JUDGMENT Coxe, J. - This Appeal arises out of an application for probate or Letters of Administration (the applicant seems not quite certain which) with respect to a Will said to have been executed on the 18th November 1897. The learned District Judge has refused the application on two grounds, namely, that the applicant has not proved, firstly, that the Will was in existence at the death of the testator, and, secondly, that it was duly executed. The facts in this case seem to me to indicate very strongly that this Will was not in existence at the time of the testator's death. He died in July 1898, eight months after the Will. The petition itself shows that he changed his mind with regard to an important portion of the property. In the Will he devoted a deposit of Rs. 200 in the Savings Bank to the service of a certain idol and directed that the Petitioner and the husband of the objector should draw the interest and spend it on the sheba. But it appears from para. 8 of the petition that the testator drew out the whole sum before his death and handed it over to the objector's husband. This shows that with regard to at least a quarter of the whole property the testator had completely changed his mind. Finally the Petitioner's conduct suggests very strongly to my mind that he knew that the Will had in some manner come to an end. It is not uncommon in a case of this nature for the Will to be made over to and kept by the person for whose benefit it is executed. Here the Petitioner's whole title is based upon the Will, yet not only did he not keep the Will himself but he does not say that he ever took any steps to obtain it or even see it after the testator's death. He was entitled under the Will to a quarter of the moveable property, but apparently he has never attempted to secure it. This application was presented 12 years after the testator's death when everybody had forgotten all about the circumstances of the case, and it looks to me very like a speculation. He was entitled under the Will to a quarter of the moveable property, but apparently he has never attempted to secure it. This application was presented 12 years after the testator's death when everybody had forgotten all about the circumstances of the case, and it looks to me very like a speculation. If the objector had been frank and truthful about the matter and had admitted the execution but pleaded revocation I could not have agreed with the view of my brother Ray that Letters of Administration should be granted. The objector however takes up the impossible attitude that this Will, which is a registered Will, was never executed and therefore he does not plead revocation. That being so, it is difficult for me to hold that the Will has been revoked, when that plea has not been taken, and I therefore will not dissent from the decision of my learned colleague. The Appeal will be allowed and Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed will be granted. Costs of all Courts to be paid out of the estate. 2. Hearing-fee two gold mohurs. Ray, J. This suit is for Letters of Administration with the Will annexed under sec. 19 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881. The Will is dated the 18th November 1897. Tekari Barak is said to have made the Will. The Petitioner is brother's son of Tekari and the objector is his daughter. The Will purports to give half his immoveable property to the Petitioner and half to the objector. If there was no Will, the whole of the property would go to the objector and after her to her sons, if she should have any surviving her. The Will was duly registered and upon reading the evidence I am clearly of opinion that its proper execution has been established. Tekari died on the 6th of Sravan 1305--July 1898. The evidence is that Tekari kept the Will in his box. The objector's husband says that Tekari had an iron safe. This iron safe has been called a box by the Petitioner. This safe was in Tekari's room and the key remained with him. The key of the room also remained with Tekari and the husband of the objector says that after his death probably it went into the possession of his wife, i.e., the objector. This iron safe has been called a box by the Petitioner. This safe was in Tekari's room and the key remained with him. The key of the room also remained with Tekari and the husband of the objector says that after his death probably it went into the possession of his wife, i.e., the objector. As to the key of the iron safe his evidence is this. "The key of the iron chest was with my father-in-law. It came to the hands of my wife after his death." The objector in her written statement denies being in possession of the Will but her husband has given evidence that they have not opened the iron chest and have not searched for the Will. On these facts the suit is not liable to dismissal on the ground that the Petitioner has not proved that the Will was in existence up to the time of the testator's death. There has been a misconception of the law on the subject. In this case the testator did not appoint an executor, so the application is necessarily under sec. 19 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881. That section provides when the deceased has made a Will, but has not appointed an executor, or etc., etc., an universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted to prove the Will, and Letters of Administration with the Will annexed may be granted to him, etc., etc. It cannot be said that "Will" must be the original document. The word has been obviously used to mean J the disposition. Otherwise in no case where the Will is not in existence the universal or residuary legatee can apply. He cannot do it even if he proves that an interested party has destroyed it alter the death of the testator. That cannot be the law. Hence I think nothing turns upon the fact that in the previous sec. 18, there is mention of a copy of the Will. This sec. 19 does not lay down any rules for the guidance of the Court in determining when the Will is established. The execution of the Will in the manner required by law having been proved, it lay upon the objector to plead and prove revocation. She has not even pleaded revocation. This sec. 19 does not lay down any rules for the guidance of the Court in determining when the Will is established. The execution of the Will in the manner required by law having been proved, it lay upon the objector to plead and prove revocation. She has not even pleaded revocation. All that she says in her written statement is that she is not aware of any Will having been executed by her father. Her husband says in his evidence that Tokani did not execute any Will. That being so, the revocation of the Will is not a question in this suit, When a Will is shown to have been in the custody of a testator, and is not found at his death, the well known presumption arises that the Will has been destroyed by the testator for the purpose of revoking it. Now this rule of law bears only on revocation when that is an issue in the suit. Then the presumption may be re-I butted by the facts, Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards L.R. 1 P.D. 154 (1876). In the case of Brown v. Brown 8. E & B. 876 : s.c. 27 L.J.A.B. 173 (1858), Lord Campbell observes:--If, for instance, it could be shown that the heir-at-law had access to the place where the testator had deposited the Will, and grounds could be shown for a suspicion that he had destroyed it, it would be a case to consider. These rules of English law are founded on reason and good sense and are regarded as of general application. The Courts in India have adopted these rules and have applied them to cases arising under the Probate and Administration Act, 1881. Anwar Hossein v. Secretary of State for India ILR 31 Cal. 885 (1904), Shib Subitri Prasad v. The Collector of Meerut ILR 29 All. 82 (1906), Ishur Chandra Sarma v. Dayamoyi Debia ILR 8 Cal. 864 (1882). This last case was for Letters of Administration with Will annexed and the application was by a residuary legatee. The Will was not produced and it was stated to be in the possession of the objector as in the present case. The Court observed--If the Will is not shown to be in existence, then the Court will have to consider whether it had been destroyed by the testator, or by his orders with the intention of revoking it. The Will was not produced and it was stated to be in the possession of the objector as in the present case. The Court observed--If the Will is not shown to be in existence, then the Court will have to consider whether it had been destroyed by the testator, or by his orders with the intention of revoking it. Sec. 24 of the Probate and Administration Act runs thus : When the Will has been lost or mislaid since the testator's death, or has been destroyed by wrong or accident and not by any act of the testator, etc., etc. It appears to me that the words 'since the testator's death qualify only the verb 'mislaid.' They have no reference to the word 'lost', otherwise, what would happen if the Will has been lost before the testator's death? The loss of the Will would not operate as revocation--vide sec. 57. To establish revocation you must show destruction by the testator. Loss is no destruction. Then the words 'since the testator's death' have no reference to the succeeding clause of the sentence. The Will could not have been destroyed by any act of the testator since his death. The second clause is independent by itself. Then the words in this clause "and not by any act of the testator" have no special meaning. For, if the Will has been destroyed by any act of the testator, it has been revoked and and it is a dead thing. In the succeeding section the words used are "when the Will has been lost or destroyed, etc., etc." The former section refers to cases when a copy of the Will is available and the latter when no copy is available. This is the only difference. In neither of these sections any rule of law has been laid down and none tending to defeat the applicant's suit. Revocation must be proved by the party who sets it up. The facts proved and admitted preclude a presumption in favour of the objector and there is no evidence that the Will has been actually destroyed. The Petitioner has established his right to the Letters of Administration. The delay in making this application is not a material fact in this case. No sooner the objector attached his half share in the immoveable property he put in this application for Letters of Administration. The Petitioner has established his right to the Letters of Administration. The delay in making this application is not a material fact in this case. No sooner the objector attached his half share in the immoveable property he put in this application for Letters of Administration. I would reverse the judgment of the learned District Judge and decree the Appeal.