JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff, a minor, sued for confirmation of possession, and in the alternative for recovery of possession of 30 and odd bighas of khas land on a declaration that the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1 in a suit for rent, in respect of the said lands, and the proceeding in execution whereof the lands were sold and purchased by the Defendant No. 1 (which were subsequently settled by him with the Defendant No. 2) were fraudulent and inoperative against him. The Court of first instance found that the amlas of the Defendant No. 1 kept the Plaintiff, who was the Defendant in the rent-suit, and his mother in complete ignorance of the suit, that the written statement said to have been filed on his behalf in the said suit by his mother had not been filed by her, and that the rent-decree which was tainted by fraud and the sale held in execution thereof were invalid. It held, however, that the Plaintiff was out of possession since the Defendant No. 1 obtained delivery of possession on purchasing the lands, and accordingly gave a decree for possession of the same. 2. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the Plaintiff having been dispossessed on the 30th April 1904 when the delivery of possession was effected and the suit having been brought on the 13th July 1908, the suit was barred by the special limitation of 2 years under Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and, on the merits, holding that there was nothing to justify a finding that deliberate fraud had been committed, set aside the decree of the Munsif and dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff has appealed to this Court. 3. The first point to be determined is whether the special limitation provided in the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to the suit, for if it does not apply, the suit will not be barred apart from any other consideration, as the Plaintiff is still a minor. The Munsif found that the Plaintiff was dispossessed by the dakhaldehani and that finding has been accepted by the learned District Judge. The question, therefore, is whether the dakhaldehani (delivery of possession) to the Defendant No. 1 by which the Plaintiff was put out of possession, constitutes dispossession by the landlord. We are of opinion that it does not, and for two reasons. The question, therefore, is whether the dakhaldehani (delivery of possession) to the Defendant No. 1 by which the Plaintiff was put out of possession, constitutes dispossession by the landlord. We are of opinion that it does not, and for two reasons. The first is, that although the Defendant No. I is the landlord, he obtained possession not as a landlord but as a purchaser at a sale held in execution of a decree. It has been held in several cases in this Court that the special limitation does not apply to a case where an occupancy raiyat is dispossessed from his holding by his landlord, not acting as landlord but in his character as auction-purchaser. See Abhoy Churn Mukerjee v. Sheikh Tilu 2 C. W.N. 175 (1897), Brojo Kishore v. Saraswati 6 C. W. N. 333 (1901) and Mahomed Khalil v. Hirendra Nath 5 C. L. J. 650 (1906). 4. It is true in those cases, the purchaser was a co-sharer landlord and not the sole landlord, but we think that makes no difference in principle. The special limitation is as much applicable to a dispossession by a co-sharer landlord, as to dispossession by a sole landlord or entire body of landlords. See Annada Sundari v. Kebul Ram 7 C. W. N. 542 (1903) The reason of decision of the three cases cited above is that the landlord takes possession in a capacity different from that of the landlord and that reason applies as much to a purchase by a sole landlord or the entire body of landlords as to a purchase by a co-sharer landlord. The possession is delivered to the landlord (whether he is a sole landlord or a co sharer landlord), not as a landlord but as a purchaser. 5. Secondly, we are of opinion, that the dispossession effected by the act of delivery of possession by the Court is not 'dispossession' by the landlord within the meaning of Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The landlord (as purchaser) no doubt, moves the Court to deliver possession and possession is delivered to him at his instance, but he gets possession through the intervention of the Court. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The landlord (as purchaser) no doubt, moves the Court to deliver possession and possession is delivered to him at his instance, but he gets possession through the intervention of the Court. The delivery of possession by which the dispossession is effected is an act of the Court and when the landlord gets into possession by a process of the Court, we do not think it is an act of dispossession by the landlord within the meaning of the article, which contemplates a dispossession by the landlord by taking the law into his own hands and otherwise than in due course of law. 6. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Respondents on the case of Aminuddin v. Ulfatunnessa Bibi 9 C. L. J, 131 (1908). There the purchaser at a sale in execution of a landlord's decree for rent dispossessed the Plaintiffs who were some of the heirs of the tenant and who had not been made parties to the rent-suit. In that case, it was found that the dispossession was made by the landlord through the contesting Defend- ant (the purchaser) who acted in collusion with him in dispossessing the Plaintiffs. If the actual dispossession was made by the purchaser subsequent to the delivery of possession by the Court, in collusion with the landlord, then the case might fall within the principle of the cases where it has been held that a dispossession by a person in collusion with, or under a settlement from, the landlord is virtually dispossession by the landlord and that therefore the special limitation applies to such cases. The learned Judges, however, in the course of the judgment said, "It is clear that when the landlord sold the holding, he impliedly undertook to recognise the purchaser as his tenant and to make settlement with him. In pursuance of that implied offer, the contesting Defendant purchased the land and took possession of the same and has now been recognised by the landlord as his tenant If there had been no such implied offer and agreement to recognise him as a tenant he would never have purchased that and. In these circumstances, we think that the landlord and the contesting Defendant must be held to be acting in collusion in the act of dispossessing the Plaintiffs and it is not the new tenant who alone dispossessed him. In these circumstances, we think that the landlord and the contesting Defendant must be held to be acting in collusion in the act of dispossessing the Plaintiffs and it is not the new tenant who alone dispossessed him. For this reason, we think that the rule of limitation is two years under Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act." 7. If the only act of dispossession by the purchaser was the act of taking possession by process of Court then the decision is opposed to the rulings we have cited above in which it was clearly laid down that the special limitation dots not apply where the dispossession is by the landlord not in his capacity as landlord but in his capacity as auction-purchaser. If the special limitation does not apply where the landlord is himself the purchaser, much less will it apply when the purchaser is a third person, even if he may be said to be in collusion with the landlord, by the mere fact of purchasing at the sale. None of the said rulings are referred to in the said judgment, and the principle of the said rulings does not appear to have been considered in the case. We, therefore, respectfully dissent from the view taken in that case and follow the principle of the decisions to which we have referred. We accordingly hold that the special limitation of two years prescribed by Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to the present case and as the Plaintiff is still a minor, the suit is not barred by limitation. We are also of opinion that the learned District Judge has not arrived at proper findings on the merits of the case. This was probably because the learned Judge thought the question of limitation was fatal to the case. At the outset, the learned Judge is in error in stating that the Munsif had laid the onus too heavily on the Appellant (Defendant), but the Munsif relied on the evidence for the Plaintiff and the circumstances of the case, and does not appear to have placed the onus upon the Defendants. Then the Judge says that the onus which lay upon the Plaintiff has not been discharged by the mere deposition of his mother. Then the Judge says that the onus which lay upon the Plaintiff has not been discharged by the mere deposition of his mother. Her mere deposition might not be sufficient, but the Munsif relied upon other facts and circumstances as well which have not been considered at all by the Appellate Court. Lastly, the learned Judge has not arrived at a positive finding that the written statement was not filed by the Plaintiffs mother or that the decree was not obtained by fraud or that the proceedings in execution thereof were not invalid-matters upon which the Munsif came to clear findings in favour of the Plaintiff. We think the case has not been properly tried on the merits by the lower Appellate Court, and that the case must go back to that Court. The decree of the lower Appellate Court is accordingly set aside and the case is remanded to that Court for a rehearing of the appeal on the merits and for disposal according to law. Costs to abide the result.