JUDGMENT : TUDBALL, J. This appeal arises out of a suit for sale brought on the basis of a mortgage deed, dated the 7th of January 1885. The property involved in the suit is a house. The bond is executed by one Jaijai Ram ostensibly in the name of one Dalip Singh. The plaintiff sued on this bond, on the allegation that Dalip was only a benami for him and that he was the true owner of it. Debi Das, one of the defendants, is a transferee of at least a one-fourth share in the mortgaged property, under a sale-deed executed in his favour by one Ram Prasad, the plaintiff's cousin. The sale-deed was signed by the plaintiff's father and brother as witnesses. We note here that Debi Das also claimed to be the owner of the remaining three-fourths share, having acquired it by means of another transaction, but we are not concerned with this fact in deciding this appeal. Debi Das defended the suit and among numerous defences there were the following two:—(i) that the plaintiff is not the true owner and that Dalip is not benamidar for him, and (2) that in the sale-deed executed by Ram Prasad there was an allegation to the effect that at that time the property was free from imcumbrance, that the plaintiffs father, brother and cousin assured him (Debi Das) that the property was unincumbered and relying on that assurance he took the property and paid his money, that at that time the plaintiff was a minor, living joint with his father's cousin and brother and that, therefore, he was estopped now from saying that the property was incumbered by reason of the misrepresentation to the opposite effect by the adult members of the family. The plaintiff's reply was that he was separate from his father and brother, that he was not a minor at the time, and that the bond was taken in the name of Dalip to prevent the plaintiff's brother from claiming a share in it. The court of first instance held that Dalip was not a benamidar for the plaintiff, i.e. the plaintiff was not the owner, and secondly, that the plaintiff was estopped as pleaded by Debi Das. Having decided these two points the court dismissed the suit. The court of first instance held that Dalip was not a benamidar for the plaintiff, i.e. the plaintiff was not the owner, and secondly, that the plaintiff was estopped as pleaded by Debi Das. Having decided these two points the court dismissed the suit. On appeal the court below has held that the plaintiff is the owner of the bond and that Dalip Singh was his benamidar. On the question of estoppel it has held that if the plaintiff was a minor at the time, there can be no estoppel against him and if he were a major at the time, the act of his relatives could not possibly estop him. On these findings the court below remanded the suit to the court of first instance for decision on the merits. 2. Debi Das comes here on second appeal raising certain grounds. In his memorandum of appeal, at the commencement of the hearing, the learned Advocate for the appellant wished to raise a question of law to the effect that the plaintiff being a minor at the time of the execution of the mortgage deed, the whole transaction was null and void This is a point which was not raised in either of the courts below, nor is it to be found in the memorandum of appeal to this court and we do not think it right to entertain it at this stage of the case. On the question as to whether the plaintiff is the owner of the deed or not we are bound by the finding of the court below on this question of fact. It is urged that the plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel from bringing the present suit, because if he was a minor at the time of the transfer to Debi Das, he was bound by the act of the other members of the family who were the adult members. In deciding this question it is necessary to keep clearly before one's mind that the lower court has held most distinctly that the bond, ostensibly in the name of Dalip Singh, was really in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is the owner of the deed. If the plaintiff is the owner of the deed, then it could not have been the property of the joint family, consisting of his father, brother and cousin, assuming that such a family existed. If the plaintiff is the owner of the deed, then it could not have been the property of the joint family, consisting of his father, brother and cousin, assuming that such a family existed. Assuming, therefore, that the father, brother and cousin made a false representation it is difficult to see how the bar of estoppel can operate against the plaintiff. It is urged that his father acted as a natural guardian and the minor would be bound by the act of the guardian. In the first place there is nothing to show that the father at the time he made the false representation was acting in his capacity as a natural guardian of the minor. In the next place it is doubtful whether the principle of estoppel can apply to the case of minor. Even granting that in certain circumstances it might operate as an estoppel, it is going much further to hold that the minor is bound by the act of the other persons. In the circumstances of the present case, it is impossible to hold that the representation on which Debi Das relies made by the father, brother and cousin is one which would close the plaintiff's mouth and prevent him from realizing the debt due to him. 3. The next point pressed is that in view of the fact that the first court came to the conclusion on the question of fact that Dalip Singh was not benamidar for the plaintiff, the suit was not dismissed on a preliminary point, and, therefore, the court should not have remanded it under Order 41, Rule 23, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion there is no force in this contention. Two points were decided and they were preliminary points, the merits of the case not having been touched. In our opinion the order of the court below is perfectly correct. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.