JUDGMENT 1. On the issue remitted by the order of my learned predecessor on 26th November 1912 the Court below has found that Mt. Bhagia was not the lawful wife of the deceased Hannu. The facts of the case, as set forth in that order, require a slight amplification. The revenue of the property in question fell in arrears. The village was attached and the proprietary rights put up to sale and purchased by the Government. The Government remained in possession of the village up to the last settlement as owner. A close examination of the documentary evidence on the record shows that the old proprietors were allowed by the Government to cultivate certain areas of land in the village on payment of rent. The khewat was still maintained, and as the old proprietors died the names of their heirs, or those whom the Government deemed to be their heirs, were brought on the khewat. In the course of the management of the village the Government gave leases to some of the old proprietors in order to see whether they could be trusted to manage the village. It was while the village was in possession of Government that Hannu died. He was cultivating land as a tenant from the Government. Mt. Bhagia olaimed to be his widow and the present plaintiff-appellant Madho claimed that he was the next heir. There was a mutation case, and in the result the name of Mt. Bhagia was entered apparently both in the khasra as tenant and in the khewat as the heir of Hannu. Finally, the Government made up its mind to give back the village to the old proprietors. In its order it is clearly and distinctly stated that there was to be no inquiry as to the title of the old proprietors. The village was to be restored to the old proprietors “as represented by the khewatdars,” i.e., I take it to be as represented by those persons whose names were on the khewat. 2. The property, it must be remembered, was dearly the property of the Government. Moreover it was note given back to be held in the same shares, as before. 2. The property, it must be remembered, was dearly the property of the Government. Moreover it was note given back to be held in the same shares, as before. The Government said that the land in the possession of each khewatdar must be deemed to represent: that kbewatdar's share, and that in lands held by tenants each khewatdar would have his share in the profits in proportion to the area of land held by him at the time of the gift as a cultivator. 3. It is thus clear that the Government was not restoring the property to khewatdars in the same proportion as was held before the attachment of the village. A settlement was made in regard to the property which is now in suit with Mt. Bhagia, and she became the recipient of the gift made by the Government. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that she must be held to have taken that property intrust for the lawful heirs of Hannu. It had to be admitted that Hannu was not the owner of the property now in suit at the time of his death, and that therefore. Madho could not inherit it as the heir of Hannu. 4. It is urged that a constructive trust arose because it was the intention of the Government to give the property to the lawful heir of Hannu. As far as one can judge from the language of the Government in its order, there was no intention whatsoever to inquire into the right and title of any person. But it was the intention of the Government to give the property to those persons whose names were on the khewat at the time. Over and above this it is quite clear that there is no question of a trust whatsoever. Mt. Bhagia did not stand to Madho in any fiduciary or semifiduciary position. In fact, from the death of Hannu they have been fighting each other and in no sense can one be said to have stood to the other in a fiduciary position. If the Government had given the land to Mt. Bhagia on trust, and if a provision of the trust had failed, then Mt. Bhagia, might be said to have held the property in trust not for Madho but for the Government. A constructive trust might have arisen in favour of Madho if Mt. If the Government had given the land to Mt. Bhagia on trust, and if a provision of the trust had failed, then Mt. Bhagia, might be said to have held the property in trust not for Madho but for the Government. A constructive trust might have arisen in favour of Madho if Mt. Bhagia had stood in any fiduciary position as regards him. But that is not the case. He is not a minor in her charge. Their interests were adverse to each other. In my opinion the appellant has failed to establish any title to the property in suit, and his suit was rightly dismissed by the Court below. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs including fees on the higher scale.