JUDGMENT Carnduff, J. - The only question raised by this appeal is as to the interpretation and application of sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877, under the provisions of which "if, before the expirat (sic) of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability, shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed ". The Respondents are the shebaits of the deity Iswar Narasingh Jiu. The akhrabari of the sheba may be said to be divided in two by a path, and there is now no dispute except as to the northern portion, upon which a hut stands. In 1908 the shebaits sued to eject the Appellant who had entered on the land and erected the said hut more than 12 years before. It is conceded before us that the suit was out of time unless a kabuliyat executed in 1897 by the Appellant contains what amounts to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of the section which I have quoted. The Court of first instance held that it did not; but the lower Appellate Court took the opposite and, in my opinion, the right view. 2. The kabuliyat in question was executed by the Appellant in favour of certain members of the family of the Nawab of Dacca, who had no concern with either the suit or the ahhrabari. It relates to several plots of land lying to the east of the road which runs along the eastern side of the akhrabari; and, in a schedule annexed to it, it describes the two plots farthest south in the following terms :--"(1) North of (sic) khal of Town Bazaar, east of the road (sic) east of the karsa lands of my jama, (sic)fat your khas tenant Akamuddi (sic)lla, and of the akhra lands of (sic) Jiu, south of the land No. 2, (sic) lands held by the tenant Prasanna Kumar Dutt, appertaining to the lakheraj of Lukhi Narain Thakur. Within this boundary, the lands measuring 55 cubits in length from north to south and 461/2 cubits in breadth from east to west. A six annas share thereof. (2) North of the aforesaid land No. 1, east of the road lying to the east of the lands mudafat the said Akamuddi and of the lands No. 3, south of the dwelling house of our ordinary tenant Lakshmi Baisnabi which has been made over to Shonakali Baishnabi in miras settlement, west of the lands No. 1 held by the aforesaid Prosanna Kumar Dutt. Within this boundary, the lands measuring 44 cubits from east to west and 42 cubits from north to south. A six annas share of the same. 3. It is now found as a fact that the Appellant purchased some land from Akamuddi Bhistiwalla in 1894, and that those lands were beyond, and immediately to, the north of the akhrabari. It appears further that the khal of Town Bazar which is mentioned as the southern boundary of the lands dealt with in the kabuliyat also runs along the south of the akhrabari. It would seem to follow that the Appellant, who in his evidence accepted full responsibility for the details set forth in the kabuliyat, in that document admitted by necessary implication, if not by express words, that the whole of the land originally in dispute was the property of the deity Narasingh Jiu. This is the view of the learned Subordinate Judge, which I am disposed to regard as a finding of fact that cannot be interfered with on second appeal. And, in any case, it is a finding which strikes me as most reasonable and which I should not be prepared to reject. I take it, then, that in the kabuliyat of 1897 the whole of the land originally in dispute, including the northern part of it which is still in dispute, was admitted by the Appellant to appertain to the akhrabari. 4. I take it, then, that in the kabuliyat of 1897 the whole of the land originally in dispute, including the northern part of it which is still in dispute, was admitted by the Appellant to appertain to the akhrabari. 4. But the learned vakil who appears for the Appellant relies on the ruling of the Privy Council in Mylapur Iyasawmy Moodaliar v. Yeo Kay (1) as explained by this Court in Imam Ali v. Baij Nath (2) and contends, first, that there is here no admission of any liability to be evicted, and, secondly, that an acknowledgment such as this addressed to a stranger and, so far as appears, not communicated to the other side is not an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of the section. 5. Now these cases, no doubt, lend support to the learned vakil's contentions; but there are two very recent pronouncements of the Judicial Committee which are so distinct as to require neither supplement nor explanation, which were delivered after the decision of this Court above referred to, and which seem to me to dispose of the matter finally. Their Lordships' judgment in the case of Maniram Seth v. Seth Rupchand 10 C. W. N. 874 : s. c. I. L. R. 33 Cal 1047 (1906) now makes it clear that, if a person admits a right, it is a necessary implication that he also admits the legal consequences of that right; so that where, as here, a person admits that land, of which he is in possession at the time, is the property of another, he admits that he is liable to be made to restore it to that other. And the case of Majumdar Hiralal v. Desai Narsilal 17 C. W. N. 573 (1913) meets the remaining contention; for in the course of the argument both Mylapur Iyasawmy Moodaliar v. Yeo Kay I. L. R. 14 Cal. 801 (1887) and Imam Ali v. Baij Nath I. L. R. 33 Cal. 613 (1906) were cited and relied upon by the Appellants, and it is manifest from the remark which Lord Moulton is reported to have made, that the ratio decidendi was the absence from the Indian Acts of the words in the English statutes which restrict the acknowledgment of right contemplated by them to such as are made to the person entitled thereto or to his agent". "It is enough," observed his Lordship, that those words are not in the Indian statutes. You wish they were there . 6. It seems to me, therefore, to be now settled that an acknowledgment, to whomsoever made, if it be an acknowledgment pointing with reasonable certainty to the liability in dispute or the right out of which that liability arises as a legal consequence, is an " acknowledgment of liability " within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act of 1877 or the corresponding sec. 19 of the new Indian Limitation Act of 1908. Consequently I would dismiss this appeal with costs. Richardson, J. I agree.