Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (September 28, 1909) affirming a judgment and decree of the said Court in its original jurisdiction (September 2, 1908). In 1871 one Venkata Row, the senior member of a joint Hindu family, died leaving four sons, of whom the present respondents were the third and fourth, and a widow. In 1886 Athmaran Row, the son of Venkata Rows second son, instituted a suit against his father and uncles and Venkata Rows widow for partition of the joint family property. After the institution of the suit the present appellant Ganesha Row, the son of the respondent Rajaram Row, was born and was joined as a defendant, his father being appointed his guardian ad litem. After various intermediate proceedings, on October 21, 1896, a final decree in the suit was made by the High Court. By this decree the respondent Tuljaram Row was held liable in various sums to his co-sharers, and among others two sums amounting to about Rs. 50,000 were decreed as payable by him to the respondent Rajaram Row, and it was further held that the respondent Tuljaram Row was liable for larger sums of money on the footing of wilful default, and that the joint family were entitled to a moiety of the profits from 1881 of a printing business claimed by the respondent Tuljaram Row. Appeals against this decree were filed by both the present respondents and by Venkata Rows widow. On August 17, 1897, a. further decree was made by the High Court in the proceedings, whereby the respondent Tuljaram Row became liable for a further sum to his co-sharers, the share of Rajaram Row amounting to about Rs. 34,000. The respondent Tuljaram Row did not discharge the liabilities imposed upon him by these decrees, but entered into negotiations with the various members of the family for a settlement of their claims. 34,000. The respondent Tuljaram Row did not discharge the liabilities imposed upon him by these decrees, but entered into negotiations with the various members of the family for a settlement of their claims. By a written agreement between the respondent Tuljaram Row and the respondent Rajaram Row dated November 21, 1897, it was provided that Rajaram Row " acting for himself and for his minor son Venkata Row" (another name for the present appellant Ganesha Row) should " relinquish and disclaim for himself and as guardian for his minor son Venkata Row" all his rights against the respondent Tuljaram Row under the said decree and would release and discharge Tuljaram Row "from all liability in respect thereof to himself and to his minor son Venkata Row," and further that the respondent Rajaram Row should enter up satisfaction of the decrees. The consideration stated for this agreement was that the respondent Tuljaram Row should withdraw his appeal and should discharge the family liabilities set out in the original decree and indemnify Rajaram Row against the same. These liabilities amounted to Rs. 4174, of which the share of the respondent Rajaram Row and his son, the appellant, was Rs. 1044. Thereupon the appeals were withdrawn and satisfaction of the decrees entered up. No leave of the Court to these acts of the guardian ad litem were ever sought or obtained. In 1906 the present appellant attained his majority, and having repudiated the agreement of November 21, 1897, called upon the respondent Tuljaram Row to pay the sum for which he was liable under the decrees. On November 7, 1907, the appellant instituted the present suit against his uncle and father, the respective respondents. He alleged that the agreement had been entered into without consideration and in fraud of his interest and without the sanction of the Court, and he prayed for a decree against the respondent Tuljaram Row for the amount of the decrees with interest thereon. The first respondent Tuljaram Row by his written statement denied the mala fides alleged and contended that the compromise agreement was valid. The second respondent Rajaram Row did not appear. Issues were settled as to whether there was consideration for the agreement and whether the compromise and subsequent entering up of satisfaction were invalid as against the plaintiff by reason of ss. 461 and 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. The second respondent Rajaram Row did not appear. Issues were settled as to whether there was consideration for the agreement and whether the compromise and subsequent entering up of satisfaction were invalid as against the plaintiff by reason of ss. 461 and 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. Issues 6 and 7, referred to at the end of their Lordships judgment, were as follows 16 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover in any event more than a moiety of the amount sued for? 7. Is the plaintiff entitled to charge interest, and if so, at what rate ? " The judgment of the High Court in its original jurisdiction was delivered on September 2, 1908, dismissing the suit. The view taken by the learned judge appears from the passage from his judgment cited in the judgment of their Lordships. On appeal the High Court affirmed this decision, taking substantially the same view as that expressed in the judgment appealed from. The learned judges considered that the leave of the Court was not necessary, for although the respondent was not entitled to receive the decretal moneys as his separate property, he was the sole decree-holder, and as such was, in their opinion, entitled to execute the decree and to enter up satisfaction. De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellant. Under s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, the leave of the Court was necessary to validate the compromise agreement, and none the less so because the guardian was the appellants father. The view that the second respondent was acting not as guardian but as a defendant is contradicted by the language of the agreement. If he was not acting as guardian, then the appellant was not a party to the compromise. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the first respondent. The High Court were right in holding that upon the form of the decree, which was in favour of this respondent personally, the leave of the Court was not necessary. The decision in Virupakshappa v. Shidappa and Basappa (( 1901) I. L. R. 26 Bomb. 109.) is distinguishable on this ground. The only class of case intended to be covered by s. 462 is that in which the minor has an immediate interest in the subject-matter of the compromise. The decision in Virupakshappa v. Shidappa and Basappa (( 1901) I. L. R. 26 Bomb. 109.) is distinguishable on this ground. The only class of case intended to be covered by s. 462 is that in which the minor has an immediate interest in the subject-matter of the compromise. If the compromise is set aside and the infant remitted to his rights, then this respondent should also be remitted to his right to appeal which was abandoned under the agreement. De Gruyther, K,C, in reply, referred to Manohar Lal v. Jadu Nath Singh and Others (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 128.), as to the minors right to be remitted to his original position, and to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 562. The second respondent did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Madras, dated September 28, 1909, which, affirming a decree made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction on September 2, 1908, dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The facts which have given rise to the present action relate back to the year 1886. The defendants Tuljaram and Rajaram are two brothers, being the sons of one Venkata Row, who died in 1871. Tuljaram and Rajaram, with two other ons of Venkata Row named respectively Rama Chandra Row, since deceased, and Luchmana Row, formed a joint undivided Hindu family. In 1881 there was a dissolution of the joint family and a partial division of the family property. A large proportion of the assets was, however, left undivided in the hands and under the control of Tuljaram, the first defendant, who seems to have been the managing member of the family in respect at least of the business or businesses in Madras. In 1886 a suit was brought on the original side of the High Court of Madras by Athmaran, the son of Luchmana Row, against Tuljaram for ascertainment of the remaining undivided family assets in his hands, for accounts and partition and other relief. This seems shortly to have been the general scope of the action instituted in 1886, in which Rajaram, the present plaintiffs father, and other surviving members of Venkata Rows family were parties. This seems shortly to have been the general scope of the action instituted in 1886, in which Rajaram, the present plaintiffs father, and other surviving members of Venkata Rows family were parties. The plaintiff in the present suit, Ganesha Row, who was not born at the time of the institution of the suit, was added as defendant on his birth in December, 1887, and by an order dated November 20, 1888, his father Rajaram was appointed his guardian ad litem. On January 14, 1892, a preliminary decree was made declaring the rights of the parties and directing accounts against Tuljaram. By the final decree made on October 21, 1896, and a sub sequent order of August 17, 1897, he was declared accountable to the family for a considerable sum of money, the share of the plaintiffs branch in the total sum being, according to the High Court, about Rs. 86,000. Tuljaram appears to have filed an appeal from the final decree of the first Court, and during its pendency he entered into agreements with the adult parties to the suit by which they either abandoned their claims, as in the case of the plaintiffs father, or compromised them for smaller sums. Rajarams agreement, which is dated November 21, 1897, recites that he " acting for himself and as guardian for his minor son Venkata Row" (another name for the plaintiff) " with a view to terminate the litigation that had-been going on in the family for the past eleven years and more, and to make an amicable settlement of all matters in dispute between the several members of the family," and in consideration of the defendant Tuljaram consenting to withdraw his appeal, Rajaram agreed to 11 relinquish and disclaim for himself and for his minor son Venkata Row " the several sums of money for which Tuljaram was found liable to Rajarams branch, and " to release and discharge Tuljaram from all liability in respect thereof to himself and to his minor son Venkata Row." And on November 25, 1897, Rajaram instructed the registrar of the High Court " to enter up satisfaction of the decree " in respect of the several sums which amounted in the aggregate to something like Rs. 86,000. Tuljaram also on his side withdrew the appeal he had preferred against the decree. 86,000. Tuljaram also on his side withdrew the appeal he had preferred against the decree. Admittedly no leave was either applied for or obtained from the Court in regard either to the agreement or the entering up of satisfaction of the decree. Matters remained in this condition until the plaintiff attained his majority. After some preliminary proceedings to which it is unnecessary to refer for the purposes of this judgment, he brought this suit on November 7, 1906, to recover from the defendant Tuljaram on the basis of the decrees in the suit of 1886 a sum of Rs. 160,000 principal and interest. Rajaram was also made a defendant in this action, and his acts relating to the agreement and the satisfaction entered under it were challenged as fraudulent, without consideration, and not binding on the plaintiff, having been made without leave of the Court. The learned judge on the original side of the High Court who tried the case was of opinion that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Treating it, however, as an application under that section, he dealt with the matter on its merits. He held that the compromise entered into by Rajaram was binding on the plaintiff, and that it was supported by consideration which consisted in the withdrawal by Tuljaram of his appeal. The principal ground of his judgment is to be found in the following passage — " In this case under the terms of the decree the money in respect of which the agreement was arrived at and satisfaction entered up was made payable to the third defendant personally and not to the minor sixth defendant. If the minor had been represented by another guardian ad litem the third defendant could just as well have made the compromise and entered up satisfaction of the amount payable to him under the decree and it could not have been suggested that s. 462 was applicable to the case. If the minor had been represented by another guardian ad litem the third defendant could just as well have made the compromise and entered up satisfaction of the amount payable to him under the decree and it could not have been suggested that s. 462 was applicable to the case. It makes no difference in my opinion that the third defendant happened to be the guardian ad litem of the sixth defendant because in making the compromise and entering up satisfaction he was not acting as guardian ad litem on behalf of the minor sixth defendant but as the third defendant in the suit." The learned judge accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs suit, and his judgment has been affirmed on appeal by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the invalidity of Rajarams acts as affecting the plaintiffs rights, the learned judges in the Appellate Court have taken the same view as the first Court, that Rajaram, in entering into the compromise, acted in his personal capacity, which they considered him competent to do as "his appointment as guardian ad litem would not deprive him of his capacity to act on his own behalf." They were further of opinion that " as the money was made payable to him only as the representative of the family of which he is the head, the compromise he entered into will be binding on the other members, including the plaintiff, only if it is a bona fide compromise of a disputed claim." It seems to their Lordships that there is a fallacy underlying the reasoning on which the Courts below have proceeded. No doubt a father or managing member of a joint Hindu family may, under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, enter into agreements which may be binding on the minor members of the family. But where a minor is party to a suit and a next friend or guardian has been appointed to look after the rights and interests of the infant in and concerning the suit, the acts of such next friend or guardian are subject to the control of the Court. Sect. But where a minor is party to a suit and a next friend or guardian has been appointed to look after the rights and interests of the infant in and concerning the suit, the acts of such next friend or guardian are subject to the control of the Court. Sect. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, expressly provides that " No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor, with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian." The Courts in India seem to think that because Rajaram was a party to the suit of 1886 and was also guardian ad litem for his minor son, who was a member of the joint family whom Rajaram was representing, it was open to him to enter into the compromise in his personal capacity, and as it was a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim, it became binding on the minor by virtue of his having acted as the managing member of the family. How far the acts of a father or managing member may affect a minor, who is a party to the suit represented by another person as next friend or guardian ad litem, is a question which does not arise in the case, and their Lordships are not called upon to express an opinion on it. But they consider it to be clear that when he himself is the next friend or guardian of the minor his powers are controlled by the provisions of the law and he cannot do any act in his capacity of father or managing member which he is debarred from doing as next friend or guardian without leave of the Court. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the object of the enactment. The learned judges, however, seem to have lost sight of the fact that the agreement which is challenged in this case was entered into by Rajaram not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of his minor son, for whom he was guardian in the suit. Their Lordships are of opinion that, in view of the provisions of s. 462, he had no authority to enter into any compromise or agreement purporting to bind the minor. Their Lordships are of opinion that, in view of the provisions of s. 462, he had no authority to enter into any compromise or agreement purporting to bind the minor. In their Lordships judgment the fact that the moneys were made payable to Rajaram, who was admittedly representing his branch of the family, makes no difference in the duty which lay on him to obtain the leave of the Court to an agreement which was clearly intended to affect the rights and interests of his son. Their Lordships are of opinion that there should be a declaration in this case that the agreement of November 21, 1897, and the satisfaction entered thereunder are not binding on the plaintiff and that he is remitted to his original rights under the decrees in the suit of 1886. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the decree and judgment of the High Court should be set aside, that a declaration should be made in the terms stated, and that the case should be returned to the High Court to deal with the other questions covered by issues Nos. 6 and 7 arising between the parties. The respondent Tuljaram will pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction and the costs of this appeal. The costs of the trial on the original side of the High Court, and those which will be incurred in the future proceedings will abide the result of those proceedings.