JUDGMENT Stephen, J. - This is a reference under sec. 113 of the Code from the Munsif of Darjeeling. In a suit before him the Plaintiff alleged that he had been ousted from the possession of land by the Defendant, who purported to be his landlord. He therefore sought relief under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Act X of 1859 is in force in the district where the cause of action arose and in view of sec. 23 (6) of that Act the Munsif refers to us the question whether the tenant is precluded from bringing a suit under the Specific Relief Act. Sc. 23 of Act X of 1859 as far as we are concerned with it is as follows: "(6) all suits to recover the occupancy or possession of any land from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the person entitled to receive rent for the same shall be cognizible by the Collectors of Land Revenue and shall be instituted and tried under the provisions of this Act and shall not be cognizable in any other Court or by any other officer, or in any other manner." 2. Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act provides that "if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law he may, by suit recover possession thereof." 3. If a man is illegally ejected under the former section it seems to me that it necessarily follows that he is dispossessed under the latter. Also I see no reason for confining the illegality mentioned in Act X to something which is illegal by reason of noncompliance with the provisions of that Act as it is suggested we should, 4. I am therefore of opinion that the effect of these two enactments when read together is that the Specific Relief Act confers a right of action of a general nature, which is subject to the particular exception provided by section 23 (6) of the Rent Act. The Plaintiffs case as set out in his claim comes within the terms of the last-named enactment, if the Defendant is entitled to receive rent from him. The question referred to us assumes that this is so. Consequently in my opinion the Plaintiff is not entitled to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act. 5. The Plaintiffs case as set out in his claim comes within the terms of the last-named enactment, if the Defendant is entitled to receive rent from him. The question referred to us assumes that this is so. Consequently in my opinion the Plaintiff is not entitled to bring a suit under the Specific Relief Act. 5. The result of this is that the answer to the Court below is that the Plaintiff is not entitled to bring this suit under the Specific Relief Act. As at present advised we are of opinion that the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is open to argument before the lower Appellate Court. N.R. Chatterea, J. 6. This is a reference by the Munsif of Darje ling under sec. 113 of the CPC in a suit instituted in his Court under the provisions of sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and the question submitted for opinion is whether "owing to the relationship of landlord and tenant existing between the parties, the tenant is precluded from bringing a suit for specific relief under sec. 9 of that Ac, which is in force in this district, and cannot he do so in spite of the provisions laid down in Rent Act X of 1859, sec. 23 (6) of which lays down that all suits between landlord and tenant are cognizible by the Collector and by that Court alone." 7. No evidence has yet been taken in the case, but the question whether sec. 23, cl. (6) of Act X of 1859 bars the suit, carmine only if there was relation of landlord and tenant between the parties before the Plaintiff was ejected. If there was none, that section would have no operation at all in a case coming under that section. The questions whether the tenancy had come to an end at the lime of the ejecment and whether the landlord had a light to eject must be decided after evidence is taken, and cannot be assumed. 8. The Plaintiff, as stated by the Munsif in the reference, alleged 'forcible dispossession ' and not 'illegal ejectment,' and the question for consideration is whether a suit by a tenant who has been 'forcibly dispossessed' comes within cl. (6) of sec. 23 of Act X of 1859. 9. Act X of 1859 provides for ejectment of tenants in certain cases. The Plaintiff, as stated by the Munsif in the reference, alleged 'forcible dispossession ' and not 'illegal ejectment,' and the question for consideration is whether a suit by a tenant who has been 'forcibly dispossessed' comes within cl. (6) of sec. 23 of Act X of 1859. 9. Act X of 1859 provides for ejectment of tenants in certain cases. Sec. 21 says that a raiyat is liable to be ejected for arrears of rent, but adds that no raiyat having a right of occupancy or holding under a pattah the term of which has not expired, shall be ejected otherwise than in execution of a decree or order under the provisions of the Act. There are similar provisions with respect to farmers and temporary leaseholders in sec. 22 Then comes sec. 23 which lays down that certain classes of suits mentioned in the several clauses of that section shall be cognizable by the Collector's Court, and not by any other Court. Cl. (5) mentions suits to eject any raiyat or cancel any lease on account of the non-payment of arrears of rent, or on account of a breach of the conditions of any contract, by which a raiyat may be liable to ejectment, or a lease may be liable to be cancelled, and cl. (6) mentions suits to recover the occupancy or possession of any land, farm or tenure from which a raiyat, fanner or tenant has been illegally ejected by the person entitled to receive rents for the same. Sec. 25 provides that if any zemindar or other person in receipt of rent requires assistance to eject any cultivator not having a right of occupancy or to eject any farmer or other tenant holding only for a limited period after the determination of his lease or tenancy, or to enforce any attachment or ejectment expressly authorised by any Regulation or Act, he shall make application to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed thereupon to enquire into the case, and pass orders in the manner provided for suits under the Act. In will appear from the above provisions that there are cases in which a landlord may have a right to eject. But he may not pursue that right in a legal manner and I think, it is only such cases that are contemned by sec. 23, cl. (6). In will appear from the above provisions that there are cases in which a landlord may have a right to eject. But he may not pursue that right in a legal manner and I think, it is only such cases that are contemned by sec. 23, cl. (6). The team 'ejectment ' has a special signification between landlords and tenants and is not the same thing as 'dispossession.' The word ' ejected ' in cl. (6) of sec. 23 must be taken to have been used in the same sense in which it is used in cl. (5) of that section which provides for suits by landlords to eject tenants, and in sec. 25 which provides for applications to the Collector for assistance to eject tenants. The Act itself draws a distinction between 'ejectment' and 'dispossession.' The word 'dispossess ' is used in sec. 28 of the Act which provides for applications to the Collector by proprietors who may desire to 'dispossess' grantees of invalid revenue-free land, i.e., who are not tenants. 10. Suits for recovery of possession by tenants illegally ejected are a well-known class of suits, and sec. 7, cl. XI (e) of the Court Fees Act provides that in a suit to recover the occupancy of land from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord, the Court-fee payable is the amount of fee payable on the rent for the preceding year. In the case of Sundar Mal v. Jessie Caroline 16 C.L.J. 875 (1912), the learned Judges with reference to the above clause of the Court Fees Act observed : "The clause does not describe the suit as one for recovery of possession by a tenant who has been dispossessed by his landlord : the suit mentioned is one for recovery of occupancy of land from which the tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord, that is ejected nominally in conformity with, but in reality in contravention of, the provisions of the rent law for ejectment of tenants by landlords. When we look to the sub-clauses which precede and follow the sub-cl. (e), it becomes fairly obvious that the Legislature had most probably in view suits of the description mentioned in sec. 23, cl. (6) of Act X of 1859; and it is worthy of note that sec. When we look to the sub-clauses which precede and follow the sub-cl. (e), it becomes fairly obvious that the Legislature had most probably in view suits of the description mentioned in sec. 23, cl. (6) of Act X of 1859; and it is worthy of note that sec. 139 of the Chotanagpore Tenancy Act of 1908 also refers to suits of the same class; these suits are triable exclusively by Revenue Courts." In the case of Khettia Nath Ghattak v. Peru Bauri 15 C.W.N. 837 (1911), it was held that sec. 139, cl. (5) of the Chotanagpore Tenancy Act (VI of 1908 B.C.), was no bar to a tenant dispossessed by a landlord instituting a suit under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, for recovery of possession. The decision, no doubt, proceeded on the ground that cl. (5) of that section only barred 'applications ' and not 'suits.' But the question whether a case of forcible dispossession (as distinguished from a case of illegal ejectment) is barred by sec. 139, was not necessary to be raised, and does not appear to have been raised, before the learned Judges in that case, and it was sufficient, for the purposes of that case, to say that it was only applications, and not suits, that were barred by the provisions of sec. 139 of that Act. 11. The case of Janardan Achatjee v. Haradhan Acharjee 9 W.R. 513 (1868) was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Peacock, C.J., Seton Karr, L S. Jackson, Phear and Macpherson, JJ., and Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench said with reference to the scope of a suit under sec. 23 (6) of Act X of 1859: "In suits under cl. (6), sec. 23, Act X of 1859, it is necessary to determine whether the Plaintiff has been illegally ejected which involves the question whether the tenancy was at an end or not. If after the expiration of a tenancy, a zemindar wishes to obtain possession without resorting to a Court of law, he may apply under sec. 25, for the assistance of the Collector, who will thereupon summarily enquire into the case and if he finds that the tenancy is at an end will render assistance in turning the tenant out. If after the expiration of a tenancy, a zemindar wishes to obtain possession without resorting to a Court of law, he may apply under sec. 25, for the assistance of the Collector, who will thereupon summarily enquire into the case and if he finds that the tenancy is at an end will render assistance in turning the tenant out. If, however, the zemindar acts of his own authority and without the intervention of a Court of law, or of the Collector, he comes within sec. 15 of Act XIV of 1859, and if the raiyat sue him in the Civil Court within six months, he will be entitled to recover possession without reference to the title of the zemindar to eject him. If, however, he sue in the Collector's Court under sec. 23 the question is open, as to whether the tenancy was at an end or not : and if at an end, he must fail in his suit," 12. In a suit under sec. 23, cl. (6) of Act X of 1859, the Plaintiff must show that the tenancy was not at an end, and that he had been ejected in an illegal manner. That is a suit different from a suit under sec. 9 of the. Specific Relief Act based upon the ground of previous possession. 13. I regret I am unable to agree in the view taken by ray learned colleagues and I am of opinion that where a tenant on being dispossessed seeks to recover possession on the mere strength of his previous possession, irrespective of the right of the landlord to eject him, a suit can be maintained by him under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act and that sec. 23, cl. (6) of Act X of 1859 is no bar to such a suit and I would answer the reference accordingly. Mullick, J. 14. I assume that the Munsif, who has referred this case is satisfied that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 and that the tenant has been illegally ejected. An attempt has been made to show on behalf of the tenant that the pleadings do not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant but I do not think we can enter in a determine ion of this point in this Court. An attempt has been made to show on behalf of the tenant that the pleadings do not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant but I do not think we can enter in a determine ion of this point in this Court. If the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist then clearly sec. 23, Act X 1859, will not apply. It is next argued on behalf of the tenant that sec. 23 does not apply because the dispossession of which the Plaintiff complains does not amount to illegal ejectment within the meaning of cl. (6), sec. 23, Act X of 1859, inasmuch as illegal ejectment in cl. (6) refers to eject men for nonpayment of arrears of rent or on account of a breach of the conditions of the tenancy as mentioned in cl. (5). There is no authority for such a contention. I see no reason for contracting the meaning of the word 'ejectment' and in my opinion illegal ejectment in cl. (6) means dispossession without consent otherwise than in due course of law. Therefore a suit under sec. 9, Specific Relief Act, and also one under cl. (6), sec. 23, Act X of 1859, would lie on the same cause of action. This being so, the only point necessary for determination is whether by reason of the special provisions of sec. 23, Act X of 1859, the former suit is barred by the latter. I think the answer must be in the affirmative. In the case of Khetha Nath Ghattak v. Peru Bauri 15 C.W.N. 387 (1911), a similar question arose with reference to the interpretation of sees. 71 and 139 of the Chotanagpore Tenancy Act (VI of 1908, B.C.) the provisions of which sections are founded on and are almost identical with those of sec. 25 and sec. 23 respectively of Act X of 1859. It was held in that case that a suit by a tenant for recovery of possession under sec. 9, Act I of 1877, was not barred by the terms of sec. 139, Act VI of 1908, B.C. The decision turned on the circumstance that cl. (5), sec. 139, authorises the making of an application as distinguished from the insertion of a suit, and the learned Judges help 1 by implication that if the expression "suits" had been used in sec. 139, Act VI of 1908, B.C. The decision turned on the circumstance that cl. (5), sec. 139, authorises the making of an application as distinguished from the insertion of a suit, and the learned Judges help 1 by implication that if the expression "suits" had been used in sec. 139 a suit under the general law would have been barred by the special provisions of the local law. Adopting this line of reasoning I think it is clear that a suit for recovery of possession by a tenant under sec. 9, Act I of 1877, is barred by the terms of sec. 23, Act X of 1859. It is scarcely necessary to observe that if the tenancy has been de ermined it is open to the landlord either to proceed under sec. 25, Act X of 1859, or to rake possession propriety motu and that in the latter event is competent to the tenant to resort to a summary suit for possession. This has been held in Janardan Achatjee v. Haradhan Achatjee 9 W.R. 518 (1868). The result is that if the relationship of landlord and tenant exists the present suit under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act which has been instituted before the Munsif must fail for want of jurisdiction. I agree therefore with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother Stephen.