Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 7, 1909) reversing. decree of the District Judge of Aligarh (March 24, 1908) which affirmed a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh (September 16, 1909). The sole question for determination in the appeal was whether the High Court was right in deciding that the appellants suit for redemption of a mortgage was barred by limitation. The facts were not in dispute and may be stated as follows. On January 2, 1842, one Dalip Singh and his co-sharers in Mauza Kheria Buzurg executed in favour of Khushwakt Rai a deed of usufructuary mortgage over the whole twenty biswas of the mauza and put him into possession of it. By the terms of this mortgage the mortgagee was authorized to receive and retain the rents and profits in lieu of interest, except Rs. 80 which he undertook to pay annually to the mortgagor as malikana. Prior to 1855 Khushwakt Rai, the mortgagee, died, leaving surviving him a widow and Musammat Jamna, who succeeded him, and a daughter, Musammat Janki. On March 31, 1866, Musammat Jamna executed a deed of sale transferring one half of the mortgagee rights to Debi Parshad and Gulab Rai, and another deed hypothecating to those persons the other half. She died in 1866 and was succeeded by her daughter Musammat Janki, who in 1867 executed a deed of sale of this latter half to the same persons. In the deeds of 1866 and 1867 Jamna and Janki described themselves as mortgagees of the property and recognized the existence of the mortgage. Under these deeds Debi Parshad and Gulab Rai became in 1867 mortgagees in possession of the whole mauza. Between 1880 and 1883 the mortgagors rights in respect of a 13 biswas 1% biswansis share were acquired by the mortgagees. Under various further transfers the mortgagee rights over this share and the mortgagor rights over the whole mauza passed to Munna Lal, the father of the appellant. For the period from 1883 to 1898 Munna Lal and the appellant, who succeeded him, enjoyed the whole of the rents and profits accruing from this share of the mauza, including the malikana payable to the mortgagor under the mortgage deed of 1842. The remaining 6 biswas 7J biswansis share was afterwards redeemed, and no question relating thereto arose in the litigation. The remaining 6 biswas 7J biswansis share was afterwards redeemed, and no question relating thereto arose in the litigation. Musammat Janki died in 1898 and was succeeded by her two sons (represented in this appeal by the respondents). In 1904 Musammat Jankis sons instituted a suit against the appellant to obtain possession as mortgagees of the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis share, on the ground that the transfers made by Musammat Jamna and by Musammat Janki were only effectual during their lives, and claiming possession as reversionary heirs of Khushwakt Kai. It did not appear from the decree in that suit (the only part of the record before the Judicial Committee) that the plaintiffs therein alleged that the mortgagor rights vested in Mannu Lal or in the appellant, though they did state that " the property .... is now owned and possessed by the defendant" (the present appellant). In this suit Jankis sons obtained a decree for " possession of a 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis share held in mortgage." The result of this decree was to 1898 the union of the mortgagor and mortgagee rights which had existed since 1883, and to place the appellant and the sons of Janki in the relative positions of mortgagor and mortgagees of the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis share of the mauza. On March 4, 1907, the appellant commenced the present suit against Jankis sons (now represented by the respondents) praying for a decree for redemption. The defendants pleaded that the suit being filed more than sixty years after the date of the mortgage was barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge of Aligarh held that the deeds of mortgage and sale executed by Musammat Jamna and Janki in 1866 and 1867 were acknowledgments of the mortgage, and he accordingly made a decree for redemption as prayed. This decision was affirmed by the District Judge. The High Court (Banerji and Tudball JJ.) allowed the present respondents appeal to that Court and dismissed the present appellants suit. The purport and effect of the judgment of the High Court appear from the judgment of their Lordships. Cave, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellant. There was between 1883 and 1898 a junction of the mortgagor and mortgagee rights in one person, the effect of which was that during that period the statute did not run. The purport and effect of the judgment of the High Court appear from the judgment of their Lordships. Cave, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellant. There was between 1883 and 1898 a junction of the mortgagor and mortgagee rights in one person, the effect of which was that during that period the statute did not run. There was during those years no person who could pay the principal money or the interest, or give or receive an acknowledgment of the mortgagors right Burrell v. Earl of Egremont (( 1843) 7 Beav. 205, at p. 235.); Seagram v. Knight. (( 1867) L. R. 2 Ch. 628.) It is true that s. 9 of the Limitation Act, 1877, provides that once the time has begun to run no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. This junction of the mortgagor and mortgagee interests was not a disability or inability within that section. If the period from 1883 to 1898 is left out, as it should be, the suit was brought within sixty years, the time provided by the Act. The High Court w7as wrong in holding that the deeds executed by Jamna and Janki in 1866 and 1867, which were admittedly sufficient in form, did not operate as acknowledgments under the Limitation Act, 1877, s. 19. A Hindu widow is not in the position of a tenant for life, but in that of an absolute owner with a restricted power of alienation. During her life she represents the estate Maynes Hindu Law and Usage, 6th ed., 1900, ch. xx., pars. 605, 625 ; Katama Nachier v. Rajah of Sivagunga. (( 1863) 9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539.) The widows acknowledgment is therefore binding upon the estate. In Bagwanta v. Sukhi(( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.), which was referred to in the judgment below, it was expressly stated that the position of a widow is on a different footing from that of other reversioners as she fully represents the estate. Further, the deeds of 1866 and 1867 were acknowledgments by persons " claiming under " the mortgagee, and were consequently good acknowledgments under the Limitation Act, 1859 (Act XIV. of 1859), s. 1, clause 15, which differs in language from the provision in the Limitation Act, 1877, s. 19. Further, the deeds of 1866 and 1867 were acknowledgments by persons " claiming under " the mortgagee, and were consequently good acknowledgments under the Limitation Act, 1859 (Act XIV. of 1859), s. 1, clause 15, which differs in language from the provision in the Limitation Act, 1877, s. 19. The appellant thereby acquired a new title or right to sue which was not affected by the latter Act, being preserved by s. 2 of that Act and by the General Clauses Act, 1868 (Act I. of 1868), s. 6. Lastly, in the suit brought by the respondents in 1904 they claimed possession of the estate as mortgagees and obtained a decree based upon their rights as mortgagees. That suit was brought more than sixty years after the date of the mortgage, and if the respondents present contention is right they could then have claimed the estate as absolute owners. They are accordingly estopped in the present suit from resisting the right to redeem by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13, Expl. II. The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought an March 4, 1907, by Lala Soni Ram, the appellant here, for the redemption of a mortgage which had been made on January 2, 1842, by the then owners of Mauza Kheria Buzurg in favour of Khushwakt Rai, who was on the making of the mortgage put in possession by the mortgagors. The mortgage was usufructuary, the profits (except Rs. 80 per annum) were to be taken by the mortgagee in lieu of interest, and the mortgagee was to pay to the mortgagors annually the Rs. 80 as malikana. By the mortgage it was provided that the mortgagors should be entitled to redeem and to obtain possession of the mortgaged property on payment of Rs. 4000, which was the amount advanced to them. No date for the redemption of the mortgage was specified, and consequently the mortgage became liable to be redeemed immediately after it was made. By the mortgage it was provided that the mortgagors should be entitled to redeem and to obtain possession of the mortgaged property on payment of Rs. 4000, which was the amount advanced to them. No date for the redemption of the mortgage was specified, and consequently the mortgage became liable to be redeemed immediately after it was made. The whole 20 bisws of Kheria Buzurg were included in the mortgage, but the original mortgagors or some of them redeemed the mortgage so far as it affected 6 biswas 17 1/2 biswansis of Kheria Buzurg, and this suit relates to the right to redeem the mortgage so far as it affects the remaining 18 biswas 2 ½ biswansis of the property which was mortgaged in 1842, if that right could at the date of the suit have been enforced by suit. In order to understand the issues which were raised and were tried in the Court of first instance, and on appeal below, it is necessary briefly to refer to the title of Lala Soni Ram, the plaintiff-appellant, as representing the original mortgagors, and to the title of the defendants-respondents as representing the original mortgagee Khushwakt Rai, and to refer to a suit which was brought on May 18, 1904, by the present defendant-respondent Babu Charan Behari Lal and his brother Lala Shib Shankar Lal against the present plaintiff-appellant, Lala Soni Ram. Lala Shib Shankar Lal was a defendant to this suit and is represented here by the respondents to this appeal. Between the years 1880 and 1883 Mannu Lal, since deceased, who was the father of the plaintiff-appellant, acquired the rights and interests of the original mortgagors in the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis of Kheria Buzurg to which this suit relates. These rights and interests so far as they can be enforced are now vested in the plaintiff-appellant, Lala Soni Ram. Khushwakt Rai, the original mortgagee, died shortly before 1855, leaving surviving him his widow, Musammat Jamna, who died on May 10, 1866, and a daughter Musammat Janki, who died on May 30, 1898. Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal, who were the plaintiffs in the suit of 1904, were the sons of Musammat Janki. Khushwakt Rai, the original mortgagee, died shortly before 1855, leaving surviving him his widow, Musammat Jamna, who died on May 10, 1866, and a daughter Musammat Janki, who died on May 30, 1898. Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal, who were the plaintiffs in the suit of 1904, were the sons of Musammat Janki. On March 31, 1866, Musammat Jamna, who had succeeded to a Hindu widows estate on the death of her husband Khushwakt Rai, executed a sale deed by which she transferred a moiety of her interest as mortgagee of Kheria Buzurg to Debi Parshad and Gulab Rai, and on the same date by deed hypothecated to them the other moiety of her interest as mortgagee. On April 29, 1867, Musammat Janki executed a sale deed in favour of Debi Parshad and Gulab Rai, by which she transferred to them her interest as mortgagee in the moiety of Kheria Buzurg which had been hypothecated to them by Musammat Jamna in 1866. The mortgagees interest in Kheria Buzurg which, by the sale deeds of 1806 and 1867, had vested for the lives of Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki in Debi Parshad and Gulab Rai, vested by assignments in or before 1883 in Mannu Lal, and from 1883 until Musammat Jankis death in 1898 Mannu Lal or his son, Lala Soni Ram, the plaintiff-appellant, who succeeded him, enjoyed the rights of the mortgagors and the mortgagee in the 13 biswas 2 ½ biswansis. In the deeds of March 81, 1866, Musammat Jamna had described herself as a mortgagee and had acknowledged the existence of the mortgage of 1842, and in the deed of April 29, 1867, Musammat Janki had similarly described herself as mortgagee and acknowledged the existence of the mortgage. Neither of those deeds is before this Board, but that is the inference which their Lordships draw from the proceedings and the judgments in the Courts below. After the death of Musammat Janki her sons, Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal, brought a suit on May 18, 1904, against Lala Soni Ram, the present plaintiff-appellant, to obtain possession as mortgagees of the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis of Kheria Buzurg on the ground that the transfers which were made in the lifetime of Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki became ineffectual as against them on the death of those ladies. In that suit Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal on October 12, 1904, obtained a decree for possession. So far as appears from that part of the record which is before this Board, Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal did not in the suit of 1904 allege or admit that the mortgagors interest had vested in Mannu or was vested in Lala Soni Ram, the present plaintiff-appellant; their case apparently simply was that the title to the mortgagees interest which had been transferred by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki had determined, so far as Lala Soni Ram was concerned, on the death of Musammat Janki, and that they became entitled as representing Khushwakt Rai, the mortgagee, on her death to possession as mortgagees. Their case was that, after the death of Musammat Janki, Lala Soni Ram was a trespasser, as in fact he was, and they claimed mesne profits. It does not appear that Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal alleged, or otherwise admitted, in the suit of 1904, that a right to redeem the mortgage of 1842, which could be enforced by suit, was vested in any one, nor was it material to their cause of action that a right to redeem which could be enforced by suit should be vested in any one. Their title to possession on the death of Musammat Janki, which was the title they claimed, related back to and was based on the mortgage of 1842 whether the right to enforce by suit redemption of that mortgage had or had not been extinguished before May 18, 1902, by limitation. The mortgage had not been redeemed and nothing had happened between the death of Musammat Janki and May 18, 1904, to disentitle Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal to a decree for possession based on that original title. As a matter of fact if Lali Soni Ram had desired on the death of Musammat Janki, in 1898, to redeem, he could have brought his suit within sixty years from the date of the mortgage, as the sixty years did not expire until January, 1902, but apparently he hoped, by holding on to the possession of the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis, to escape from having to pay the Rs. 4000 redemption money. 4000 redemption money. When the suit of 1904 was brought, the period of sixty years, computed from January 2, 1842, had expired. In this appeal, which is ex parte, the plaint and other pleadings in the suit of 1904 are not before their Lordships, but they draw the inference which they have expressed from the judgment of October 12, 1904, and from the judgments of the Courts below in this suit. The effect of the suit of 1904 was to give by process of law to Babu Charan Behari Lal and Lala Shib Shankar Lal the possession as mortgagees to which they had become entitled on the death of their mother Musammat Janki on May 30, 1898. Lala Soni Ram, the present plaintiff-appellant, on March 4, 1907, brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh this suit against Lala Shib Shankar Lal and Babu Charan Behari Lal for the redemption of the mortgage of January 2, 1842, so far as it affected the 13 biswas 2 1/2 biswansis of Kheria Buzurg. Other defendants were subsequently added. In their written statement Lala Shib Shankar Lal and Babu Charan Behari Lal admitted that the mortgage of January 2, 1842, was made, and so far as is now material pleaded that the suit was not brought within sixty years of the date of the mortgage, that no admission of the right of the mortgagor was made within sixty years from the date of the mortgage, and consequently that the suit was barred by limitation. They also alleged that in the suit of 1904 Lala Soni Ram had pleaded that he had a right to redeem, but that the Court in that suit had decreed their claim for possession, and they relied upon the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13. They further pleaded that in the suit of 1904 it had been decided that the deeds which had been executed by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki were not binding upon them the answering defendants after the deaths of those ladies. The Subordinate Judge held, and rightly as their Lordships consider, that the suit of 1904 did not by the operation of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13, bar the present suit. The suit of 1904 was a suit by Lala Shib Shankar Lal and Babu Charan Behari Lal for possession as mortgagees. The Subordinate Judge held, and rightly as their Lordships consider, that the suit of 1904 did not by the operation of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13, bar the present suit. The suit of 1904 was a suit by Lala Shib Shankar Lal and Babu Charan Behari Lal for possession as mortgagees. The mortgage had not been redeemed and the plea of Lala Soni Ram that he was entitled to redeem was irrelevant to a suit by the usufructuary mortgagee for possession. Lala Soni Lals title as mortgagor was not in question in that suit, nor could he as a defendant to that suit have converted that suit into one in which he could have obtained a decree for redemption. The Subordinate Judge, however, applying Act XIV. of 1859, s. 15, to the case, held that the acknowledgments of the existence of the mortgage by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki in their respective deeds brought this suit within time, and he gave the plaintiff a decree for redemption. The District Judge of Aligarh, on appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge, affirmed the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, and by his decree of March 24, 1908, dismissed the appeal. From the decree of the District Judge the defendants appealed to the High Court at Allahabad. The High Court, rightly holding that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding is the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding, unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary, held that Act XV. of 1877, and not Act XIV. of 1859, was the Limitation Act which was applicable to the suit. By Act XV. of 1877, s. 19, it is so far as is material for present purposes enacted as follows " If, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he claims title or liability, a new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability, shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." This is a suit to redeem, and the period prescribed by Act XV. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 148, within which a suit against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged is sixty years from the time when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. The learned judges of the High Court held that; there could not be any doubt that the mortgage of 1842 was in terms admitted by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki in their respective deeds, but they also held that the defendants derived title through their grandfather Khushwakt Rai, who was mortgagee and the last full owner of the rights of the mortgagee, and did not derive title through Musammat Jamna or Musammat Janki, who, although for certain purposes they did represent the estate, were not persons who could be deemed to have admitted for the benefit of the mortgagees estate a right of redemption in the mortgagor, and that in making such acknowledgments they had no power to bind any interests except their own. To have held otherwise would, in their Lordships opinion, have been to extend the power of a Hindu woman in possession for her limited interest to bind the estate to an extent which has not been sanctioned by authority. It was also contended in the High Court on behalf of the plaintiff that there had been a fusion of the interests of the mortgagee and the mortgagor in the same person between the years 1883 and 1898, and that no mortgage was in existence during that period; and that art. 120 and not art. 148 of Sched. II. of Act XV. of 1877 applied, and that the suit was within time. The learned judges of the High Court pointed out one obvious answer to that contention. It was that, if art. 120 applied, the suit was not within time, as Musammat Janki had died more than six years before the suit was brought. They also pointed out that the mortgagees interest which became vested in Mannu was only the limited interest of a Hindu lady, and consequently there had been no merger. The High Court, by its decree of August 7, 1909, allowed the appeal on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit with costs in all Courts. From that decree the plaintiff Lala Soni Ram has brought this appeal. The High Court, by its decree of August 7, 1909, allowed the appeal on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit with costs in all Courts. From that decree the plaintiff Lala Soni Ram has brought this appeal. In this appeal it has been contended that the Limitation Act applicable to this case is Act XIV. of 1859, and consequently the acknowledgments of the existence of the mortgage of 1842 which were contained in the deeds which were executed by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki brought this suit within time. As to that contention it is sufficient for their Lordships to say that they agree with the High Court that Act XIV. of 1859 does not apply to this suit and that the Limitation Act which does apply is Act XV. of 1877, and further that the acknowledgments which were made by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki were not acknowledgments within the meaning of s. 19 of Act XV. of 1877 made by a person or persons through whom the defendants derived title or liability. Their Lordships consequently consider that these acknowledgments were ineffectual to give a new period of limitation. The contention in this appeal which is based upon the General Clauses Act, 1868, s. 6, and the Limitation Act, 1877, s. 2, was pressed upon the High Court. Their Lordships agree with the High Court that an acknowledgment of liability only extends the period of limitation within which a suit must be brought and does not confer title, and is not a "thing done" within the meaning of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. In this appeal it was also contended that the operation of Act XV. of 1877 was suspended during the whole period 1883— 1898 when Mannu or his son Lala Soni Ram, the plaintiff, were in the position of mortgagors and mortgagees, the contention being that that period should be excluded from the computation of the sixty years provided by Act XV. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 148, as between 1883 and 1898 no suit for redemption could have been brought by Mannu or after his death by the plaintiff Lala Soni Ram. Their Lordships are by no means certain that this particular contention was raised in the High Court; the contention there apparently was, not that the operation of art. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 148, as between 1883 and 1898 no suit for redemption could have been brought by Mannu or after his death by the plaintiff Lala Soni Ram. Their Lordships are by no means certain that this particular contention was raised in the High Court; the contention there apparently was, not that the operation of art. 148 was suspended during the period 1883— 1898, but that by reason of the fusion of the interests of mortgagor and mortgagee art. 148 did not apply to this case and that the article which did apply was art. 120. In support of the contention in this appeal this Board was urged to apply in this suit the principle which Lord Langdale M.R. applied when construing s. 40 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, in Barrett v. Earl of Egremont. (7 Beav. 205.) Their Lordships are unable to accede to that contention, as art. 148 of Act XV, of 1877 is essentially different in its language and intention from s. 40 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and the facts upon which Lord Langdale acted were not in any way similar to the facts in this suit. Under s. 40 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, no suit could be brought to recover money secured on a mortgage or otherwise charged upon land, but within twenty years next after a present right to receive the same shall have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or a release of the same, unless in one or other of the events specified in the section. The sixty years period of limitation allowed by Act XV. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 148, begins to run in such a case as this " when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues." In Burr ell v. Earl of Egremont (7 Beav. 205.) there was a charge upon an estate which no assignable person was liable to pay and in respect of which no person was capable of making an acknowledgment that it was due. In this case the right to redeem the mortgage of January 2, 1842, accrued to the mortgagors the moment the mortgage was executed, and the sixty years period of limitation must be computed as having begun on January 3, 1842. There is nothing in Act XV. In this case the right to redeem the mortgage of January 2, 1842, accrued to the mortgagors the moment the mortgage was executed, and the sixty years period of limitation must be computed as having begun on January 3, 1842. There is nothing in Act XV. of 1877 which would justify this Board in holding that, once that period of limitation had begun to run in this case, it could be suspended. Their Lordships consider that if they were to hold that, by reason of the fusion of interests between 1883 and 1898, the period of limitation was suspended, they would—this not being a suit to which the proviso to s. 9 of Act XV. of 1877 applies—be deciding contrary to the express enactment of that section that " when once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it." At the hearing of this appeal two other contentions, each of which involved the consideration of facts and of law as applied to those facts, were raised. Neither of those contentions, so far as appears from the record which is before this Board, had previously been raised by any one at any stage of this suit either in the Court of first instance or on either of the appeals, and consequently had not been considered either by the Subordinate Judge, or the District Judge, or the learned judges of the High Court. Further, neither of these contentions is even suggested by any of the grounds of appeal which were set out in Lala Soni Rams application to the High Court for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, nor is either of them suggested in the reasons contained in the case for the appellant here, and it must be remembered that this appeal has been heard ex parte, neither the respondents nor any counsel on their behalf having appeared. Their Lordships are not disposed to depart from the established practice of this Board not to allow on appeals to His Majesty in Council new cases to be made which were not made below. The result is that their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed, and the decree of the High Court should be affirmed.