JUDGMENT No. 239-- 1. This Appeal arises out of an application for execution of a decree for rent under the Bengal Tenancy Act not exceeding Rs. 500, and the question is whether the application for execution is barred by limitation having regard to the provisions of sec. 184 and Art. 6, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It appears that in the rent suit, the Court of Appeal by its judgment, dated the 23rd December 1902, held that the Plaintiff was entitled to rent at the rate claimed by him and allowed the plea of part-payment set up by the Defendant. The decree, however, which was prepared, did not mention the amount claimed, the annual rent, or the amount of rent and costs decreed. The Defendants appeal to the High Court was dismissed on the 28th April 1905 and the decree of the lower Appellate Court was accordingly confirmed. The decree-holder applied for execution of decree in December 1907, but the Court rejected the application on the ground that the decree could not be executed. Thereupon the decree-holder applied to the High Court for amendment of the decree by inserting in it the annual rent, the amount claimed and the amounts decreed as rent and costs. 2. This Court thereupon made the following order on the 6th July 1908 : "The decrees passed by the lower Appellate Court in these cases do not state what reliefs are granted to the successful parties before it. The decrees should specify the reliefs granted. We accordingly direct that the decrees be modified and the reliefs granted be specified from a perusal of the plaints and judgments of the lower Appellate Court." This order appears to have been made in the absence of the judgment-debtor who subsequently made an application stating that he did not get notice of the decree-holder's application in time for instructing pleader to oppose the said application and prayed for setting aside the said order. And the following order was made on the 16th July 1898 :"The order made by us on the 6th July last on the application of the Respondent for amending the decrees of the lower Appellate Court will stand, but that order should contain a further direction that the present Petitioner, namely, the Appellant in this Court, will be entitled to raise any question as to limitation in the execution proceedings and our order for amendment of the decree will not affect any such plea of limitation. We do not express any opinion on the question of limitation." The decree was accordingly amended on the 23rd June 1909. 3. The present application for execution of the decree was presented on the 2nd October 1909, and the judgment-debtor opposed it on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Both the Courts below have given effect to the objection, and the decree-holders have appealed to this Court. We are of opinion that the application for execution of the decree is not barred by limitation. Art. 6 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act no doubt provides a three years' limitation for an application for execution of a rent decree passed under that Act not exceeding Rs. 500 and the time is to run from the date of the decree. But that limitation can apply only where there is a decree which can be executed at the date it is passed. The decree in the present case as originally passed was one wholly incapable of execution and until it was amended under the order of the High Court in 1909 there was no decree which was capable of being executed. We think that if Art. 6 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act were to apply to such a decree, the decree-holder may be deprived of the fruits of a judgment in his favour through the fault or delay of the Court or of its officer in drawing up a decree which can be executed. It is not a case where the decree could be executed although the decree-holder could not obtain the full benefit of the judgment owing to the decree not being in accordance with and not fully expressing the result of the judgment. A similar view was taken in the case of Muhamad Suleman Khan v. Muhamad Yar Khan I. L. R. 17 All. 39 (1894). A similar view was taken in the case of Muhamad Suleman Khan v. Muhamad Yar Khan I. L. R. 17 All. 39 (1894). In that case the decree as originally framed was found by the High Court to be incapable of execution and was not finally amended by that Court so as to become capable of execution, until nearly twelve years after it was passed, and it was held that an application to execute such decree which was made within three years from the date of the amendment of the decree was within time. 4. The learned Judges in that case were of opinion that Art. 178 of the Limitation Act was applicable to such a decree, but it seems to us that so long as no decree capable of execution is in existence, no question of limitation arises with respect to it. 5. We do not express any opinion upon the questions whether the decree-holder can get a fresh start from the date of amendment of a decree which is capable of execution though such decree may not be in entire accordance with the judgment, and whether a case of amendment of decree comes within the words 'review of judgment' in Art. 6, cl. (3) of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the provisions of which are similar to those which were contained in cl. 3 of Art. 179 of Act XV of 1877 (before cl. 4 was introduced by the present Limitation Act IX of 1908) as to the construction of which there is some difference of judicial opinion. The facts of the present case are peculiar. The decree did not at all specify the relief granted, and the judgment-debtor succeeded in getting the application for execution made in 1907 rejected on the ground that the decree was incapable of execution. Under these circumstances we do not think that it is now open to them to say that the decree was capable of execution before it was amended. 6. The learned District Judge has held that the decree was "time-barred and therefore legally dead" at the time when the application for amendment was made, three years having passed from the date of the original decree. But we think the decree stands practically in the same position as it would have stood, had it not been signed by the Judge all this time. But we think the decree stands practically in the same position as it would have stood, had it not been signed by the Judge all this time. In either case it would not be capable of execution, and we do not see how a decree which cannot be executed could be 'dead' or time-barred. We are fully alive to the fact that the object of the Legislature in prescribing a three years' period of limitation for execution of rent decrees under the Bengal Tenancy Act, is that such decrees should not be kept pending for a long time like ordinary decrees, but we think the decree for which a limitation is prescribed by Art. 6 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is one which is capable of execution. We are accordingly of opinion that the application for execution is not barred by limitation. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether the present application for execution can be said to be a continuation of the previous application made in 1907. The orders of the Courts below are set aside, and the case is sent back to the Court of first instance so that it may proceed with the application for execution according to law. 7. The Appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court. We assess the hearing-fee at one gold mohur. Each party will bear his own costs in the Courts below. This judgment will govern the other Appeals, Nos. 281 to 284 of 1911.