JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - This is a reference to me as a third Judge under the provisions of the Code, occasioned by a difference of opinion between two learned Judges of this Court. The case came before them by way of second appeal, and, on the merits they both agreed that the Appellant ought to succeed : but while one of the learned Judges was of opinion that an appeal would lie, the other considered that it would not. This is the only question that remains unsettled. The determination of this question turns upon the construction of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for this was a suit instituted by a landlord for the recovery of rent, under that Act, and no second appeal would lie unless the decree has decided a question relating to title to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto. The only question then is whether the decree has had this effect. It appears to me that it undoubtedly has. The Plaintiff claims to be the lessee under Defendant No. 3, and the point determined adversely to the Plaintiff by the lower Appellate Court was that this lease was invalid and that he had no title. That has been decided by the decree in a suit to which they both were parties : and not only was it a decision relating to title to land or to some interest in land, but the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 3 appear to me to be parties having conflicting claims thereto. The claims certainly are not identical claims to the extent of the Plaintiffs alleged interest--they are in conflict with one another, and none the less because the Plaintiff claims under Defendant No. 3. This does not appear to me to require the authority of cases but it seems to me to be fully illustrated by the accepted principle that as between a vendor and a purchaser, or a lessor and lessee, under instruments which are for some reason ineffective, the purchaser in one case and the lessee in the other, can, where the conditions permit, set up and successfully establish the plea of adverse possession, if there be adverse possession. It appears to me then that the rights are conflicting rights. It appears to me then that the rights are conflicting rights. For these reasons I think that the Appeal should be allowed with costs as was determined by the two learned Judges in the event of my coming to the conclusion to which I have just given expression. 2. There will be no order as to the costs of this reference.