JUDGMENT 1. The only question arising in this Appeal is whether the Plaintiff's suit under sec. 77 of the Registration Act was barred by limitation. Under that section, the suit had to be instituted within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal. Taking the facts as stated by the learned District Judge, on 9th May 1908, the Plaintiff-Appellant applied for registration of a deed of sale, dated 2nd April 1908. There were a number of adjournments and, on 27th August 1908, the Subordinate Registrar recorded the order "I decline to give further adjournment; the case is struck off." On 18th September 1908, the Appellant appears to have applied to the Registrar for a review of that order and notice was issued to the Defendants. On 5th January 1909, the Registrar noted "the Respondent (i.e., the Defendant) does not object to the restoration of the case and files a written statement denying the execution of the deed." Evidence was accordingly taken on both sides and the Registrar decided in favor of the Defendants and, on 28th January 1909, passed the final order refusing to register the deed. This suit was instituted on 26th February 1909 admittedly within thirty days of the order of the 28th January 1909 but, of course, for more than thirty days after the order of 27th August 1908. Both the Courts have held that the order of 27th August 1908 was the order of refusal and have accordingly dismissed the Plaintiffs suit as barred by limitation. On the facts, we do not think that this decision was correct It is conceded by the learned pleader for the Defendants (and, indeed, his argument is based upon it) that the Registrar is not a Civil Court governed in all respects by the Rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. He is an executive officer and as such there is no rule of law so far as we know, to prevent him from reviving an application which may have been struck off his list by reason of the non-appearance or failure to prosecute of the applicant. This he appears in this case to have done and, what is more, when notice was issued to the Defendants, instead of raising any objection to such a course, the Defendants did not object. On the contrary they accepted the position and adduced evidence in Court. This he appears in this case to have done and, what is more, when notice was issued to the Defendants, instead of raising any objection to such a course, the Defendants did not object. On the contrary they accepted the position and adduced evidence in Court. We think, therefore, that the order of 27th August 1908 was not the order of refusal, but that the order of 28th January 1909 was the order of refusal in respect of which the Plaintiff was entitled to institute the suit in the Civil Court. 2. The Appeal must accordingly be allowed and the case remanded to the Court of first instance to determine the question of fact whether the deed was, in fact, executed by the Defendants or not. Costs of this Appeal will be costs in the case. We assess the hearing-fee at two gold mohurs. 3. The Appellant is entitled to a refund of the Court-fee in this Appeal.