JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of malikana for the years 1303 to 1314. The Courts below have concurred in holding that the suit was barred by limitation, and the Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. It appears that the Plaintiffs obtained a decree establishing their right to the malikana so far back as 24th December 1855, but it is found that the Plaintiffs never received any malikana since that date, and their attempt to prove payments between 1855 and 1895 failed. The question is whether under these circumstances the claim is barred by limitation. 2. Now under Art. 132, Sch. II of Act IX of 1871, the period of limitation for a suit for money charged upon immoveable property was 12 years from the time when the money sued for became due, and it was expressly provided that malikana shall for the purposes of that article be deemed to be money charged upon immoveable property, and similar provision is contained in the later Limitation Acts. But under Act XIV of 1859, it was held in a series of cases that malikana was an interest in immoveable property and not rent, and consequently governed in the matter of limitation by sec. 12 of Act XIV of 1859 [see Bhoalee Singh v. Neemoo Behoo 13 W. R 498(1869), Gobind Chunder Roy Choudhary v. Ram Chunder Choudhary 19 W R- 94 (1873) and the cases cited therein] and that if there had been no enjoyment of malikana for a period of 12 years, the right to sue for money recoverable on account of it was barred. [See Heerranund Shoo v. Ozeerun 9 W R. 102 (1868).] The right to the malikana in the present case was no doubt established in 1855. But since that date and before Act IX of 1871 came into force, the Plaintiffs were for a period of more than 12 years not in enjoyment of it. The effect of the decree of 1855 was that Plaintiffs' right to an interest in immoveable property was established, but they lost that right by reason of not being in possession and enjoyment of that right for a period of 12 years. The effect of the decree of 1855 was that Plaintiffs' right to an interest in immoveable property was established, but they lost that right by reason of not being in possession and enjoyment of that right for a period of 12 years. The analogy of a landlord's claim for recovery of arrears of rent, which is not barred, even though no rent may have been realised within 12 years, where the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists or is established by a decree of Court, cannot apply to the present case. As pointed out by Markby, J., in Beebee Ghummun v. Om Koolsoom 13 W. R. 465 (1870), the zamindar does not lose his right as against his raiyat, although he does not for a number of years choose to assert them, because a raiyat stands in a totally different position from an ordinary person as to gaining a title against the zamindar. Ho derives his right to possess from the zamindar, and in a measure represents and protects the title of his zamindar. But the position of the parties here is in no way similar to that of landlord and tenant. 3. It was contended that the Plaintiffs' right having been established, they ought to have been held entitled to succeed until it was found that the Defendants or their predecessors had set up a title adverse to the Plaintiffs' after the decree of 1855. But the Defendants' predecessors having appropriated the entire profits to themselves for a period of 12 years, notwithstanding the decree of 1855, the Plaintiffs were out of possession for 12 years and their right was accordingly barred. The fact therefore that the Plaintiffs' right was established in 1855 does not help the Plaintiffs. 4. In the case of Chhagan Lal v. Bapubhai ) ILR 5 Bom, 68 (1860), it was held that where a Plaintiff has already obtained a decree declaring his title, it is not necessary for him to establish his periodically recurring right against any. person who is bound by that decree, and, that this being so, there is nothing in the. Law of Limitation which can be construed into a restriction of the Plaintiffs' right to recover the arrears falling due within the period of limitation. person who is bound by that decree, and, that this being so, there is nothing in the. Law of Limitation which can be construed into a restriction of the Plaintiffs' right to recover the arrears falling due within the period of limitation. In that case, however, the decree establishing the Plaintiffs' right was made in 1869, and Act IX of 1871 came into force before 12 years had run out from that date. The claim was for the recovery of a share of the income of a certain vatan connected with an hereditary office, but was not strictly speaking a charge upon immoveable property, and the ground upon which the decision proceeded was that the right was a periodically recurring right. But under Act XIV of 1859 malikana was held to be an interest in immoveable property and not like rent a periodically recurring right. The case is therefore clearly distinguishable. The Plaintiffs have been found to have never received any malikana since 1855, i.e., for more than half a century, and their right was barred under Act XIV of 1859. We are accordingly of opinion that the decrees of the Courts below are correct and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.