JUDGMENT : CHAMIER, J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent against the appellants under section 159 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The respondent is lambardar of a mahal which includes 50 bighas held by the appellants and he has paid to Government the revenue assessed upon those 50 bighas. The appellants' defence was that they are entitled to hold the land free of revenue under an agreement made in 1833. It appears that in 1833 one Debi Prasad, who was then owner of the zamindari, transferred the whole of it to one Dalganjan, except the 50 bighas which he retained for himself, it being agreed that Debi Prasad was to pay no revenue for the land and further that he was to receive Rs. 12 per annum from the transferee. Both the zamindari and the 50 bighas have passed through various hands and there has been a partition un der which part of the 50 bighas fell into one mahal and the zamindari into another mahal of which the respondent is lambardar. Respondent occupies the position of Dalganjan, as regards that portion of the 50 bighas which is his in the mahal. The question for decision is whether the agreement of 1833 is still in force between the parties to this suit. In a suit between the appellants and the lambardar of the other mahal it has been decided that the agreement is still binding as between the appellants and that lambardar and it is contended that that decision renders the question res judicata. It is obvious that the question is not res judicata in the present case, for the respondent was not a party to the case in which the decision was pronounced. Apart from the decision which is that of a subordinate court, it appears to me that the question is free from doubt. It is argued that the agreement of 1833 runs with the land and can be enforced for all time by the owner of any portion of the 50 bighas against the owners of the zamindari. Apart from the decision which is that of a subordinate court, it appears to me that the question is free from doubt. It is argued that the agreement of 1833 runs with the land and can be enforced for all time by the owner of any portion of the 50 bighas against the owners of the zamindari. At common law in cases other than those between landlord and tenant, which are treated differently, the right to take advantage of covenants made with the owner of the land to which they relate runs with the land in certain circumstances, but the burden of covenants made by the owner of land to which they relate does not run with the land at law. This seems to be the law in India under section 55(2) of the Transfer of Property Act which nowhere provides that the burden of a covenant shall run with the land except as between landlord and tenant (see sections 108 and 109). In equity a covenant is not said to run with the land. The equitable doctrine is that a person who takes with notice of a covenant is bound by it but this applies only to restrictive not to affirmative covenants, and this seems to be the law in India, see proviso to section 11 and section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. Here we have in effect a personal undertaking by a transferee of land that he will pay the revenue on certain other land and there is no stronger reason for holding that the undertaking is annexed to the land transferred than for treating it as annexed to any other land belonging to the transferee at the time of the transfer. It seems to me impossible to hold that the owners, however numerous they may be, of the land transferred in 1833, are for all time burdened with the liability to pay the revenue of the so bighas. The case is clearly distinguishable from that of Naubat Singh v. Narain Singh,[1907] 4 A.L.J.R., 867 where the agreement was one between a superior and an inferior proprietor and was held binding upon them. The case is clearly distinguishable from that of Naubat Singh v. Narain Singh,[1907] 4 A.L.J.R., 867 where the agreement was one between a superior and an inferior proprietor and was held binding upon them. Nor can the case be treated as if a revenue-free grant had been made by Dalganjan to Debi Prasad, which could be resumed by the latter or his representative and should be treated as being in force until resumed by proceedings taken under the Tenancy Act. The point has been decided more than once in Oudh. I am not aware of any decision oh the point in this Court but it seems clear to me that the appellants cannot treat the undertaking of Dalganjan made in 1833 as a covenant annexed to the zamindari and enforceable against the owners of it for all time. It is not suggested that the respondent is the heir of Dalganjan. The appeal is dismissed.