JUDGMENT 1. We are clearly of opinion after perusing the whole of the evidence in this case that the learned Magistrate was justified in finding that it was extremely doubtful whether this was not a Civil case brought to put pressure on the acccused to recover the money. All the arguments that have been used on the evidence to show that there was dishonest conversion and that the story of loss is not true depended upon the evidence which was given before the learned Magistrate drew up the charge on the 3rd March, and had he then acquitted the accused merely upon his own statement we should have held that such acquittal was irregular and without jurisdiction and that there could only be an order of discharge, because if the evidence before the charge was not sufficient for conviction the learned Magistrate was bound to discharge him and not to acquit him. But we find that some very significant cross-examination of the principal witnesses took place after the charge, and that in this cross-examination it appears that certain statements made by the complainant are contradicted by Babu Bepin Behary Banerjee, that there was some kind of settlement proposed and the allegation that Jiban Mal did not reject the consignment of jute in question is rendered very doubtful by the admission of the complainant himself, that Jiban Mal's man was in Court and he was not prepared to examine him, and by the manjhi's clear statement that the day before or two days before Jiban Mal had actually declined to receive the jute from this firm on the ground that it was very inferior. This jute also appears from the manjhi's statement to have been inferior, for he says that the first firm to whom the accused went to offer it refused to take more than 12 bales, because it was full of water Now this cross-examination of the complainant and the manjhi and of Babu Bepin Behary may in our opinion have very properly affected the Magistrate's mind so as to induce him to have very grave doubts whether this case was not a case of civil nature brought for the purpose of bringing pressure on the accused to pay the money. In appeal from an acquittal we cannot interfere unless the judgment of the Court below is wrong and perverse, or without jurisdiction and based upon obvious errors in procedure. Nothing of the kind appears. The learned Magistrate has given his mind to the case, and even if he had been wrong his decision is one which we should be bound to uphold; because it would be based at the most on a doubtful weighing of facts and not on any irregularity or negligence, or other matter going to the jurisdiction or to the regularity of the trial. 2. For these reasons we must decline to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. The Appeal is dismissed.