JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioner before us is the Plaintiff in a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Rangpur in which he sued for the recovery of property valued at nine lacs. The case turns on an adoption relied on by the Defendants of which the Plaintiff denied both the factum and the validity. The suit was instituted on the 31st July 1911, and came on for hearing on the 1st April 1913. The Plaintiff closed his case on the 22nd April and just before he did so the Defendant applied to have one Surendra Chandra Lahiri made a Plaintiff, and to have Surendra and the Petitioner ordered to give security for the payment of the Defendant's costs. The Court refused to make Surendra a Plaintiff, but ordered that the Plaintiff should give security for the costs of the suit up to Rs. 5,000. A Rule has been granted, to show cause why this order should not be set aside as being made without jurisdiction and why Surendra should not be made a Defendant. The facts on which the order is made are that the Plaintiff before bringing this suit made an agreement with Surendra by which the latter advanced Rs. 3,000 of the former to pay the Court-fee on the institution of the suit, and undertook to advance any amount that might be necessary to prosecute the appeal up to the Privy Council. The amount so advanced is to be realised from any property recovered by a final decision or on a compromise : and Surendra will have a charge therefore on any decretal property or money. The Plaintiff and Surendra will then divide equally the balance of what is recovered. If the suit is unsuccessful the Plaintiff will not be liable to Surendra for costs. Surendra will be able to compromise the suit. The fact of this agreement was, it is stated, known to the Defendant before the institution of the suit. 2. We may say at once that the part of the Rule that relates to Surendra being added as a Defendant must fail : partly because the original application was made at too late a stage in the case for such an order to be appropriate, partly because it does not appear that Surendra has any actual present interest in the property. This part of the Rule is therefore discharged: but as it was not asked for by the Petitioner but was inserted by the Court, it is discharged without costs, which Surendra does not in fact deserve. 3. The order now before us was not made, and cannot be supported under Order XXV ; but the question is whether the Court has inherent power to make it. That the Court has some such power seems to be certain. So in Ram Kumar Kundu v. Chandra Kant Mukerjee I. L. R. 2 Cal. 233 at p. 259 (1876), Sir Montague Smith, in delivering a judgment of the Privy Council, says, "It is ordinary practice, if the Plaintiff is, suing for another, to require security for costs, and to stay proceedings until it is given. The new Plaintiffs were fully aware, during the pendency of the former suit, of the arrangement between the McFacens, another Defendant, but instead of applying for security for costs, they petitioned to make him co-Plaintiff under the 73rd section of Act VIII." In this case the Defendant in the original suit was suing the maintainer of the Plaintiff, and thus though the facts relating to the contract of maintenance were very similar to those in the present case, the above observations were not necessary for the purpose of deciding the case in hand. They no doubt however can be taken as a correct indication of the existing law : and were so treated by Trevelyan, J., in Khasan Assenullahjoo v. Soloman I. L. R. 14 Cal. 533 (1887), who after referring to that decision holds that the Court "has power to require security for costs if it finds that the Plaintiff is not the real litigant, but that he is only a puppet in the hands of others." The Plaintiff had parted with half his interest in the property that might be recovered in the suit: but it was held that he had a substantial interest in the suit, and that the suit was instituted on his behalf. The application for security was therefore dismissed. 4. On referring to English practice it seems that security may be demanded from a Plaintiff on the original hearing when he is only a nominal Plaintiff. The application for security was therefore dismissed. 4. On referring to English practice it seems that security may be demanded from a Plaintiff on the original hearing when he is only a nominal Plaintiff. We are however not aware of any cases where security was ordered for this reason except where questions of insolvency, which affect the whole legal status of the Plaintiff, were concerned. 5. The question which should determine granting of an order for security thus seems to be, Has the Plaintiff got a substantial interest in the suit, or is he suing for another, in the capacity of what Trevelyan, J., conveniently describes as a puppet ? The Judge has not treated the matter from this point of view: but has dealt only with the question--can the Plaintiff pay the costs if he loses ? and on coming to the conclusion that he cannot, has made the order before us because he has the assistance of Surendra. The order admittedly cannot be made merely because the Plaintiff is a poor man. If Surendra's interference is not illegal, it cannot alter the position so long as the suit is in any way that of the Plaintiff. 6. We are asked to say that Surendra's interference is illegal in the sense that it is against public policy as described by the Privy Council in Chedambara Chetty v. Runga Krishna L. R. 1 I. A. 241 at p. 264 : s. c. 22 W. R. 149 at p. 152 (1874). On the facts disclosed however we cannot say that this is so. 7. We hold therefore that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the Rule absolute, and set aside the order. We make no order as to costs. Let the record be sent down as soon as it is convenient.