JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - The only point raised in this Appeal is whether of the two parties in this case, both of whom appear to have been appointed Receivers of portions of the estate, one can maintain a suit and the other defend the suit brought against him by the former. These two gentlemen, the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 2, are brothers and they seem to be quarrelling over their father's estate with another brother. Apparently, there was a partition suit and, on the 2nd June 1909, the Court by an order which obviously must have been a consent order appointed each of the three brothers Receiver of a portion of the property and, in the words of the order, each of the brothers was given full powers under sec. 503 of the old Code of Civil Procedure. That section conferred upon the Receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for realisation, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property and the collection of the runs and profits thereof as the owner himself had or such of those powers as the Court thought fit. The Court gave full powers and, therefore, each of the Receivers as regards the land of which he was appointed the Receiver, had the power of bringing and defending suits. It would be impossible to cons rue otherwise the words of the authority given by the order appointing the Receiver than that each of the Receivers had powers to bring and defend suits. Therefore, obviously, the Plaintiff had the power to institute the present suit and the Defendant had also the power to defend it. The only question is whether there was such a grave and serious contempt of Court by the Plaintiff in suing the Receiver of another portion of the estate, that the Court is bound to say that the suit must fail and ought to be dismissed. I am not clear that the argument put forward by the learned Vakil for the Appellant is right that when this point as to the suit having been instituted against an officer of the Court without the leave of the Court is a defence to be used at the trial to have the suit dismissed, that must of necessity make the Plaintiff's suit fail. It is much more likely that the statement which was read to us by the learned Vakil from some text-book that the state that prevailed in the old Courts of Equity is what represents the practice to-day. It is quite true that proceedings cannot be brought against a Receiver without the consent of the Court. The Receiver is an officer of the Court and the possession by him is the possession of the Court and to bring a suit so as to interfere with the possession of the Court without the leave of the Court is a contempt of Court. That has been established by a large number of authorities. But if a party is guilty of contempt of Court, the proper way for the Receiver to act is to bring it immediately to the notice of the Court and the Court will deal with the party so guilty of the contempt of Court and take proper steps : and, no doubt, in a proper case, it would grant a party leave to proceed with the suit against the Receiver. Where leave is allowed to a person who happens to occupy the position of a Receiver by an order which is obviously a consent order, to keep the matter unchallenged until the suit comes on for hearing and then say that the suit must be dismissed is not a proper way. The only point on which there is any difficulty in the Plaintiff's way is the case of Pramathanath v. Khetranath ILR 32 Cal. 270 : s.c. 9 C.W.N. 247 (1904) decided by Mr. Justice Bodilly. Whether that case does not too broadly state the proposition of law that is laid down in the judgment I do not wish to express any opinion. I rather wish to guard myself against either approving or disapproving it. It is quite sufficient to say that the order appointing the Receiver clearly authorised the Receiver to bring suits to recover the rent of the property of which he was appointed the Receiver. That being so, it seems to me that the present Appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. N.R. Chatterjea, J. I agree.