JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal by the Plaintiffs in a suit for recovery of money due on a promissory note executed in their favour by their agent, Sri Chand Das, on the 30th July 1905. It is alleged that on that date, the accounts between the parties were settled and that a promissory note was executed for the sum due by the agent to the principals. Sri Chand Das died shortly, and on the 28th July 1908 the Plaintiffs commenced this action against his brothers, not only in their character as representatives in interest of their deceased agent but also as sureties inasmuch as they had made themselves liable under a surety bond executed by them on the 9th July 1911. They disputed the amount due and claimed that a substantial sum was payable by the Plaintiffs to their brother on account of salary. The Courts below have taken the accounts and made a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs for a smaller sum than what is mentioned in the promissory note. This decree has been assailed before us on behalf of the Plaintiffs substantially on three grounds: namely, first, that it was not competent to the Defendants to go behind the promissory note: secondly, that they could not plead a set off in a suit of this description: and, thirdly, that the claim for interest from the date of the suit, should have been allowed. In so far as the first ground is concerned, we are of opinion that the contention of the Appellants is wholly unfounded. No doubt, as between a principal and an agent, settled accounts will not be re-opened, unless fraud or undue influence is established, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Mr. kellar v. Wallace 5 M. I. A. 372 (1853) and by the House of Lords in Parkinson v. Hansbury L. R. 2 H. L. I (1867). This principle, however, is limited in its application as between a principal and an agent. If the principal seeks his remedy against the surety, he cannot successfully contend that the surety is bound by the admission of the principal debtor as to the sum due from him. It may be a matter for controversy whether, unless by a stipulation with the surety [Swan v. Bank of Scotland 10 Bligh. N. S. 627 (l836). If the principal seeks his remedy against the surety, he cannot successfully contend that the surety is bound by the admission of the principal debtor as to the sum due from him. It may be a matter for controversy whether, unless by a stipulation with the surety [Swan v. Bank of Scotland 10 Bligh. N. S. 627 (l836). an admission by the principal debtor is evidence against the surety [Abheyheir v. Sutcliffe [1890] L. R, 26 Ir. 332., and Lysaght v. Walker 5 Bligh. N. S. 1 (1831).but as was pointed out in the case of In re Young 17 Ch. D. 668 (1881). where the rule laid down in Douglass v. Howland 24 Wendell 35 was accepted as good law, a surety is not concluded even by a judgment or award against the principal: he is entitled to have the accounts taken in his presence. In the case before us, as the Plaintiffs have sued the Defendants not only in their character as representatives in interest of their agent but also as sureties, the latter were entitled to have the accounts examined in their presence: and the very fact that they have successfully contested the claim of the Plaintiffs fully justifies the course adopted by the Court. The first contention consequently fails. 2. In so far as the second ground is concerned, it has been argued that as the sums claimed by way of set off were not ascertained amounts, it was not competent to the Defendants to plead a set off. This conten ion is clearly unfounded. It was pointed out by this Court in the case of Bhagbat Panda v. Bamdeb Panda I L. R. 11 Cal. 557 (1885).that the provisions of the CPC (sec. III of Act XIV of 1882) do not take away from parties any right to set off, whether legal or equitable, which they would have independently of that Code: and that such right exists, not only in cases of mutual debts and credits, but also where cross demands arise out of the same transaction or are so connected in their nature and circumstances as to make it inequitable that the Plaintiffs should recover and the Defendants should be driven to a cross suit. The same principle had been previously recognized in the case of Clark v. Ratnavaloo Chetti 2 M. H. C. R. 296 (1864). The same principle had been previously recognized in the case of Clark v. Ratnavaloo Chetti 2 M. H. C. R. 296 (1864). and was subsequently adopted in the case of Chisholm v. Gopal Chander I. L. R. 16 Cal. 711 (1889). It has been argued, however, that the Respondents were not entitled to be allowed credit for arrears of salary due to their brother. There is plainly no substance in this contention. The Defendants have been sued as the representatives in interest of their deceased brother and every defence which was available to him would be equally available to them. The second contention consequently fails. 3. In so far as the third ground is concerned, we are of opinion that the Plaintiffs are entitled to interest by way of damages from the date of the institution of the suit and not merely from the date of the decree of the Court of first instance. This contention must consequently prevail. The result is that this Appeal is allowed in part, and the decree of the Court below modified only in respect of interest which will run not from the date of the decree of the first Court but from the date of the institution of the suit. As the Appeal has substantially failed, the Appellants must pay the Respondents their costs of this Court.