparently no provision for a default. But it appears to me that it is of little importance whether this was an adjustment under O. 21, r. 2, or not. If it was, the judgment-debtor's objection contained a prayer that it should be certified and that prayer was in time. If it was not, it did not require certification and the objection to the delivery of possession can be dealt with under sec. 47. If it was, the judgment-debtor's objection contained a prayer that it should be certified and that prayer was in time. If it was not, it did not require certification and the objection to the delivery of possession can be dealt with under sec. 47. I certainly see no reason why this controversy should be relegated to another suit. We are bound as I have said for the present to accept the statements in the petition as true. They are to the effect that the application to set aside the sale should be dropped and the sale confirmed but that the delivery of possession should be delayed to give the judgment-debtor time to pay off the debt. I certainly can see no reason whatever why the parties should not make arrangements of this kind, if they desire to do so, and if they do make them it seems to me unnecessarily technical to insist that the proof of such arrangements should be left to a subsequent suit. Indeed I think it is extremely probable that such a suit would be met with the plea that it was barred by sec. 47 of the Code. If this agreement is true then the judgment-debtor is entitled to a decision upon it. He has raised it in time, supposing that it comes within Or. 31, r. 2, so that it is not excluded from recognition by the 3rd clause of that rule. In these circumstances it seems to me the interest no less of the decree holder than of the judgment-debtor that the matter should be disposed of without further delay and in the current proceedings. I would accordingly allow the Appeal and send back the case to the Subordinate Judge for decision on the merits. Costs will abide the result. Ray, J. I agree. In the present case the decree-holder was himself the purchaser. His prayer for possession has been opposed by the judgment-debtor. It appears to me that this is a question falling within the scope of sec. 47 of the Code. The arrangement pleaded appears to me to be a contract relating to the execution of the decree and as such the matter should be determined under that section. The case is to be sent back for decision on the me its.