JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal arising out of execution proceedings. The plaintiff who is the appellant before me brought a suit against the defendants to eject them from a house. The defendants contested the plaintiff's claim. The parties finally came to terms. A compromise was filed in Court and the following decree was drawn up: “A decree according to the terms of the sulahnama may be prepared (contents of the compromise). The parties have come to terms. The plaintiff zamindar is the owner of the house. Let a decree for possession be given. The defendants, according to the pleasure of the zamindar will continue to dwell in the house on payment of an annual rent of one rupee. Whenever the plaintiff zamindar wishes it, the defendants will at once vacate the house.” This decree was passed on 1st August 1905. In the year 1912 the plaintiff wished the defendants to vacate the house. But they refused to do so. Thereupon he made an application to Court to eject them in execution of the decree. The Court below has rejected the application directing the appellant to bring a fresh suit for ejectment. The question is whether the appellant can put his decree into execution and thereby eject the defendants or whether he must bring a fresh suit. It is quite clear that in the former suit there was a contention between the parties as to the ownership of the house. The parties came to terms. The defendants admitted the title of the plaintiff and the latter in consideration thereof allowed the former to remain in possession as tenants on payment of an annual rent. The relation between the parties which commenced to exist immediately after the compromise is the relation between a landlord and tenants. Prior to that the relation had been, if it can be called one, that which exists between a trespasser and the true owner of a property. 2. The words dakhai ki digri farmai juwai in the decree simply meant that the Court was to validate the title of the plaintiff and no more. It seems to me that decree, so far as it was capable of execution, was practically executed by the distinct change of relation between the parties in the fact that the defendants continued after the decree to hold the property as tenants. It seems to me that decree, so far as it was capable of execution, was practically executed by the distinct change of relation between the parties in the fact that the defendants continued after the decree to hold the property as tenants. In my opinion the direction of the Court below is quite correct that the plaintiff should bring a fresh suit against the tenants who have refused to vacate after due notice. It is suggested that the present application might be treated as a plaint and the plaintiff allowed to make good the deficiency in court fee. I do not think that Section 47 of the CPC, was intended to operate in a case like the present. The plaint which the plaintiff will have to file will contain much more than is now stated in the application for execution. The question of notice may also arise, and it will be far better that the plaintiff should set forth the matter in a correct and proper method otherwise he will find himself landed in difficulties and lose the suit. I dismiss the appeal. In view of the circumstances of this case I direct that each party shall pay his own costs of this appeal.