Judgement Consolidated Appeals, between the same parties, from three judgments and decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (dated as to the first March 19, 1909, and as to the second and third March 29, 1911), the first decree in part affirming and in part reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh, the second and third in part affirming and in part reversing a decree of the District Judge of Rae Bareli. Under circumstances appearing from the judgment two suits were commenced on August 10, 1907, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh. In the first suit (No. 548 of 1907) Sheopal Singh, Bhukhan Singh, and Mahabir Pershad (the respondent) were plaintiffs, and Basant Singh (the appellant), Binda Sewak Singh, and Ram Pershad were defendants. In the second suit (No. 549 of 1907) Bhopal Singh and Mahabir Pershad (the respondent) were plaintiffs, and Ram Pershad and others were defendants. Each suit was to recover possession with mesne profits of a certain share in five villages in the Partabgarh district and arose out of transactions by the managers of two Hindu joint families to which the villages belonged in unequal shares. On April 25, 1907, before either suit was commenced, the respondent Mahabir Pershad, who was joined as a plaintiff in both suits, had entered into two agreements with his joint plaintiffs in the respective suits. These agreements were in the same form, which is fully set out in the judgment, and provided shortly as follows — 1. 1. That in the share of each co-plaintiff "Mahabir Pershad will be co-sharer of one half share." 2. 2. (a) That Mahabir Pershad would bear the entire expense of the litigation. (b) " That in the event of success Mahabir Pershad will be entitled to proprietary possession of the share entered in clause (l.)." Save in so far as he had an interest under these agreements the respondent had no interest proprietary or otherwise in the property in suit. In each suit the defendants by their written statements pleaded, inter alia, that the respondent Mahabir Pershad had, under the agreement with his co-plaintiffs, no interest in the property, and issues were settled on this defence. In each suit the defendants by their written statements pleaded, inter alia, that the respondent Mahabir Pershad had, under the agreement with his co-plaintiffs, no interest in the property, and issues were settled on this defence. In suit No. 548, on April 22, 1908, there was filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 375, a compromise made between the defendant Basant Singh (the present appellant) and the plaintiffs other than Mahabir Pershad (the respondent) whereby those plaintiffs agreed that their claim in that action should be dismissed. Both suits were heard together on July 7, 13, and 18, and on July 22, 1908, the Subordinate Judge delivered separate judgments. In suit No. 548 he treated the matter as though the compromise (which was then disputed) had not been made ; he held that under the first clause of the agreement of April 25, 1907, the respondent had an existing interest in the property, but upon other grounds he dismissed the suit. In his judgment in suit No. 549 the Subordinate Judge did not deal with the position of the respondent under the agreement of April 25, 1907, but he dismissed the suit upon other grounds. The subsequent course of the litigation was as follows— Suit No. 548 Against the decree of the Subordinate Judge two only of the plaintiffs, namely, Sheopal Singh and the present respondent, appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Oudh. The learned Judicial Commissioner by his judgment delivered on March 19, 1909, held that the claim of Sheopal Singh was concluded by the compromise of April 22, 1908; he agreed with the judgment of the Subordinate Judge that under the agreement of April 25, 1907, Mahabir Pershad (the present respondent) acquired a present interest in the property, and as he decided the other questions raised in the appeal partly in accordance with the plaintiffs contentions, he made a decree in favour of Mahabir Pershad (the present respondent). This decree is the subject-matter of the first of the consolidated appeals. Suit No. 549 Against the decree of the Subordinate Judge the plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge of Rae Bareli, as the valuation of this suit was under Rs. 5000. This decree is the subject-matter of the first of the consolidated appeals. Suit No. 549 Against the decree of the Subordinate Judge the plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge of Rae Bareli, as the valuation of this suit was under Rs. 5000. The District Judge, following the decision of the Judicial Commissioner in suit No. 548, on May 12, 1909, remanded the suit to the Subordinate Judge, who on August 3, 1909, also following the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, made a decree partly in favour of the defendant and partly in favour of the plaintiffs, including the respondent. Against this decree both parties appealed to the District Judge at Rae Bareli. The plaintiff Bhopal Singh on October 8, 1909, entered into a deed of compromise with the defendant Basant Singh (the present appellant) under which Bhopal Singh agreed upon terms that his claim in that action and his appeal should be dismissed. Thus Mahabir Pershad (the respondent) was left to prosecute the appeal alone. The District Judge agreed with the Subordinate Judge and dismissed both appeals. Against this decree both parties appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Oudh. The appeals were referred to a Division Bench of two judges, who on March 29, 1911, delivered judgment therein and made two decrees, the one allowing the appeal of the present respondent and the other dismissing the appeal of the present appellant. These decrees were the subject-matter of the second and third of the present consolidated appeals. The present appellant did not in suit No. 549 in his grounds of appeal either to the District Judge or to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner raise any question as to the competency of the respondent to join in the suit or to continue it alone. The point was not alluded to in the judgment of the District Judge or in the judgments in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in this suit, and it was not raised by the appellant in either of his petitions to appeal to His. Majesty in Council. The appellant, however, in his printed case in the present appeals specifically stated as follows " The main questions for determination on the present appeals are whether the respondent alone was competent to carry on the litigation, and . . . Majesty in Council. The appellant, however, in his printed case in the present appeals specifically stated as follows " The main questions for determination on the present appeals are whether the respondent alone was competent to carry on the litigation, and . . . ." Among the reasons submitted in the appellants case were the following —" (1.) Because the respondents suit was a mere gambling in litigation, and he was not competent to carry it on after the withdrawal of the other plaintiffs..... (2.) Because the respondent is not entitled to possession of the property in suit or to any other relief." De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellant. Under the agreement of April 25, 1907, the respondent acquired no present interest in the property in suit. It was merely an agreement operative in the event of the suit succeeding. The respondent had under it no rights which entitled him either to join as a plaintiff or to continue the litigation after the other plaintiffs had compromised their claims. The decison in Lal Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Hussain Khan (( 1905) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 113.) is distinguishable, for it was held that the instrument in question in that case conferred a present interest in the property. Lowndes, for the respondent. By clause (1.) of the agreement a present interest is conveyed. The word " will " refers only to the getting of possession and does not mean that the proprietary right is intended to be in futuro. The judgment of the Sub ordinate Judge in suit No. 548, confirmed by the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, meant that by the proper construction of the agreement, which was n the vernacular, it conveyed a present interest. In any case the respondent was in the position of an equitable assignee -and was entitled in equity to be joined as a plaintiff and to continue the suits in the name of the other plaintiffs. Except by the original defences and at the hearing of the appeal in suit No. 548 in March, 1909, the appellant never raised the question until he presented his case in these appeals, and it is too late to raise it now. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKINSON. Except by the original defences and at the hearing of the appeal in suit No. 548 in March, 1909, the appellant never raised the question until he presented his case in these appeals, and it is too late to raise it now. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKINSON. These are three consolidated appeals from three decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, the first dated March 19, 1909, and the other two March 29, 1911. By the first of these, certain decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh, dated July 22, 1908, were in part affirmed and in part reversed, and by the two latter a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Rae Bareli, dated February 5, 1910, was also in part affirmed and in part reversed. By this decree of February 5, 1910, a previous decree of the same Subordinate Judge, dated August 3, 1909, was in part affirmed and in part reversed. The facts out of which all this litigation has arisen are shortly as follows—A certain estate in five villages in the Partabgarh district was owned by two joint Hindu families, the respective heads of which were two brothers Binda Sewak and Ram Pershad, the share of the said Binda Sewaks branch being 7 annas 2 pies and that of Ram Pershads branch 8 annas 10 pies. A genealogical table set out in the respondents case, the accuracy of which is not disputed, shews of what members these two families were composed — The persons whose names are printed in italics are plaintiffs in the two suits, numbered 548 and 549 of 1907, in which the decrees appealed from were respectively made, namely, Sheopal Singh and Chandra Bhukhan Singh in the first, and Bhopal Singh in the second. In each of these suits one Mahabir Pershad, not a member of either family, but claiming an interest in portions of the joint family property under certain agreements, was joined as a plaintiff. By two deeds, dated respectively January 2, 1900, and October 3, 1901, Binda Sewak purported to sell to Basant Singh (the appellant) his share of the joint family property. Thereupon Ram Pershad, as co-sharer in the family estate, instituted two pre-emption suits in respect of these two sales, and obtained decrees therein. By two deeds, dated respectively January 2, 1900, and October 3, 1901, Binda Sewak purported to sell to Basant Singh (the appellant) his share of the joint family property. Thereupon Ram Pershad, as co-sharer in the family estate, instituted two pre-emption suits in respect of these two sales, and obtained decrees therein. He subsequently, by deeds dated June 4, 1903, and August 3, 1903, respectively, purported to sell and convey to the same Basant Singh (the appellant) the share of the property the right to which he had thus acquired by pre-emption, together with all but a 6 annas share of his own share of the family property. In addition he5 by deed dated February 4, 1907, mortgaged this latter 6 annas share to the same Basant Singh to secure a sum of Rs. 12,000. The mortgage was a possessory mortgage for a period of twenty-five years. Sheopal Singh, Chandra Bhukhan Singh, and Bhopal Singh determined to impeach all these dealings with the joint family properties as being, on several grounds, void according to Hindu law, but they had no money to meet the cost of litigation. Two agreements, both dated-April 25, 1907, were accordingly entered into between them and Mahabir Pershad, the one by Sheopal Singh and Chandra Bhukhan Singh jointly and the other by Bhopal Singh. They are practically identical in terms. They provided that Mahabir Pershad should in each case finance the contemplated litigation on certain terms to be presently considered in detail. Two actions were accordingly instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh, the first on August 10, 1907, in which Sheopal Singh, Bhukhan Singh, and Mahabir Pershad were plaintiffs, and Basant Singh, Binda Sewak Singh, and Ram Pershad defendants, praying for “a decree for proprietary and actual possession of 4 annas 9 pies 6 2/3 karants under proprietary share " in five villages therein named and for Rs. l,704.14.9 33/36 mesne profits. In other words, it was an action of ejectment and for recovery of mesne rates. In the second suit Bhopal Singh and Mahabir Pershad were plaintiffs, and Basant Singh, Ram Pershad, and his grandsons Bijai Bahadur Singh and Raghubar Singh defendants. The relief claimed was similar, namely, to recover possession of one-sixth of the property conveyed away by Ram Pershad by the three deeds already mentioned. In the second suit Bhopal Singh and Mahabir Pershad were plaintiffs, and Basant Singh, Ram Pershad, and his grandsons Bijai Bahadur Singh and Raghubar Singh defendants. The relief claimed was similar, namely, to recover possession of one-sixth of the property conveyed away by Ram Pershad by the three deeds already mentioned. In both suits a plea was filed to the effect that Mahabir Pershad was not entitled to recover possession. That point was thus distinctly raised. Both suits were contested, and both heard together. The principal defendant in the first suit, by deed dated April 22, 1908, compromised with the two principal plaintiffs in that suit, namely, Sheopal Singh and Chandra Bhukhan. The deed provided, amongst other things, that the claim of these plaintiffs to recover the possession of the lands mentioned should be dismissed, and their claim for mesne profits rejected. This deed was filed in Court under s. 875 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and the suit was dismissed as against these plaintiffs. A similar compromise was entered into in the second suit with Bhopal Singh, and that suit was also dismissed as against him. Mahabir Pershad thus became the sole plaintiff in both suits. His claim to recover the possession of the shares of the property mentioned in them respectively thus rests entirely upon the agreements he so entered into with these plaintiffs. Even if all the impeached deeds were absolutely void he would not be entitled to the relief he claims unless these agreements conferred upon him a right to recover possession of the undivided shares of these villages of which he seeks to recover the possession. The agreements thus become the foundation of his title. Until their true construction and the nature of the rights they confer have been determined, it is irrelevant to consider the question of the validity or invalidity cf the deeds. The other is the preliminary question, and it has not only been raised, but actually ruled upon by the Subordinate Judge in his judgment delivered upon July 22, 1908. In the last paragraph but one of this he, when dealing with the seventh issue, said, " The suit, however, cannot fail altogether, as was contended by defendant 1. Plaintiff 3 has acquired an interest as to half the property." This seventh issue ran thus " To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? In the last paragraph but one of this he, when dealing with the seventh issue, said, " The suit, however, cannot fail altogether, as was contended by defendant 1. Plaintiff 3 has acquired an interest as to half the property." This seventh issue ran thus " To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? " Owing to the compromise that issue came to mean, to what relief is the third plaintiff, Mahabir Pershad, entitled ? And the last of the reasons stated in the appellants case lodged in these appeals is that the respondent, Mahabir Pershad, is " not entitled to possession of the property in suit or to any other relief." It may well be that this question, though it had been raised, was not discussed on the hearing of both the appeals before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, but since the point arises on the very face of the documents on which the plaintiffs case is founded, their Lordships think they are bound to decide it. It would be quite impossible for them to advise His Majesty to grant to a litigant relief to which they were of opinion he was not entitled, simply because those concerned for the parties in the cause abstained from discussing in the Court from which the appeal to His Majesty had been taken a vital point plainly appearing on the very face of his written proofs, and plainly raised as this point has been in this case. As the two agreements are practically identical in terms, it will be sufficient to consider one of them. It is elementary law that a plaintiff in an action of ejectment must recover by the strength of his own title, not by the weakness of his adversarys. What may be the rights or interests, if any, which the plaintiff may have under these agreements in the subject-matter of the suit are irrelevant considerations if he has not a right to the possession he seeks to recover. The primary question for decision, therefore, is, Did the agreement in the first action confer upon Mahabir Pershad at the time that action was instituted a then present right to that possession ? There is no suggestion that if he had not the right then he has since acquired it. The primary question for decision, therefore, is, Did the agreement in the first action confer upon Mahabir Pershad at the time that action was instituted a then present right to that possession ? There is no suggestion that if he had not the right then he has since acquired it. The provisions of the agreement setting forth the conditions upon which it was entered into, relevant on this point, run as follows " 1. That in the share of each declarant amounting to 2 annas 4 pies and 13 1/2 karant, Mahabir Pershad will be a co-sharer of one-half share, and the remaining one-half share will belong to us, the declarants, as follows Sheopal Singh. 2 annas 4 pies 13 1/3rd karant share. Chandra Bkukhan Singh. . 2 „ 4 „ 13 1/3rd „ “2. We, the declarants, and Mahabir Pershad, will be bound by the following conditions — “ (a) That Mahabir Pershad will bear the entire expenses in connection with the suit from the original Court to the Court of Appeal from his own pocket in the way he pleases, and if the opposite party prefer any appeal then Mahabir Pershad will have to defend the appeal also with his own costs. “ (b) That in case of success Mahabir Pershad will be entitled to proprietary possession of the share entered in para. 1 of this document or one-half of the share which may be decreed, and it will be at the pleasure of Mahabir Pershad either to keep his share joint or to have it partitioned. But during the period of jointness he will have all rights of making collections and management of the zemindari share decreed. (c) That Mahabir Pershad will remain a co-sharer and proprietor like ourselves in all the sir and khudkasht lands and all zemindari rights relating to the zemindari share like ourselves, and we will have no right to keep separate possession over any sir and khudkasht land, nor will we raise any plea as to exproprietary right." In the view of their Lordships these provisions did not confer upon Mahabir Pershad a then present right to the possession of any share in the property the subject-matter of the suit. That right would arise, if at all, only when success in the contemplated litigation had been achieved. Success has not been achieved. That right would arise, if at all, only when success in the contemplated litigation had been achieved. Success has not been achieved. By the agreement it was contracted that up to that time, at all events, he, Mahabir Pershad, should merely be a partner or co-owner with his co-plaintiffs in a certain undivided fraction of the property mentioned in the first of its paragraphs. There was no present grant or assignment to him of any separate share or fraction of the property divided or undivided. At best the contract only amounted to this, that in a certain future event he should become entitled to the proprietary possession of a certain undivided fraction of it, and then have the right to have that fraction partitioned.